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F 0 R E VI~ R D. 
AL""ter much consideration, this thesis was given the title "Aspects 
of Transport Rationalisation in South-West England". As a native Devonian, 
the author tenders no apologies for his definition of South-West England 
in these pages. The personal decision to restrict the scope of this study 
to Devon and Cornwall only is supported by strong geographical factors, for 
the peninsula forming the two counties is distinctly different to the 
remainder of the conventially··accepted notion of' the South-West Region. 
Counties to the east of Devonshire, i.e. Dorset, Somerset, Wiltshire and 
Gloucestershire, are orientated towards London and Bristol, whereas 
Devonshire and Cornwall are geographically and economically introspective. 
The first Report of the South-West Economic Plaiming Council, "A Region 
with a Future" (H.M.S.O.), published as this foreward was being written, 
clearly defines the variations between the prosperous east and the declining 
west of the Economic Planning Region. The f'act that Devon and Cornwall have 
economic difficulties gives emphasis to the problems of transport in the two 
counties. 
The author has been a railway enthusiast all his life, and the decision 
to write this thesis was prompted by the Beaching railway proposals of 1963. 
During the post-war years a considerable change has taken place in the 
transport structure in Devon and Cornwall and the author has grown up during 
the same time. The advance of private car ownership in particular has 
affected the whole pattern of' life in the peninsula. Thus, in recent years, 
public transport undertakings have been compelled to reduce their sphere of 
operations. 
.. (JY) .. 
Rationalisation is a much-maligned term. To the layman it is 
synonymous with closure. In ~act, rationalisation in the language o~ 
economics implies the elimination o~ waste by the re~ormation o~ an 
industry. Where transport is concerned, rationalisation does entail the 
contraction o~ routes as an essential measure to ensure that the remainder 
o~ the system operates pro~itably and e~~iciently. In principle, closures 
o~ routes are discharged only where necessary. Adverse public reaction to 
this aspect o~ rationalisation, however, has obscured the other objects o~ 
the public transport undertakings to provide a pro~itable network. 
This thesis then does not concern closures alone. The aim is to study 
the immediate effects of transport rationalisation on the socio-economic 
structure o~ the South-West. In many ways research into the problem has 
been a most ~rustrating task as the rationalisation process is by no means 
complete. Long-term e~~ects cannot be gauged with any degree o~ accuracy, 
but that is not within the scope o~ this report, which is an analysis o~ 
recent events witnessed by the author. 
Meanwhile, the transport revolution continues and at the time of 
writing a number o~ Transport 'fuite Papers are ~~ticipated, plus a new 
Transport Act. A change o~ government transport policy based on social 
~actors is indicated as the struggle to achieve pro~itability falters. In 
view o~ these ~orthcoming changes, this would.seem to be a most opportune 
time at which to end this thesis, ~or basically it is an account of the 
struggle of transport undertakings to achieve a pro~it in a changing economic 
environment. Under the new measures, it is likely that publicly owned 
transport wvill not be charged with the burden of pro~itability. A new 
chapter in the story of transport in the South-West is about to begin, in 
_( v,i.} 
which public transport may at last provide a public service. 
G.A. Griffiths, 
Honicknowle, 
Plymouth. 
July, 1967. 
NOTES IN THE TEXT. 
i).-Capital letters(!· thus) refer to footnotes. 
ii). Numerals( ~thus) refer to references which are listed at the 
end of each chapter. 
(Vii) 
CH.API'ER ONE 
INTRODUC'l'ION. 
a). The Ph.vsical Background 
The physical constitution of the South-West has presented 
great difficulties in the develop~nt of the transport system. Devon and 
Cornwall form a peninsula over 150 miles long, and varying in width 
from twenty to seventy miles, most of which is in Highland Britain, 
west of tm Tees-Exe line. Thus the sedililentary rocks of the peninsula 
are mostly older than the coal-bearing strata of the Carboniferous 
series.! Basically, the structure of the two counties is that of a 
compound syncline, formed by the Armorican folding of Permo-Carboniferous 
times. The centre of this syncline is marked by the Culm Measures, 
the resistant and upstanding series of shales ·and grits in North and Mid-
Devon and North East Cornwall. To the North and South of the syncl:L.'"lal 
centre are Devonian rocks, (Shales, slates, limestones, and sandstone); 
whilst in the extreme South are highly altered representatives of 
Ordovician and Silurian age, with Cambrian rocks· in the Lizard and Bolt 
Head areas. The youngest· sedimentary rocks in the peninsula are in 
E~t Devon - the famous Permian Red Sandstone and earlier rocks 9 
Into the syncline in Permo-carboniferous ·times,· were injected huge 
masses. of granite, which metamorphosai the surrounding rocks, injecting 
them with quartz veins - sometimes bearing ores of tin,copper and 
radium. These granitic uplands •• • .Dartmoor, Bodmin Moor, Hensbarrow, 
Carnmenellis, Lands End, and the Scillies •••• are the highest parts of 
Devon and Cornwall. 
Topography· in the peninsula is very strongly marked)!. 
Apart from the physical variety, there is a heavy rainfall, causing a 
prolific drainage system with many river valleys. The topography 
is complicated because there have been sever~l changes in the level 
of the land in relation to that of the sea, also chan~s in sea level, 
A For geol., see Map 7 ,Pp. 8/9 
B " top n " 2 n..... ... /4 
.. , t.c-p._:> 
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sea level,/ 
the most important or which were associated with the end of the Ice 
Age. This has resulted in several distinct morphological features:-
(a) Erosion Surfaces ••••• mainly at 400 feet, 800 feet, 
and 1,000 feet, with some at 200 and 300 feet in West 
Cornwall and the Lizard. 
(b) Raised Beaches. 
(c) Rias, submerged river valleys on the South Coast, which 
are a serious barrier to land communications, though 
providing excellent harbours. 
(d) Deep river valleys. 
The intricate river pattern and the hilly topography have 
c~used numerous problems in the development of land transport. Most 
of the main rivers flow towards the South Coast, against the main 
direction of traffic flow. Due to the comparatively recent rejuvenation 
of the river system, there are few expansive stretches of lowland which 
can be used by main routes. In the West, both the railways and the 
main roads have been forced inland by the rias of the Channel Coast. 
~be superposition of the drainage pattern across the lines of communication 
was one of the contributor,y factors to the strong maritime tradition of 
most large coastal settlements in the region. 
With the exception of Bar.nstaple/Bideford, the main develop-
ment of coastal settlements was along the south coast, with its sheltered 
bays and rias. In colllttrast to the submergent coast line of the south, 
the north displays emergent features, with formidable cliffs and short 
streams plunging int_o the sea. For this reason, the north has few 
po~s or deep-water anchor~s, and it has alw~ys been at a disadvantage 
to the south. The hinterlands of the south coast ports have benefited 
until modern times by the availability of sea transport. For instance, 
the accessibility of the seaboard in South Co~wall aided the development 
of the metalliferous mining and china clay working in. the e igb.teenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 
·-3-
b). Climate 
The South-West has warm summers, mild winters, with rain all 
. 0 
the year rotm.d. _Mean January temperatures are well over 40 F, and 
July means are just over 60°F. · Rainfall averages increase towards the 
West from about 35-4.0 inches. Dartmoor and the other moorlands are 
much wetter than this, however, and~ thus negative areas for the 
development of settlement and transport. The general mildness of the 
climate has aided the development of transport as it is a cause of the 
heavy traffic in horticultural produce, and a contributory factor to 
the attraction of the area to holiday-makers. ±n addition, the chaos 
caused by fog, ice and snow, is rare except on the high moors. 
c). Settlement 
The earliest settlements in the region were in the upland 
areas away from the inhospitable forests of the lowlands. There 
was a mass movement of liJiegali thic peoples into Cornwall, which was 
colonised extendvely by settlers from Brittany up to the Bronze Age. 
· The foundatio:J;lS of the present rural settlement pattern, however, were 
laid by the Saxons who were responsible for the agricultural colonisation 
of the rich lands in South Devon, South-East of a line between Tiverton ·· 
and Tavistock~ The settlements of this area are typically Saxon, 
small and compact, built around· the iocal church. But the smallest 
settlements of all are those of Celtic origin in Cornwall, where 
they were often associated with tin-streaming in addition to farming. 
Here the churches are usually later additions to the community, and 
frequently stand apart from it. By the Dark Ages, the South-West had 
a fairly dense rural population in certain areas, but there were 
few towns, except Exeter, Totnes, Izy-d'ford and Barnstaple: the present 
urban pattern dates from:nediaeval times. 
In the Middle Ages, there was a fresh colonisation and 
enclosure of farming land, and much of the presentrural settlement 
pattern was established. Market towns were built at intervals of 
8 - 10 miles, so that it was easy to drive cattle to them in one day. 
-4-
Many of the inland market towns became associated with mining, woollens, 
and other textile illdustries. Good examples of' the prospering market 
towns were the Stannary towns of Devon •••• Ashburtpn, Chagford, Tavistock 
and Plympton •••• where the Government taxed the miners of Dartmoor. 
Totnes and Tiverton developed woollen industries and Boniton was famous 
for it.s lace. Between the market towns, there was considerable 
trade, and a network of inter-town roads and trackways was evolved. 
The leading settlements, however, were also seaports, for 
these were not only centres of internal trade'· but also commercial 
links with the outside world at home and abroad. Plymouth, Dartmouth, 
Bideford, and Falmouth were among the premier ports of the realm during 
the late mediaeval period. Along the coasts numerous fishing villages 
also dave loped. 
of the.region. 
In this period was formed the great maritime tradition 
In the eighteenth centucy, with the advent of the Industrial 
Revolution and the concentration of manufacturing industry on the coal-
fields of the Midlands and North of England, the traditional industries 
of the South-West began to decline. ~'he inland market towns lost 
their main sources of prosperity. Rural areas began to decline in 
population and importance and the holiday industry started to emerge, 
first of all in Devon. ]n Cor~wall," however, therewas a revolution in 
the fieli of ~talliferous mining, where improvements in engineering 
and technique made deep-mining possible, just ·as the alluvial deposits 
were declining. Such developments led to a hoom in the mining of copper 
(with a peak from l830-18p0) and lode tin (peak period 1865-1892). 
This increased mining activity had a profound effect on the distribution 
of settlement and population in Cornwall and in parts of West Devon. 
The main mining areas •••• Tavistock/Callington; Carnmenellis; and Land's 
End •••• experienced a mild explosion in population. Among the towns 
which expanded due to mining activity were St. Just, Penza.nce, Camborne, 
Redrut.h, Truro, Helston, and i'avistock. By Victorian times, where 
there was mining, there was a concentration o1' settlement, but in the 
farming areas there was a dispersion. 
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In this way, the population distribution in Cornwall became unbalanced, 
being concentrated in the west of the County (except around Gunnislake). 
Mining activit,y attracted other industries to.the main areas of exploit-
ation, adding to the density of population. i'ngineering was developed 
in the Camborne area, and in all the mining areas there was a growth of 
small-holdings with a ready market for their produce. In West 
Cornwall, there was a considerable development in the ports and an 
internal railway system was built. - All this new prosperity, however, 
did not solve the problems of Cornwall's isolation. 
The boom years of Cornish mining were short-lived and the 
end came rather suddenly, when the exploitation o.t" the large alluvial 
deposits in other countries lowered the world prices of tin and 
copper. Mining in Cornwall had virtually ceased by 1918. When the 
end came, there was no alternative irldustry and great distress was 
caused. The only solution for thousands of Cornish miners was to 
leave home for the coalfields and the colonies. In addition to this, 
employment in agriculture had been declining since 1851, and all the 
ma.in farming areas in the South-West experienced a decline in population 
and in the sizes of settlements. In that period of decline, the only 
expanding industry was the holiday industry. 
The events outlined above had a profound effect on the 
development of the present transport system. Modern rail and road 
building was geared to the requirements of the places along the south 
coast, where economic expansion was concentrated, except in the 
Barnstaple/Bideford area. Along the Channel coast were situated the 
main ports; expansion of mining, and later china clay, in West Cornwall, 
favoured the expansion of port activity .. in the sheltered rias. Growth 
in the holiday industry favoured the towns along the Channel as they 
were more attractive to visitors than the exposed settlements which 
faced the Atlantic. Farming was more pro_$perous on the fertile 
soils of the south, especially in Devon. Gradually, settlement 
became concentrated in the south and it was to that area the railways 
first came, thereby accentuating the disadvantages of the North, 
where the railways came too ·late. In the north the rural population 
declined and is still doing so. 
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Nevertheless, the actual distribution of settlements is extremely 
dense, and justifies a tremendous network of roads and tracks. 
d). Population 
Due to the lack of large-scale industrial development in 
the South-West, the density of population is far below that of the 
British Isles. In Devon and Cornwall, there are only o·5 persons 
per acre compared w-i-th 4•1/acre in the South East and 3•3/acre in the 
North West. In 1961, the pQpulation of the two counties was just over 
one million, and was comprised by the following figures:-
TABIE 1 I 
I ; POPULATION OF THE SOUTH WEST 1951-1961 Source: H.M. Census figures. 
------· ---- -----·:-, ------ -------1' 
ADMN. AREA. 
DEVuN A.C. 
CORNWALL A.C. 
PLYMOUTH C .B •. 
EXErER C.B. 
' 1 
I 
I 
l 
514,208 
345,442 
208,017 
75,513 
TOTALS 1 , 143 , 180 
----~~~-- .L ----------
I 
i 
The. above fi@ures show but a small increase 
from 1951-1961. On the basis of such statistics, it 
1961 
539,021 i 342,301 
1: 
204,409 I 
I' 
80,321 ~ I 1,166,052 I. 
-:1 
in population 
has been 
forecast by the local authorities that the . rate of increase will 
continue to be slow until 1981, unless migratory population is 
attracted. from other ~as. Devon has experie~ced a small net increase 
in every year since the war (+3•6% from 1951-61), but, as the above 
table shows, Cornwall's population declined between 1951 and 1961 
(-o·9'fo). Population trends in the two counties differ greatly. By 
natural change from 1951-1961, Devon's inhabitants declined by -0·7%, 
whereas in Cornwall there was an increase of +0 • &fa. The reversal 
of these trends in the net figures above is caused by Devon's high 
-7-
- -
migration gain and Cornwall's high migration loss. Since the 1961 
census, however, a healthier trend has been displayed, for Cornwall's 
population rose steadily by 2•1% to 347,000 in 1964, and Devon's b,y 
2·~- to 851,000 in the same year. Despite this, there would still seem 
to be a decline in the more remote rural areas.! 
In Devon, the ~neral distribution of population shows a 
concentration in the South.! Apart from this, there are three main 
areas of dense population ••••. the Barnstaple/Bideford area; the coastal 
belt from Budleigh Salterton to Dartmouth; and the Plymouth area. 
In Cornwall the distribution is more general, but there is a tendency 
for a concentration in Mid and West Cornwall. For this reason, 
transport resources tend to be concentrated in these areas, where the. 
demand is ~atest. 
The problem of rural decline is not the only possible obstacle 
to the future prosperity of the Region. The structure of the population 
shows a marked 1mbalance, with a large proport:loi'l of persons over the 
retiring age. Most of the inward migration into the region is 
accounted for by persons over the a~ of·fifty-five, while outward 
migration is mainly in the 20-49 age group. Thus there is a decline 
in the numbers of persons of working age, and in the pool of labour 
essent~l to attract any new industry to the South-West, 
----·---.c. - -· ------- --···- .. l i 
I 
I 
I 
TABUl 2. 
!9!..KING AGE POPULATION 1961. 
-r---- 1961. -~---- ~ •• 1951-61 r--- -- -~-1 
i t CORNWALL ; 202,600 - 9,000 4•2 , ~--~von --:--7-::j --:::--:--4_79 '-~~ ___ ~ .,. ___ _L __ -_7-=-,o-=o:-o---::-_ _,__ __ -_l-_•_4_-----4' 
upon which the future development of transport depends. 
! See map 5 • , Pp. 6/7. 
B See map 4. ,Pp.5/6. 
-e..; 
e ) • Industry and Employment. 
The present structure of industry and employment is dom-
inated by tourism and agriculture. Agriculture, though unimportant 
numerically, is significant in terms of area and its contribution to 
the life o!" the region. Farming has been an important activity in 
the South-West since before the colonisation of the Middle Ages. 
In the mediaeval market towns there developed a system of industry 
which was complementary to the agricultural system• Each market town 
had small industries •••• textiles, leather, pottery, paper-making, boat-
building, and many others. These traditional, all-year round, industries 
declined with the advent of the Industrial Revolution, tending to 
unbalance the social and economic structure of the region. As we have 
seen, even the boom in tin-mining did not aid the region in the long 
run because there was little development of associated industries to 
outlast the mining industry when it died. 
From 1851 there was a constant decline in agricultural 
employment. Tourism began to emerge as the major industry, and in 
association to this growth the railways helped ·to develop the coastal 
resort towns. The traditional industries continued to decl~ 
throughout the nineteenth century, but since the First World War there 
has been a rise in the marketing and processing of dairy produce and 
in the numbers of modern light industries. 
few have boomed except the holiday industry. 
Of all industries, however, 
After the Second World 
War, the universal increase in "holidays ·with pay" and in the numbers of 
private cars helped to make the South-West Britain's most popular 
holid~ area. 
The results of the indu.strj.al unbalance ·may be seen in the 
present employment structure. Employment in the service industries 
is very high compared to the national.average. From/ 
r----· 
~--
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TABLE }• 
-----:---===:-:-:-~c:-:::-::==-:==-==-==-== -----S.W. mDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMi:!:NT STRUCTURE, 1263 
Comparison by broad groups: Nos. of insured Employees. 
Source:_ Associated Industrial Consultants 
-----. 
' 
GROUP- --fee-~ ~~~Li-r -;;;-~-~ ~;;;~~-r-~-_-EXET-. ER-__ "": _-u-. --~--.--:-
___ ----- ~ -- - --· -~ --- ·- ·-t-
16.9 I -9.8 1.8 ~ 5o3 5o5 
I 
EXTRACTIVE 
.lliJ.ANUF ACTOR nm 
CONSTRUCTION 
SERVICES 
TOTALS 
--~----------------1 
16.0 64.0 55.5 
100.0 1 100.0 100.0 
-~------L 
I 6.9 
I 
I 9.4 68.4 49.4 
100.0 100.0 
.. --
From 1951-1961, there was a dec·line in the primary group, but this was 
much less than the national tendency, and still the percentage employed 
in agriculture is much higher than the national figure. A percentage 
is emp~oyed in the 11miscella.neous services11 group, which includes hotels 
and catering (15•9% in Cornwall and 21·6%. in Devon in 1961). A 
surprisingly high number of workers are employed in transport, especially 
in view of the high rate of car ownership and the paucity of demand for 
commuter services. The 
--------~ 
T.ABIE 4. 
:EERCENTAGE EMPLOYED lN 'l'RANS?ORT, 1961 f 
---------1 
Source: 
CORNWALL l 
-- !__ ---
instability of the employment situation is illustrated by the low 
number of insured persons; in 1961 only 42% of the" working age 
population was insured, compared to 66% in the U.K. as a whole. 
'. 
I 
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TABLE: 5. 
NUMBERS OF INSURED PERSuNS IN THE WORKING AGE POi'UL.ATION, 1961 
Source: A.I.C •. ; H.M. Census figures 
----···--··.-·--·------··•··· ·-------"i 
CORNWALL DEVON !'LYMOUTH EXETER 
INSURED 98,720 137,.174 94,946 45,482 
202,600 479,000 (including Plymouth and Exeter) 
··-----------. -- - . 
With the tourist industry so dominant~ there is a great deal 
Ur~-
of casual and seasonal employment. Consequently, winter "employment 
rates in the South-West tend to be double the summer average. This 
trend to high winter unemployment is particularly noticeable in the 
service group of industries, whilst~~~ there is a low rate in the manu-
facturing group throughout the year. Also the biggest variations in 
the unemployment register 
TABU:: 6. 
SEASONAL UNE~!IPLOYMENT IN T.BE SOUTH WEST. 
Source: Ministry of Labour. 
·---- -·- -- ·-----·-
-... ---~-- - .. 
··---· 
CORNWALL 1i2i ~ 1960 1961 1962 .!2§1 12M 
~anua.ry 3.92 6.31 6.59 4.77 5.69 6.72 6.41 
July 1.97 3.16 2.66 2.06 2.45 2.31 1 •. 95 
DEVON 
January 4.10 4.59 3.86 3.24 3.27 4.76 3.87 
July 1.48 2.08 1.56 0.75 1.48 1.74 1.66 
tend to be in the areas near the coastal resorts. For example, the 
numbers of unemployed in TorqllSJT in 1963 rose from 1~ 1n summer to 900 
in winter; similar variations were registered in Fenzance (300-1,000), 
Newquay ( 65-450), and Ilfracombe (75-350) •. 
J 
l! 
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The basis of the eeonomy is still agriculture and tourism, 
but there has been a· growth in light manufacturing industry since the 
Second VTorld War, especially in the South Coast areas. In Devon, for 
example, one-sixth of the firms employing twenty or more people were 
established in the period 1951-1961, and seventy-two of the 176 firms 
listed in 1964 had been established since 1939·. One-third of these 
new factories were concerned with the manufacture of electrical goods or 
in light engineering. In Cornwall, however, ·there is a more traditional 
image, with 24% employed in "ships and marine engineering'', mostly at 
. Falmouth. Plymouth has over 40% employed in this group, most of whom 
are employed in the Naval Dockyard, the region's largest single employer 
of lbour. Industries in this group, however, have an uncertain future, 
and the local authorities are anxious to attract more manufacturing firms 
to the region to strengthen the employment structure. 
Despite the establishment of new factories, there has been 
little benefit to the transport network. A sU+vey conducted by Devon 
C01mty C01.mc'il in 1962 concluded that there was little evidence of 
workers travelling long distances to work. Most new firms move their 
raw materials and products over long distances, as labour costs are so 
low as to make this worth-while. Few of these commodities, however, are 
heavy or bulky. Fifty per cent of the firms in Devon use rail transport 
in varying degrees:, but most are road users. Most firms use their own 
fleets of vehicles,because of the ease of handling. Thus transport 
interests have gained little from the establishment of new industry; 
in any case, much of the material used is unsuitable for rail handling 
or ~OF! the long-distance haulage firm. Sea transport also plaJS little 
part in t~is industrial expansion apart from the import of timber. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of more new industries would 
seem to be necessary in the .region to counteract the problem of seasonal 
unemployment. Proof o~ the benefits is demonstrated at Paignton and 
Exmouth, where the building of a. few new factories has almost erased the 
seasonal rise in unemployment. 
.J-
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New factories may help to arrest the migration of young people who 
see their own region as lacking in opportunity. Although migration 
figures show an .. increase in population, there is a net loss in the 15-59 
age group (of 16,000 from 1951-1961). What the transport industry 
hopes for is the type of heavy manufacturing industry which uses large 
amounts of materials in bulk. 
f). The Holiday Industry 
Tourism, as the major industry in the. ~outh-West, warrants 
special consideration in this introductory chapter. No matter how 
much new manufacture is attracted to the region, the South West is likely 
to derive most of its prosperity from the millions ~f visitors each year. 
The two counties, with their varied scenery, mild climate, and freedom 
from urban development, are most attractive to holid~-makers. Tourism 
is a long-established industry, and this has resulted in the provision 
of many amenities for the visitor, plus a varied amount of accommodation. 
With the increase in national affluence and "holid~s-wi th-pa,y", the 
annual holiday has been established as a national habit. Since the 
Second World war, this has been of particular benefit to the South-West 
because, lacking large centres of population iri its vicinity, it could 
not previously depend on visitors unable to afford long journeys. 
Increases_ in earnings have also led. to increa.sec;l car ownership, enabling 
people to tour the area they have chosen for their holiday; this is 
important in the s·outh-West, where the scenery is the main attraction. 
CORNWALL 
DEVuN 
TABIE 7. 
U.K. RESIDENTS: .MAIN HOLIDAYS 
Source:· A.I.C!; British Travel Assocation 
1951. OOOs !22i 
950 ,. 1,442 
1,720 2,675 
2,670 4,117 
%increase 
52 
55.5 
53 
" 
- -- . - . 
------
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TABLE 8. 
EXPENDITURE: U ~K. RESIDEN'l_IS: ALL HOLIDAYS 
. -
Source: A.I.C. Estimates• Britis~ Travel Assocation; 
National Income and Expenditure Tables' 
Family Expenditure ourvey. 
·--- --•~o~- --l···•· • 
£millions 
CORllliVALL 
DEVON 
Tlil'.ALS 
" 
., 
I 
~--~----
12.8 
23.1 
35.9 
19o3. 
25.4 
47-5 
~ All holidays include day trips and excursions from within and 
without the region. 
Expendi t-u.re includes :fare payments. 
Estimated expenditure by for~ign visitors to the region not 
included: 1963 estimate was £5 million~ 
The increase in car ownership, however, has not been of · 
benefit to public trSllsport. .Another effect of the motor age has been 
the significant increase of self-contained accommodation, including 
flat lets, chalets, caravans and tents •••• the so-called 
r -~- -, 
TABLE 9. 
< 
:, HOLmAY ACCOMMODATION 1964: · · CARAVANS, CHAIETS , TENTS. 
L~o~c~: A.I.C. & ~ounty Pl~Jl_l~g- De_p~tmen~G.__ _ 
~ CARAVANS J CHAlETS ; TENTS 
CORNNALL 8,600 1,800 4,400 
DEVON 15,400 5,300 71 900 
TOTALS 24,000 7,100 12,300 
TOTAL 
14,800 
28,600 
43,400 ;i 
I 
. - . - --_ __, __ _ 
------..-· ----.--~
"freedom holiday", free from the necessary restrictions o:f hotel Slld 
boarding house life. The freedom from routine on holiday is a principal 
advantage afforded by the family car, and the increase in the use of 
accommodation of the non•traditional type can be attributed to the 
greater mobility of the holidaymaker. In fa~t, one third of the visitor s 
to Devon in 1964 stayed in caravans, tents, chalets,etc. 
: 
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There would also seem to be a desire to I!lake the cost of holidays 
as cheap as possible so as to increase the amount of available spend-
ing money. 
The trends of recent years would seem to indicate that the 
demand for holidays, particularly of the informal type, will continue 
to grow. It is desirable that the expansion will be spread into the 
off-peak season, as· many areas are becoming overcrowded in the peak 
months of July and August. In recent years the length of the holiday 
season seems to be growing but this is only a-slight movement, and well 
over half the visitors to Devon and Cornwall come in July and August. 
In some ways this peak is inevitable as it 
TABlE 10. 
----, 
U.K. RESIDENTS: PERIOD MAIN HOLIDA¥5 TAREN. 
,--------
Source: A .• I .c • 
"--~·----------------,---·-------· -·- . ---~ --- - -·. --· ___ .. ____ _ 
;' MAIN HOLIDAYS. ADDITIONAL HOLIDAYS. : 
I 
; 1951 % 1961 1951 % 1961 
MAY/JUNE 
JULY/AUGUST/SEPTEMBER 
OTHER MONTHS 
18 
78 
4 
22 
72 
6 
1-3 
64 
23 
23 
50 
27 
coincides with the annual industrial holidays and the school holidays; 
also the weather is more li~ly _to be reliable.: A more balanced 
holiday season, however, would be desirable, ·as it would result in the 
improvement of the quality of the accommodation available and in the 
structure of the employment pattern in the industry. Congestion on 
the main roads would be relieved to some extent. But, if the expected 
demand for holidays is accounted for by those who use tents and caravans, 
then the problem of the peak will remain large~ unsolved. Tents and 
caravans have a short season, whilst hotels and boarding houses are open 
throughout the year. 
Another pro~lem is that of the distribution of holidaymakers, 
resulting in the overcrowding of certain areas, especially during the 
peak two months. The South coast would seem to be more popular 
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more popular/ 
than the other holiday zones, particularly in Devon. In 1960, 
for instance, 58% of the visitors to Devon stayed in the coastal strip 
between the Exe and Dart estuaries. Twenty per cent ·of the visitors 
to Cornwall are estimated to staj in the Newquay area. Although the 
popularity of these areas has advantages in the concentration of 
holiday facilities, a tremendous strain is placed upon the road system, 
especially in the Exeter area. Paradoxically, the increased mobility, 
which might have solved this problem, only serves to worsen matters in 
creating new., conflicting _streams of holiday traffic. 
These are some of the problems to be solved if the South-West, 
visited by well over four million people a year, is to retain its 
outstanding popularity, and value to the economy. One disturbing 
feature is that, despite the rise in the numbers of visitors, especially 
those staying in chalets, caravans, tents, there have been no new hotels 
constructed in recent years. Yet the numbers of people. s.taying in 
licenced hotels has risen, whilst the numbers s~aying in unlicenced 
hotels and boarding houses has declined. Careful attention should be 
given to the future provision of more and better-quality hotel 
accommodation, for the hotel user is a most valuable custemer. 
Visitors who use the large hotels rarely vary their choice of accommodation 
and the hotel has the advantage of a longer sea.son and offers considerabl e 
employment. The hotel e~rts a considerable influence of luxury and 
stability. 
Nevertheless, the increased numbers using caravans, tents, 
chalets, etc., must be accommodated; this presents a ~jor amenity 
problem in many areas, as great care must be taken in the siting of 
encampments. Some existing caravan sites still have accommodation, but 
at the same time, there are localities where holiday development should 
be discouraged,eit~r because a reasonable capacity has been reached, 
or.because it is necessary to safeguard the character of a particular 
district. However, with careful planning, it would seem that there is 
no doubt that the increase in numbers can be accommodated. 
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A The Annual A bstract of Statistics, 1961~, estimated that 
in 1980, the population of the U .• K. will be 58,000,000~r~c:::·. If 
the present proportion of about 60% going on ho1iday continues, there 
will be about 35 ,000,000 r '- :. :-:! home ho lid~-ma.kers by 1981. If at 
least one-fifth of these go abroad, there will be about 28,000,000 f·'~::· 
ta!d.ng holidSJTS in this country. Assuming the proportion visiting 
the south-West continues at about 18-20%, then there should be an 
increase over 1961 of ovex: 50,000 persons at peak times and 500,000 during 
a whole year. Most of this increase ·would probably be absorbed by 
caravans or chalets, the majority of which would be on new sites aw~ 
from the coasts. More chalets might be built because they have more 
~rma.nence than caravans, thereby helping to lengthen the season. 
g). Minerals. 
Despite the lack of the basic raw materials-for industry, 
Devon and Cornwall are rich in many other mineral resources that are 
suitable for bulk transport. The. main sources of minerals are 
listed below: 
CHINA CLAY. 
Fotmd around St. Austell,-Bodmin-Moor, and s.w. Dartmoor:over 
lt million tons of this iswon each year, about twelve per cent of the 
total coming from Devon. Resources are likely to last for the next 
one hundred years and the material is likely to remain ·the major item 
in freight transport, for 72% is exported from the region. The waste 
is a useful source of building materials. 
BALL CLAY 
Ball clay is fo1.md at Bovey, in South Devon, and Meeth, in 
North Devon, which are together responsible for 60% of the U.K. 
production, the remainder coming from-Dorset. Production is increasing 
at the rate of 5% per annum, and 4~ of Devon's output is exported 
via Teignmouth •. 
A. H.M.S.O. 
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LIMESTONE/CHALK.· · 
Production of' limestone is confined to Devon and runs at 
about 12 million tons per annum, ~ of the national output. 
Annual quarrying of chalk is much less, only 60;000 tons per annum. 
Production has doubled in the period 1952-1961, also in the associated 
field of cement manufacture. Near the largest·quarries and works, 
transport facilities have benefited by the expansion. 
SAJ.'ID AND GRAVEL 
This industry is quite well-developed, despite the lack of 
glacial and recent deposits, and is concentrated in East Devon, where 
twelve quarries are situated. Also a great deal of sand and gravel 
is obtained by .the dredging of estuaries, and in the English C lmmel. 
In Devon in 1960, 22% of the sand and ·gravel deposits were obtained through 
estuarine and marine sources. A great deal is obtained as a by-
product from the china and ball clEzy" pits. 
BRICK CLAY 
The main source o!" brick clay is -the weathered Devonian 
slate in South Devon. Production averages ·65,000·tons a year and the 
main quarries are situated at Ottery st. Mary, Exmouth, Pinhoe, 
Paignton, and Steer Point. Expansion of the industry is concentrated 
at the Pinhoe Quarry. 
IGNEOUS ROCKS AND SANDSTONE 
Quite extensive quarrying is foUllld, for high quality road-
stone and concrete aggmgate. The railways own huge ballast quarries 
at N..eldon and Menheniot. The quarrying of granite has been important, 
especially in West Cornwall,but now it is concentrated in small quarries, 
owing to the sporadic distribution of good higb-quali ty stone. · 
Sa.I'.dstone quarrying is concentrated mainly in North Devon. · Total 
prod}lction averages about 800,000 tons per annum of igneous rock, and 
300,000 tons of sandstone. 
METALLIFEROUS MINING 
Only two ac_tive mines are left in Cornwall, but in recent 
PLATE TWO . 
DRAKEWALLS MI NE'; Gl:'INNISLAKE. Th e landsc ap e o f t h e igneous areas 
of Cornwall is dott ed •nth the remains of derelict mines. 
Drru{ewalls,near Gunnislake in the Tamar Valley,was one of the 
r ichest mines in East Cornwall.The principal metal mined was tin, 
with some arsenic and co pper. Production was s pasmodic, wi t h peaks 
in t he early I 850s and mid-I870s.Between I 875-I 883,tin ore to 
the value of £2I8 ,000 was won from t he 80 fathom lode without 
haVing to siru~ a s haft over six feet in dept h .Closure came to 
the mine in I9IO. The View shows the ivy-clad ruins of some of 
the mine buildings . 
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in recent/ 
years the International Tin Co,uncil's price for world tin has risen 
to over £1,000 per ton and there has been a considerable amount of 
new prospecting in the hope that many old mines may be re-opened. 
At the moment the Cornish production of tin concentrate (7o% tin) is 
about 2,000 tons per annum, giving 1,400 tons of me.tallic tin. It 
is estimated that the output could be increased to about 3-4,000 tons 
by 1970, also that.£2,500 millions worth of tin lies under the soil 
of Cornwall and West Devon. Despite the conflict of land use which 
~ arise, a total of 25 square miles may b~ w0rked again in the not 
so distant future. Although the production would not generate 
particularly great loadings, there is bound to be some :fringe benefit 
to the transport system. 
h). Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing. 
Over two million acres in the South-West are used for 
farming, of which about one-ei~h is rough pasture. Eighty per cent 
of the land utilised is in pasture and the region produces nine per 
cent of the total agricultural output of the U.K. The amount of 
rough pasture and derelict land is decreasing but the number employed 
shows a sim:hlar trend. T}'l.e main sources of revenue are from small-
holdings, livestock, and dairy products, especially milk. Market 
gardening produce from the Scillies, West Cornwall and the Tamar 
Valley, is an important source of rail revenue. Also, daily milk 
trains are run to London. 
Forestry is localised; many areas have been taken over l;ly 
the Forestry Commission, with a resultant increase in conifers. 
The revenue from fo~stry in 1964 was £178,000 from 2.7 million hoppus 
feet of timber. The Forestry Commission's contribution to the total 
was £107,000 which will rise to £500,000 in the future when young 
trees have matured. 
The decline in Fishing has been arrested but production is 
sufficient to generate large amounts of freight traffic. Transport 
is expensive and the industry has suffered by recent increases in rail 
transport prices. Small canning factories have been built in some 
ports to attempt to revive the industry. 
./-
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However, it is unlikely that the region's fishing industry will 
ever regain its former importance. Only Newlyn and Brixham now 
harbour fleets of over twenty vessels. 
THE DEVELOPMI!:NT Ol!' '1'EE TRANSPORT SYSTEM. 
Within the geographicaJ. and historical surroundings, the 
transport system in the South-West has developed to its present 
state by four 4istinct stages:-
i) • The "Horse and Cart" Era. 
ii). The Rail way- ·Age • 
iii). '.rhe Inter-War Period; the entry of the Internal 
Combus~ion engine. 
iv). Post-War Competition.~ •• ~he motor car age. 
The "Horse and Cart11 Era. Devon and Cornwall together have a 
tremendous road mileage , over 11 ,000 miles, of which Devon has about 
7,000 miles. In Roman times there were only Just over 1,000 miles, 
of which a mere forty-five miles were actually built by the Romans. 
Yet the present network and mileage had developed substantially by 
1815, though on~ one-tenth had been turnpiked or paved. The 
extension of turnpiking along fresh sections of main roads in the 
mid-nineteenth century almost completed the present network. 
The proliferation of roads and trackWays in the region was 
a direct result of the geography of the region. Rural settlement 
was scattered :in nature and the rugged topography o1· most areas 
necessitated circuitous routes. The long and indented coastline has 
caused many deviat.ions in the routes which reach the important coastal 
settlements. La.r~ numbers of agricultural holdings all require 
adequate road access. Indeed the very elongate shape of the peninsula· 
fostered the development of a dense system of roads. 
T~e great majority of roads date from the agricultural 
colonisation of the early Middle Ages, although many of· the :inter-
village roads are Saxon in origin~ Contemporary maps of the mediaeval 
period seem to indicate that there was quite a considerable network of 
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network of/ 
A 
roads in use by that time; the number of ancient bridges still in 
use would seem to support this. The main means of transportation 
throughout the Middle Ages, and until about 1800, was the pack horse. 
For heavy loads a wooden, sled-like vehicle called a "trucka.muck" 
was used, drawn by horses or oxen. Oxen were quite common for heavy 
work or on steep hills. In the eighteenth century, however, coach 
and wagon services began to replace the older methods of transport. 
Turnpiking improved some of the main routes, and the quality of long-
distance coach travel improved to reach its highest level just before 
the railways reached the region from outside in the 1840s. Many new 
main roads were built at this time. 
Although the railw~s killed long-distance coach travel, 
short distance road travel remained a feature of the South-West, because 
of the configuration of the landscape and the thin spread of the rail 
system. In fact, the road system in the region did not go out of 
use to the same extent as in industrial areas. Carrier 1 s carts remained 
a prominent feature of rural life until the late thirties, when the 
internal combustion engine assumed almost complete control. 
In industrial areas, the canal era bridged the gap between 
the horse era to the railw~ age. However this period is missing 
in the history of the South West because of the low traffic potential 
and the difficulties imposed by the landscape on building. Only a 
few short canals were built in the region. The Exeter Ship Canal, 
an earlier, Mediaeval venture has been the only 1asting canal. 
Despite the proliferation of the road system, the main form of 
long-distance transport during the period in question was sea. Long-
distance transport by land was too slow and-inadequate until the turnpike 
era. The physical nature of the SouthfWest •••• ·.the length of the coast, 
the topography, the large numbers of inlets, bays;, .and coves ••••• 
favoured sea transport. Numerous trading and fishing ports grew up 
around the coasts, dealing with coastal and world trade. 
A.See Plate 3. 
PL..4.TE THREE. 
PLYM BRIDGE. Before the Industrial Revolution , goods were transported 
by pack-horse, for the narrow lanes with their high hedges were 
prohibitive to wheeled transport. On the rivers of the South West, 
there are many survivals of bridges built for this traffic. Plym Bridge, 
on the Plymouth boundary , is a 17th century bridge of five granite 
arches across the River Plym. 
-21-
The exploits of some of the seafarers from South-West ports is now 
legendary; the region played no small part in the creation of the 
. -
British Empire. Throughout the Middle ages, there was also a 
steady trade with the ports of Brittany. Later, Plymouth and 
Falmouth develope~ considerable trade with the West Indies and America ••• 
the latter was famous for the mail 'Packet• services to America, 
developed during the eighteenth century. Quays on the many river 
estuaries aided the expansion of many industries including Cornish 
mining. Even todSJT, coastal shipping is still important, but there 
has been a great decline in shipping in the region •. 
The Railwav Age. This era really dates from 1844, when the first 
main line reached the region from the East. Gradually, the network 
expanded, and long-distance road traffic and coastal shipping declined. 
The principal contribution of the railWSJTS to the region was the 
development of the coastal resorts. In West Cornwall, the early 
network of mineral lines, which formed the basis of' the main line 
later, did help the development of the mineral ports, but the arrival 
of the main line from Plymouth stopped that. Falmouth lost her 
mail packet service, a.Ild ports all over the South West declined, although 
there was no similar recession in road traffic as a whole, for the 
reasons outlined above. 
The First World War and the Rise of the Internal Combustion Engine. 
During the First World War, the internal combustion engine 
experienced a revolutionary development, and after t}J.e War, many of 
the omnibus and haulage companies were established in the region. 
Many people bought cars too. The railw&J' companies began to lose 
business, particularly in the field of passenger transport, where 
they began to feel the effects of bus competition by the late 
twenties. Cars, however, were still a luxury. 
The Post-1947 Competition After the Second World War, the omnibus 
industry expanded still further at the expense of the Railways. 
Not only local rail traffic suffered, but long-distance traffic 
declined too, because of the long-distance coach. 
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In the fifties, however, a new element entered the field of 
competition, in the fqrm of the motor car. Due to the increase 
in private car ownership, all forms of public transport (except 
air) are threatened. 
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CHAPI'ER TWO. 
THE RAILWAY PROBLEM. 
i). The development of t:J:l..e Railwa,ys. 
The network of railways in the South•West was developed 
by two main companie~: ••• the Great Western Railway and The London 
and South Western Railway. Transport by rail came quite early to 
the region in the form of small mineral lines, '9ut the first main 
line passenger link arrived in 1844, when the broad gauge Bristol 
and Exeter Railway reached Exeter. From Exeter, this line was 
extended by the South Devon Railway to Plymouth·via Newton Abbot and 
Totnes, P~outh being reached on 5th May, 1848. Eleven years later 
it was possible to travel throughout from London to Benzance by train. 
On 2nd May, 1859, the opening of Brunel's Royal Albert Bridge at 
Saltash linked Devonshire's railw~ys with the Cornwall Railw~y main 
line to Truro. From Truro to Benzance the main line bad already 
been develope~by the West· Cornwall Railway (1852), using mineral 
lines as a basis for expansion. 
Early railway history was as colourful as anywhere in 
the country at that time. Besides enthusiasm, there was also 
failure, suspicion, and battles with civic dignitaries and local 
landlords. Despite early teething troubles, the main line to Fenzance 
became a great success in the latter part of the· nine.teenth century, 
and it brought prosperity to the region. When the railways became 
established, many formerly important towns which had been missed by 
the main line began to clamour for their own links. Consequently, 
the Great Western Railway, which had absorbed the early companies,! 
built a number of branches from the original main line. 
! The G.W.R. absorbed the Bristol $ld Exeter, and the· S. Devon Railways ~ 
in 1876,; the Cornwall Railway was absorbed in 1889. All these 
Companies were formerly subsidiaries of the G.W.R. 
~· Built to the Standard gauge;converted to the 7' Oi-" broad 
gauge I867;first through trains Paddington-Penz4f.l.ce I.3.I867. 
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These branch lines were of two main types:-
1). Coast lines •••• linking the main line to the coastal 
towns, thereby assisting the growth of seaside holiday 
resorts. 
2). Country lines •••• joining the main line to established 
inland market towns which had lost some of their 
nodality with the arrival of the main line. 
The purpose of both types of line was to serve the 
surrounding countryside and to feed the main line with long-distance 
passengers. Without doubt, the coast lines were more successful 
from the 'outset because they helped to establish the new seaside 
resorts. Country lines made only a marginal profit, if at all; 
frequently they were built in areas of decline. 
Another of the pre-grouping railway companies also had 
ambitions in the South-West, namely the London and South Western Railway, 
whose main line reacr~d the region from Waterloo via Salisbury. The 
opening of the line was long-delayed by legal proceedings and parlia-
mentary discussions, but finally the link to Exeter from Yeovil was 
opened on 19th July, 1860. Five short branch lines were built from 
this main line to the coastal resorts of East Devon.! 
Beyond Exeter, the L.S.W.R. was retarded in its development 
by the actions of the G.W.R. Originally, there was a Central Scheme 
of the former to project a route beyond Exeter over Dartmoor and Bodmin 
Moor to Falmouth, but this idea was defeated in Parliament. The 
L.S.W .R. arrived in Devon at a late stage, when the richest areas in 
the South of the county had been entered·by the G.w.R. Lines which were 
developed to the West of Exeter by the L.s.W.R. consisted of a main 
line to Plymouth, plus secondary lines to Padstow!, Bude, Ilfracombe, 
and Torrington. 
A To LYme Regis (now in Dorset}, Seaton, Sidmouth, Budleigh Salterton 
and Exmouth. 
B The L.s.w.R. had acquired (in l-847-) the Bodmin and Wadebridge 
Railway, opened in 1834. 
at the up platform on 2)th . Dece~ber ,I ) 62 , the last day of 
o pe acions on the 34!- mile Plymouth- Launc eston branch . Th e 
Plymouth- TaVistoc secti on of t he line was o ened by the 
South Devon and Tavisto ck ail 7a y on 22nd . June , I 859 ; the 
remainin I 9 mil es to Laun ces ton were buil t by the Launceston 
and South Devon _ail nay and opened on Ist . June ,I865.Both 
compani es wer e absorbed by t he South Devon ailway i n I 865 , Hhich 
in turn becam e part of t he Great Western ail way . Tavistoc:;: v1as 
th e mos t important intermedi ate s t a tion;its overall roof was 
designed by I . K. Brunel , engineer o f the line . 
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There were few short branch lines of the G.W.R. type (above). 
In 1848, the L.S.W.R. had plans to develop the docks at Plymouth 
into an ocean terminal but the Great Western had already established 
a grip on the area, and built the Great Western Docks ·at Millba.y 
(completed 1852), a lesser scheme than the· L.S.W.R.'s. Thus the 
South Western's hope of big business was lost and the company's first 
trains into Plymouth, on 18th M~, 1876, entered the town by humbly 
using the G.W.R •. branch from Iqd.ford. An independent company (an 
L.S.W.R. subsidiary), the Plymouth, Devenport and South Western 
' 
Junction Railway, built the present line from Iqd.ford via Bere Alston, 
~ich provided-an independent entry for L.S.W.R. tra~s from 
2nd June, 1890.. Even so, South Western trains were forced to use the 
Great Western's metals in Plymouth to reach their own Friary terminus, 
opened on 1st July, 1891. 
The Great Western was the on~ British railway system_ to 
retain its old identity in the important railway groupings of 1923, 
and it kept all its lines in the South-West. At the same time all 
former L.S.W.R. property was ceded to the Southern Railway. The 
Southern system, like its predecessor, remained the poor relation 
·of the G.W .R., and acquired the nick-name of "the withered arm" beyond 
Exeter. By 1923, the whole of the rail,way network had taken shape, 
with the exception of the wandering light railway branch between Halwill 
Junction and Torrington, which opened in 1925 and was absorbed by the 
Southern Railway. 
At nationalisation in 1948, all G.W .R. lines were made 
part of the Western Region of British Railways, whilst-all southern 
Railway lines were integrated into the Southern Region. :W.anagement 
under nationalisation became unsettled, for the ·western Region acquired 
all the Southern lines West of Exeter, on~ to return them in 1958, 
']he arrangement, however, was short-lived, for ~rom 1st January, 1963, 
the Western Region has controlled all the ex-Southern lines west 
of Salisbury. 
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Thus the railway structure ~n the South-West has always 
presented a contrast between the powerful, prosperous Great Western 
with its many branch lines, and the flimsy network of Southern lines, 
forced to eke out an existence in the rural wilderness of North Devon 
,_;••- I 
and Cornwall. Apart from the Plymouth main line, none of the 
Southern 1 s routes warranted double-track.· The company's trains 
were notoriously pedestrian beyond Exeter·and all the principal expresses 
lost time by dividing into sections at Exeter, Okehampton, or Halwill. 
~ contrast, the Great Western attempted to provide an efficient 
and fastsexpress service to Torbay, Plymouth and Penzance, with good 
branch line connections where possible. Even on the difficult 
Cornwall main line, services were vastly superior to the Southern 1 s. 
ii). The Railway HeY-Day. 
The railways undoubtedly brought a ~at deal o! prosperity 
to the South-West after the completion of the main line system b,y 1860. 
Towns served by the railway advanced, while tho·se it by-passed fe 11 
bac.k. Many new resorts were established with the aid of railWS3'S, 
and the holid83' trade became a major industry in many parts of the 
region. Every member of the population came directly or indirectly 
under the influence of the railways. Communications with London 
were quicker and more numerous than in stage-coach days. Increased 
travel, the universal adoption of Greenwich time, the growth in cir-
culation of national newspapers, the greater interest in national 
events afforded by the telegraph (an important railway enterprise) •••• 
all this had started to blend the South-West with the rest of the country •. 
The process of orientation and dependence upon London was initiated 
by the railways. The world of 1860 was totally different to that of 
1830, when the stage coach had been at the peak of its deve loplilent. 
This process may be compared with Brittany, 
Paris was increased by railway development •. 
where the influence of 
Gradually the railways established themselves as an economic 
force and built up a near-monopoly in public transport, but there 
were also short-comings • 
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In the pioneer d83's, there were many instances of business inef-
fiency, where the companies failed to exploit deiii8.Id as fully as they 
might have done. Even the proud Great Western made many mistakes, 
for pride bred complacency. Until 1892, the GW.R. persisted with the 
i• ot• broad gauge to which Brunei had constructed the main line. 
This difficulty created great inconvenience in linking up with other 
railway systems. Not until 1892 was the G.W-.R. obliged to swallow its 
pride and converted the main line to Devon and Cornwall to the 
standard 4' at• gauge. The logic of this step was soon demonstrated, 
for through expresses were soon introduced from the Midlands and 
the North. 
The L.S.W'.R. main line, which reached Exeter in 1860, was 
in many respects too late~ Unlike the broad gauge lines to Penzance, 
it did not bring a vast increase in prosperity ·to the market towns en 
route. Rural de-population was a serious problem in East and North 
Devon long before the arrival of this railway. Axminster had lost 
its carpet industry and Honiton was re-awakened only by the motor-car, 
reviving as an important cross-roads town. East Devon suffered in that 
it was left virtually off the transport map from the opening of the 
Bristol and Exeter line in 1844, to the completion of its own main 
line in 1860. 
In latter Victorian times too, there were examples of under-
development and inefficiency. The Cornwall Railway was particularly 
notorious; it was slow, the maintenance of the track was of a shocking 
standard, and it had a bad accident record. Patronage was poor in the 
early years, both because of inefficiency and the fact that the cornish 
people did not habitually travel far. But mining declined rapidly, 
and the rapid exodus of thousands of miners in the 1870s he~ped the 
traditional sources of railway revenue, tourism and agriculture, to 
increase. At the Eastern end of the Cornwall line Plymouth had 
only two stations to serve about 100,000 people in 1871. Only 
twenty trains left the area each weekda.Y in winter, and all trains 
were notoriously slow. 
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Many passengers, as. well as goods, were still going by sea, not only 
because of the paucity of trains_, but also because of high fares. 
However, the arrival of the L.S.W.R. from ~ford in 1876 brought 
a new spirit of competition to the area and trains and traffic grew. 
Gradually, competition on the two systems increased, the 
L.S.W.R. demonstrating a great deal of business enterprise in encour-
aging third class fares on their trains, which the conservative G.W.R. 
did not. Not until October, 1890, was every train on the G.W.R. open 
to all classes. Two' years later, the 213 miles of exclusively broad-
gauge ·track on the G.W.R. west of Exeter were converted to standard 
gauge. In 1890, the L.S.W.R •. reached Plymouth on its own P~.D. & S.W.J.R. 
route. With this,· and the exciting possibilities of through trains 
from the North and Midlands, ·the stage was set·for true competition. 
The peak of railway efficiency was reached in Edwardian times. 
This ~ be illustrated by the tremendous increase in ocean traffic 
from Plymouth at that time. Great hopes had been expressed for the 
future of the Great Western Docks at Mill bay and in late Vict·oria.n times, 
many homeward-bound ships dropped mails at Plymouth, to be conveyed by 
the Great Western to London. Later, passenger specials were started 
and, in 1904, the trickle became a flood, when the L.S.W.R. ·started to 
attract passengers to their new terminal at Stonehouse Pool. One of 
its first ocean specials covered·the 230 miles from Stonehouse Junction 
to Waterloo in 4 hours 3 minutes. The G.W.R.-'s reply is now an epic 
of railway history, for the locomotive "City of Truro" attained the 
maximum speed of 102.3 m.p.h. on Wellington Bank with a mail special on 
9th :May, 1904. This train reached Pa.ddington in 3 hours 42 minutes 
from Millbay Docks at an average speed of 66.5 m.p.h. including·•a stop 
for engine-changing at Bristol. Although the South Western could not 
hope to equal this, the accent on speed continued until a bad collision 
at Salisbury on 1st July, 1906, when 24 of 43 passengers on a Waterloo-
bound ocean special were killed. After this, competition was mainly 
restricted to comfort and reliability until in 1910, the two companies 
signed a peace treaty, and the L.S.W.R. withdrew from ocean activities 
in Plymouth. 
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There was also considerable competition between the two 
. -
companies for local traffic in the P~outh area. The L.S.W.R •. in 
the 1890s started several locals for Dockyard workers between 
D~vonport and st. Budeaux, but the G.W.R. did not counter this until 
1904, when there was a sudden ·increase in local services in the area, 
· run by the new steam railcars. Several new halts were built between 
Mill bay and Sal tash. Many people moved to the suburbs near the 
new halts and these areas grew rapidly, notably St • Budeaux and Lipson. 
In 1906, the f'.D. & s.w.J~R. opened their new halts, increased the 
Davenport-St.· Budeaux service and exte~ded it to Friary. From 1881 to 
1914, the year when Plymouth, Devenport and Stonehouse were united, the 
population of the area increased from 138,000 to 214,000.. Saltash and 
Plympton grew because of their increased rail services; so too did 
the villages served by the Yealmpton and Turnchapel branches. Popul-
ation in the centre of Plymouth thinned as more people moved out to the 
suburbs; the acreage devoted to housing doubled. 
With competition and the increase in through traffic, the 
Great Western Railw~ became truly great·.- By July, 1903, the 
"Cornishman" express started to reach Exeter in 3-i hours, Plymouth in 
4 hours 50 minutes, and Penzance in 7 hours 46 minutes. This paved 
the wa:y for the introduction of the faino.us "Cornish Riviera Express", 
introduced on 1st July, 1904, which reached Penzance in only seven 
hours, via Bristol. In 1906, a shorter route via Castle C~was 
opened and the non-stop Paddington-Plymouth run was completed in 4 hours 
7 minutes. The "Riviera" typified the advance of the Great Western, 
which substantially increased its patronage after the First World War 
on a wave of popular worship. West Country holiday popularity was due 
in no small measure to the G. W .R. , which ran numerous summer extra trains 
to the S0.lil.th-West, especially to Torba:y. In .its peak between the wars, 
it was a ·splendid railway, the pricE of the South-West, ·completely 
eclipsing the image of the Southern Railway west of Exeter. 
A· From Castle Cary to Taunton, which reduced the Paddington-Plymouth 
- mileage by 2Dt miles. 
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iii). Social Conditions. 
The Railway Age brought a new prosperity to the South-West, 
and railway revenue in tu...""ll benefited from this. Up to the First 
World War, the success of the railways was due to a near-monopoly 
in public transport. After that war, the development of the internal 
combustion engine brought new competitors to the scene~. Omnibus 
services sprang up all over the region and theJe were many companies 
formed after the war. Some men who had left the forces with gratuities 
used their money to set up in business with an omnibus. :Many country 
Ca.ITiers expanded their trade, and began to invest in the carriage of 
passengers. At the time the railways did not view the competition with 
much dismay. In fact, the Great Western began to run its own services, 
and was the pioneer operator of buses among the· large railways in 
this country, with a service from Helston to the Lizard in 1911.!. 
The complacency of the railways was not surprising because 
of their monopoly which had lasted for so long. Despite the excellence 
or the Great Western as a whole, the monopoly created a condition 
where the operator could be both extravagant and tight-fisted •••• and 
get away with it. Thus railway officials were slow to realise the 
full threat of the challenge until about 1925, when the railways started 
to lose an enormous amount of traffic, particularly over surburban 
routes and the shorter branches in rural areas. Yet both t~e Great West-
ern and the Southern continued to run uneconomic services parallel 
to the competing bus routes, and little was done to make the system 
more profitable by the pruning of un~conomic services. 
In fact, only three lines were closed by·them in the period 
before the Second World War. These were as follows:-
!. · The Fowey-St. Blazey line which closed on 8th July, 1929. This 
short line, only five miles long, was little used after 1895 because its 
connecting services with the main line competed with the Loswithiel-
Fowey service. Omnibus services quickly acqui~ed the local traffic 
between Fowey and the St. Austell area. 
! With vehicles bought from the ~ton and Barnstaple Railway 
(see Chapter 6). 
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2. The Lynton and Ba.rnstaple Railwa.y,which closed on 29th September, 1935. 
This was the Westcountry 1 s own ( l 1 nt•) narrow gauge passenger railway 
and was completed by the local people in ·1898 to link thetwin resorts 
of LYnton and ~uth with the outside world. From the start it 
had s~ finances, and in 19?? it was sold to the Southern Railway. 
The rurality of the area, the fact that trains"Ere fully ... loaded only 
during the holiday season, and the introduction of a quicker bus service 1 
hastened the closure of this expensive line. One reflects ruefully that 
today the line would possibly be a major tourist attraction, comparable 
to similar lines in North Wales. 
3. The P~ymouth-Yealmpton branch closed on 7th July, 1930, when it 
succumbed to a quicker bus service on the adjacent main road. However, 
it was re-opened on 3rd November, 19411 to accommodate P~outh people 
living in the country after the Blitz. Closure came again, finally, 
on 7th October, 1947. 
These were the only real economy measures taken, for few 
wayside stations on other lines were closed. In fact, between 1925 
and 1930, the G.W.R. began building a number of wayside halts on its 
lines to compete with nearby bus services, on a scale comparable with 
the building of suburban halts in the Plymouth area in the 1905-10 
period. Past traditions and prejudices prevailed, and·little attempt 
was made to abandon the uneconomic lines. in rural areas. Besides the 
feeling of competition, there was the sense of duty to the public. 
What this, in fact, meant was the provision of uneconomic services 
for the Ihinori ty to the detriment of the majority of customers on 
main lines. ~e Southern was especially guilty of this, as we shall 
see. !. Ordinary principles of business management did not seem to 
apply. Yet,unAike under nationalisation, the railways were under no 
obligation to provide ~uneconomic services. 
! See Chapter 4 • 
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The railway companies also met the threat of omnibus 
competition by expanding their own road services, a move which 
eventually proved harmful to their interests. Rather than risk a 
clash of interests, the railways joined with the lar~ road combine 
of Tilling and British Electric Traction by an agreement of 1929. 
Thus the railways became almost half-owners of the bus companies, 
but the strength of the latter was greatly increased by the inflow 
of railway capital.. As the bus companies grew from this impetus, so 
the railways gradually backed -out of bus operations;! they had lost 
the battle, although they did not realise it at the time. 
At nationalisation the Great Western Railway was the only 
oneof the 1big four• to be showing a profit. In the South-West, this 
profit was probably only marginal, yet a mere fifteen years later, 
it was stated:!! that the railways in the peninsula were losing over two 
million pounds per a.nnum. The fifties stripped the railways naked 
from the cloak of false prosperity which they had succeeded in wearing 
for so long. A revolution began in transport •••• the spread of the 
private motor car. Until the fifties, the railways in the area had 
off-set the losses on the branch lines and local services by an expan-
sion in long-distance traffic, particularly during the holiday season. 
This expansion went on even up to 1955, when 98,042 long-distance · 
1· ... ~·' passen~rs alighted at Torquay, and 70,365 at Paignton, on the 
Saturdays during the summer service. 
Personal transport added to bus competition made the losses 
on the branch lines rise; but in terms of long-distance travel the 
numbers of people coming to the South-West by car increased and the 
numbers coming by rail decr:eased rapidly. The following table, based 
on British Travel and Holidays Association Surveys, shows how holiday-
makers travelled in 1951, 1955 and 1960: 
1!· 
The G.W.R. sold its buses in the s.w. and made an agreement with 
thew. & S. National Omnibus Cos. in 1932 (see Chapter 6) 
Beaching Report. (Reference P. 54) 
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TABlE 11 
--
TYPE OF 1951 1955 1960 1960 
TRANSPORT for U.K.% for U •. K•% for U.K.% for· S.W.% 
Rail 47 37 30 .2.3 
Car 27 34 47 63 
Coach/bus 27 33 21 14 
101~ 104~ 98 100 
~The excess over lOO%_is because some ho1:lday-makers used more than 
~ne type of transport •. 
The impact oft~~ change in social conditions hit the railway_ 
traffic hard and the enormous economies necessary eventually were 
extremely harsh. Besides the increase in private transport! many 
other changes contributed to this situation. 
TABLE 12. 
INCREASES m PRIVATE CAR OWNERSHIP 
Source: M.O.T. Road Statistics 
AUTHORITY ALL VEHICLES 
.!2.2! ~ ~ 1225. 
Devon c.c. 165,300 171,470 
Exeter C .B;,C. 19,010 20,470 
Plymouth C.B.C. 37,150 40,020 
Cornwall c.c. 22!121 106!780 108.~20 110 1 8~0 
TOTAL S.W. 121,408 328,240 340,320, 356.560 
AUTHORITY OF WHICH CARS POP./CAR 
1251 ~ 12M. .!2§2 12M 
Devon C.C. 103,310 111,940 5.5 
Exeter C.B.C. 12,170 13,520 6.1 
Plymouth C.B.C. 25,400 27,950 7.6 
Cornwall c.c. 21a022 62.~10 68 1100 12all0 2·1 
TOTAL S.W. 83.644 206,250 222,110 240,250 5., 
A See table .a.2 
--
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Rural de-population continued to be a problem, and as the countryside 
is vacated, so.transport loses customers. The problem is P,articularly! 
serious in North Devon and Cornwall; in the latter .case the ·situation 
is aggravated by an actual outward migration from the cotmty • .!! In remote 
areas, the railwEcy"s inadvertently helped the decl:ine by taking local 
business to larger towns nearby. Old-established market centres and 
lar@B villages contracted. Okehampton, for example, lost much of 
its business to Exeter. The private car has merely accentuated this 
process of dependence on the larger centres. 
tong-distance holiday traffic is no longer profitable to 
-
the railways now that they have lost the lion 1s sPa-re of the revenue. 
Rural de-population has not been accompanied by any massive expansion 
in urban centres or in the field of industry. The econom;y of the 
South-West has become lop-sided (see chapter one), with too many people 
employed in service industries (see table 13), an 
TABIE 13 
PROPORTION OF WORKERS EMPLOYED IN· SERVICE INDUSTRTI:S (1962). 
Source: Ministry of Labour Statistics 
Devon 
Cornwall 
s.w. Average 
73.3% 
71.4% 
72.4% 
.. ---1 
aging population (see table 14), and too great a dependence on the short 
holiday season, with its heavy traffic. 
-.... --- TABLE ·14 --~ 
': Cu.MPARISON OF AGE STRUCTURE •••• DEVON AND ENGLAND & WALES. 
a. SUMMARY OJ!' POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX •••• ENGLAND & WALES 
MALES(%) FEMALES(%) 
AGE GROUP 1951 1961 1951 1961 
0-14 11.3 11.6 10.8 11.0 
15-64 32.2 32.4 31o9 30.1 
65 and over 4-5 4.6 9-3 10.3 
TO'l'AL 48.0 48.6 52.0 51.4 
! See Chapter one 
B See Table 1 in Chapter one. 
l 
i 
·I 
AGE GROUP ij 
o-14 I 
15-59 ~ 
! 
60 & over I 
TOTAL J 
-I 
,• 
1---
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TABLE 14 (Cont.) 
b. SUMMARY OF POPULATION BY AGE AND SEX •••.• DEVON 
MALES(%) FEMAIES (%) 
AGE GROUP 
.l2ll 1961 1221 1961 AGE GROUP 
0-1.4 10.2 10.4 9.1 9.9 0-14 
15-64 30.2 29.5 30.9 28.3 15-59 
65 and over 6.2 7-1 12.8 14.8 60 & over 
TOTAL 46.6 41.0 53-4 53.0 TOTAL' 
--··- - ·---- ---·-
It is no longer attractive to the railway to run extra trains on summer 
Saturdays for journeys in one direction only. Operating procedure 
necessitates that coaching· stock usually returns from the region empty. 
The holiday season is insufficiently spread; the "peak" fortnight at 
the beginning of August is economically ruinous. In Cornwall the problem 
TABIE 15 
MONTHLY TUTAJ.S· OF VISITORS TO DEVON 1 1260. 
S9urce: D.C .C. Survey of Holiday Industcy, 1960. 
--·-·-
---.:::..a'----=- ~-- ------MONTH liTO. OF VISITORS ~OF TOTAL 
January 24,600 1 
I 
February 24,600 1 
March 73,800 3 
April 98,400 4 
May 196,800 8 
Jmle 467,400 19 
July 565,800 23 
August 590,400 24 
September i. 270,600 11 
' October 73,800 3 
November 24,600 lJ. 
December 49,200 2 
- ·- --t I 
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is accentuated because the season is shorter and, therefore, expensive• 
~~lidays with pay have given the worker ~ore leisure an4 the number 
of visitors has increased steadily since·the 1939-45 War. But the 
holidayma.kers do not now mainly _come by train •. · After the Second 
World War, the increase ·in traffic on the railways was due to the 
increase in post-war purchasing power. Travel was one of the few 
outlets for pleasure. Now other luxuries, including the private car, 
have replaced this. 
In the'remote rural areas where de-population is a serious 
problem, it follows that there is little industry other than that 
connected with the holiday trade. North Devon and East Cornwall are 
special cases. Here rail transport arrived too late to arrest the 
migratory flow from the land. In some ways, rail transport 
accelerated the decliile in the most remote areas, for ttt:r transferred 
much of the trade of the smaller market towns to the larger centres. 
It was too late to bolster the sagging economies of such towns and 
villages. There was little industry and the holiday season on the 
North coast is shorter, so unemployment is always a nagging problem. 
North Devon has become like a wilderness; the geographical dif!"er-
ences between·Devon North and South of Dartmoor are quite amazing. 
Furthermore, the transport arteries of the peninsula are lineal, and 
so it is particularly difficult, even in Cornwall, to travel from the 
North to the south by public transport. From ~adstow to Fowey, 
twenty miles, it takes about ~hours; it is almost quicker to travel 
between Plymouth and London than between Plymouth and Barnstaple. 
In North Devon, only Barnstaple and Ilfracombe have real~ benefited 
from the railway. Barnstaple has established herself as the "capital'' 
of North Devon, and Ilfracombe has become the only large resort in that 
part of the ~ounty. Trains to Bude, Padstow and other places along 
the North Coast by the Southern lines were always too slow and 
inconvenient. 
The general isolation of the South-Wes~ usually blunts 
ambitions to attract industry. Cornwall was extremely prosperous 
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prosperous/ 
during the mining era, but after the slump of the First World War, 
. . 
the decline in the industry has caused an inland depression in the 
county. China Clay has replaced mining a.s the principal extractive 
industry and has a fairly dense network of railways connecting the 
pits. Most of the clay, however, is sent away by sea, which does 
not help the railways· in respect of long-distance freight traffic. 
Fishing, another formerly important industry, has declined drastically. 
Horticultural traffic is large, but is largely uneconomic from the 
freight point of view unless it can be handled in large quantities. 
Traditional industries have declined, and the new factories are usually 
without rail connections, but rely on road transport. For example, 
in the City of Plymouth, twenty four-new factories were built during 
the period 1945-1966 (17 since 1957); none of these has a direct 
rail link. 
In the cities, Plymouth and Exeter, the changes in social 
conditions initiated by the railways have continued. People have 
gone on drifting to the outskirts of these cities to live, but the 
new suburbs are no longer being built near the railways, Trams and 
then omnibuses replaced the railways as the main form of suburban 
public transport. During the last war, many small halts and platforms 
were closed in the Plymouth area. The services based on Millbay and 
Friary stations were cut from the time-tables,killed by road competition. 
Against this background of social conditions, it must be 
stated that the South-West is a very difficult area geographically 
(see chapter one).. Dartmoor and Bodmin Moor are barriers to rail 
transport, and the whole peninsula is deeply incised with rejuvenated 
river valleys and a coa.s t-line crenellated with inlets. The railway 
system has to avoid these obstacles, and thus steep gradients and 
sharp curves are prevalent on most lines, having seve:r:e effects on 
speed. In so many places the railways have lost business because the 
local station is too far from the town centre {as·at Callington), or 
perched on the top of a steep hill (as at Tavistock N).! 
! See Map 14. , Pp. 79/80. 
I5.IO from lynouth to Cardiff 
the New _ ed Sandsto e eli fs on a sumn er Saturday in 
I 9 59 . Heading the train is a Class ' 9F ' 2 - IO-O, a typ e o f loco motive 
norDally r eserved for frei gh t haulage . Until recent years , the 
dense holiday traffic at week - ends in the Sum~er placed a 
tremendous strain on the r.1ain line rail nays . At t h e p ea:.: ;:>er; od 
all s par e resources of motive power and co a chi g stock v1ere 
pressed into serVice . This stretch of line rras part of I .K. Brun el ' s 
atmospheric raill7ay , constructed in I 846 . To ay it constitutes 
a difficult section of the Exeter- ·'ievrton Abbot main l ine . 
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In addition, the North is a poor area for agriculture and has a 
harsh coastline, so that development has tended to be in the South. 
Fortune has always favoured the main line to Penzance, as it follows 
the grain of the peninsula. Other lines are ancillary to this (see 
the _1966 rail map), hence the numbers of branch lines which have 
become uneconomic. 
i v )-. Economic Factors • 
The econo~ of the South-West has long been unbalanced 
(see chapte~ one), partly because of its isolation, but in more 
recent t~mes, because of the lack of industrial raw materials. 
.. ,, 
We have already touched on some of- the current economic problems in 
. . . . . 
this chapter and in aapter One, such as rural depopulation, lack of 
industry, and the dependence on the holiday season. Now it is a 
question of whether such problems are inevitable, or whether they 
have been caused by the inadequacies of the railwajr syste·m. With 
the contraction of the system, it has been argued by many local people 
that the disappearance of the railways in many areas will accentuate 
these problems. 
Rail closures would seem to have local effects but so far 
they have not affected the overall economic situation in any marked 
way. The first lines to be closed down were mostly rural liries, 
serving country towns and villages which could not possibly generate 
enough traffic for a viable railway system. Some measure of de-
population and unemployment has occurred as a result of rail closures, 
but it should be remembered that de-population has been going on for 
many years in such areas. In North and Mid-Devon, for example, the 
population declined by 2.3% from 1951 to 1961~ More serious problems, 
however, ~ be raised in the 
are losing their rail links. 
the holiday traffic decreases 
future,as some of the coastal resorts 
The railways argue that their share of 
annually, and tl'l.at they cannot afford to 
operate branch lines which are underused for nine months of the year. 
LOcal authorities believe that they will lose visitors because of the 
lack of rail facilites and that the traffic transferred to the roads 
will cause considerable congestion. 
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Trends in the numbers of holidayma..lters, hovrever, would not seem to 
indicate this over the.region as a whole. Choice belongs to the 
consumer; the tourist has opted to use the private car and thus rail 
traffic has declined. Small hoteliers do seem to suffer some 
inconvenience , however, as the motor age has increased the demand for 
touring and camping holidays rather than for nesidential periods at 
one place. Economic problems caused by trJS witr..drawal of passenger 
trains services,.however,, would seem to be personal rather than 
universal. 
The problems of indus.try and the railways r,esemble a vicious 
circle. Lack of large industries with possible bulk loads has caused 
the withdrawal of many railway freight facilities. Yet in turn, the 
lack of rail facilities in the region as a whole has discouraged the 
attraction of large new industries. Most new industries are of the 
light variety and use road transport. The contraction of the rail 
system does cause many indirect problems for industry. Almost all 
firms have to import their raw materials from outside the region, and the 
increasing lack of rail facilities has increased the costs of many 
firms. Difficulties are experienced in the distribution of fuel and 
other heavy freight. The railways are concentrating their freight 
depots, andare using road vehicles for the final distribution. The 
efficiency of t~is system can only be impaired as road congestion 
increases. :Many firms have taken steps to provide their own transport, 
which detracts from the revenue of the railways and. increases road 
congestion (see chapter seven for increase in 'C' licences). Local 
industrialists have frequently complained of the poor communications,on 
radio, television and in the press; private road fleets are a tangible 
expression of this dissatisfaction. 
The overall basis of the problem is that of isolation. 
South-West England is too far from the major centres of population and 
industry, which is a good thing only for·the holiday industry. In 
North Devon and Cornwall, the tenuous secondary lines! were almost 
part of the landscape; 
A To Bude and Padstow 
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landscape;/ 
their loss will undoubtedly cause great personal hardship in many 
cases; the only long-distance links from these areas have been 
destroyed with the closure of-~he lines to Bude and Wadebridge from 
Okehampton on 3rd october, 1966. Cross-country· journeys are becoming 
even more difficult, and it seems that the rift between North and 
South will widen. Despite the increase in p rivate car ownership, 
can the South-West survive the threat of seeming isolation by lack of 
public transport? On traversing the stretch of line between Launceston 
and Wadebridge on the last train after eighty years of service, one had 
the feeling of abandoning the huddled crowds on stations like Delabole 
and Camelford to their fate. The feeling of hopelessness was reflected 
in the windswept plateau, where the very trees strained to escape to 
the East. 
As utilisation decreases, so the railways find it necessary 
to increase their fares. Increased prices in turn discourage traffic, 
and so the authorities are enforced to refuse to carry unsuitable 
traffic. If this process continues much further, then the very exist-
ence of traditional industries like fishing and horticulture will be 
threatened. The function of the railways will ·be confined to the long-
distance passenger traffic and to the handling of freight which can be 
transported in bulk loads. The situation resembles a vortex, a 
downward spiral that cannot possibly be broken without direct Government 
intervention. These problems will be considered in more detail in 
the following chapters • 
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CRAmER THREE 
TEE DECLTI~ OF THE RAILWAYS - 1247-62. 
i). The Economic Problem. 
From 1st J~uary, 1948, the railways became nationalised. 
In the South-West, ex.-G.W.R. lines were absorbed by the Westem 
Region of British Railways, and the ex-S.R. lines became part of the 
Southern Region. The new management was mandated to provide 
•adeq~ate railway services' throughout the country, considering the 
needs of agriculture and the rural population. In 1953, the 
requirement of adequacy was dropped, and the railways were permitted 
·to run whatever services they chose. But this freedom was limited 
by the procedure of the Transport Users' Consultative Committee, 
and by two statutory duties of making enough revenue to 'make provision 
for the meeting of charges properly chargeable to revenue, taking one 
year with another', and having •due regard •••• to the needs of the 
public, agriculture, commerce 'and industry' •1 • These two requirements 
conflicted, for if they were to consider the public need, the Commission ! 
would have to provide services which minimised their chances of 
making their revenue meet their expenditure. Throughout the fifties 
the hands of the railways were tied by these anomalies, and necessary 
economies were not forthcoming until the dramatic increase in the 
national rail deficit after 1957. However, this does not place the 
blame for the losses on the Government alone. 
The economic burden placed on the railways of the South-West 
was a heavy one. At first the cancerous growth was di~guised by a 
resurgence of traffic in the immediate post-war years. The simple 
explanation for this was that, .in the days o~ austerity and few 
entertainments, travel was one way of finding pleasure. Until 1955 
too, excursion and long-distance traffic expanded to an unprece•dented 
level. In 1955, the first national railway operating loss was 
announced, and the enigma was exposed. But then it was already too 
late to correct the situation in the South-West. 
! Transport Act. H.M.s.o. 1947. 
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The biggest single contribution to the post-war profit 
was that the railways continuled to carry, on a national scale, a 
considerable amount of heavy freight, particularly coal. After 
the recessions in the coal and steel industries, ·this traffic was lost, 
and the operating surplus soon became a deficit. For the first tim, 
it was realised how serious the problem in the South West act:uaiJ:ly 
was. At this time, road competition, particularly the private car, 
had started to ma~ considerable inroads into railway traffic. Also 
the railways had emerged from World War II in a poor physical state, 
which had created bad operating conditions and had detracted from their 
public image. Passengers were constantly a.zmoyed by lateness, inef-
ficiency and dirty trains, and their impress iom of the railways were 
distinctly Victorian. The decline of the G.W.R., in the nationalised 
guise of the Western Region, was parlacularly galling to Westcountry 
travellers who had worshipped the Company in pre-war days. 
In 1\lfarch, 1955, the railways a.zmounced a £·1,240 million 
Modernisation Plan~· which was essentially a plan for the modernisation 
of equipment rather· than the shedding of unecono_mic liabilities. The 
Plan was too late to help the railways of the South-West; it missed the 
true reasons for the poor economic position. Great faith was placed 
in the Modernisation Plan by both the railway management and the public, 
although it was really ten years too late. A popular railway journal 
of the day received the Plan in typically enthusiastic manner~ • SaJ'"ing 
"The :S'o.'T .C. :has not grasped its opportunity half-heartedly", and 11It is 
hoped that every project •••• it outlines will be in motion within 
five yea.rs 11 • 
The South-West received a great deal of national publicity 
at the publication cf the Plan, for it was implied that all lines to 
the West of Newton Abbot would be turned over to complete diesel 
operation. Although the diesels did eventually arrive,! developments 
in the region before or after the Plan were not rapid. 
A The first main-line diesel loco. appeared in April,- 1958, but a 
real impression was not made until after 1960. 
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The attitude of the local management was conditioned by the days of 
near-monopoly, when the railways felt a social obligation to carry 
traffic, and rates of charge w·ere fixed by statute without relation-
ship to local costs. Accounting was not detailed enough, and no 
figures were available ·concerning the contributions of individual branch 
lines to total revenue. Thus there was too much cross-subsidisation, 
which was exposed by road competition. Profits from the busy main 
lines subsidised the poorly-used branches and helped to keep them open. 
Road competition, however, ~e~uced the rates of good railway traffiq to 
the point where they were quite incapable of subsidising. the very costly 
provision of services which handled the poor ratlway traffic. The 
burdening of good traffics with the costs arising from poor ones led 
to the transfer to road of a considerable volume of traffic which the 
railways were best equipped to handle, because customers were unable to 
afford the rates which were kept at high levels ~ the unec?nom~c traffics. 
Road operators had a considerable advantage over the 
railways, for they had low fixed costs. The high fixed costs of the 
railways could be overcome only if there was a high usage,even on 
single-tracked lines. Thus, in the passenger field, the biggest 
losses are incurred by branch-line and stopping-passenger services, in wh.~ 
the South-West abounded. On British Railways in 1960, one-third of 
the system carried 1% of the passenger traffic4·, while one third of the 
mileage! also carried only 1% of the freight ton-miles. Furthermore, 
half of the total route mileage carried about 4% of the total passenger 
miles and 5% of the total freight ton-miles. Applied to the South-West, 
these figures would probably be somewhat different, as the greater 
proportion of the rail system consisted of branch lines, but bearing 
in mind that the above figures concern the country as a whole, the 
situation in the s.w. region must have been much worse. One fact was 
certain; the figures r~veal an alarming tenden~y for the bulk of the 
system to carry a minimum of the traffic at enormous costs. Such traffic 
does not even match the costs of stations themselves, and maims no 
contr~bution to route costs, movement· costs, nor terminal costs. 
! No separate figures are available for the s. West. 
PLATE SI • 
- ORTH DEV01 & CORNWALL J UNCTION LIGHT RAILWAY . Thi s li n e, between 
Halw:Lll Junction and Torr ington, was the last of a ny length to be 
built in Devon and Cornwall and vv-as opened in July,I925.Passenger 
serVices consisted of three trains each way ( we ek day s only),which 
were Virtual l y unused. 'r h e line v1as closed in 1'1arch,I965,but six 
mil es at its eastern en d were retained for ball clay traffic 
between Torrington a n d the North Devon Clay ·Company ' s Work s at 
Peter ' s l·1arland,nea r Petrock stow. '..l: his typical view s h ows Class 
12MT' tank engine No .L~I298 and one coach forming the IO . 38 
Halvdll-Torriugton on 30th . March,I963.The train i s about to 
cro ss t h e River Torridg e near the end of its journey. 
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Railways in the South-West developed in the days when the 
horse was the only alternative form of rural transport.Even under 
these near monopoly conditions,it is doubtful whether many of the 
branches in Devon and Cornwall have ever paid their way.In recent 
times,these services competed \nth omnibuses serving the same basic 
purpose,and no\v both are fighting an impossible battle for economic 
survival against the motor car.In these conditions,it has beem 
estimated that British Railways meet less than IO% of the demand 
for rural transport,and to do this they provide services accounting 
for a large proportion of passenger route miles.Most branch and 
stopping passenger trains in the fifties carried less than a bus-
load per journey and lost nearly twice as much as they collected 
in fares. 4· 
This shaky economic situation w as not only confined to the 
passenger trains.Freight traffic was also highly inefficient and most 
South-Western services undoubte~ly operated at a loss.The original :5.!' 
dense network of rural freight stations was built to be served by 
horse and cart from the local areas,Most of the traffic was conveyed 
in single wagon-loads.Great numbers of primary and secondary 
marshalling yards were necessary to assemble trains from these 
small units for destinations outside the region,and to split in-
coming freights into trip-workings for the respective destinations of 
the individual wagons.Because of this, freigh~ trains were slow and 
inefficient.Few wagons were equipped \tith vacuum. bra~e apparatus 
because of the marshalling which was a feature of operation.The 
development of new types of wagon was thus impaired,Turn-around 
times were numbered in days and a~ enormous fleet of wagons was 
required in order to maintain an 11 effic:ient" service. 
Inevitably,the policy of cross-subsidisation in both 
passenger and freight traffic led to increased fares and carriage 
rates.Fares became too high for the limited demand,and there was 
seldom any real increase in revenue as a result of an increase in 
charges.Taxis became cheaper than rail transport for groups of 
people,and were in fact cheaper than bus fares. 
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Using door-to-door transport, the rural populace began to realise 
the inconvenience of rail services! which had descended to them from 
the horse-and-cart era. 
From these facts it must now become apparent that the 
railway management was large~ responsible for the abominable 
deterioration in the state of the railways in the South-West. Officials 
did not realise in time, i.e. in the immediate post-war years, that the 
railways could not pay their way in most of the area and they continued 
to provide what were essentially social services. Many economies 
cou;I.d have, and should have, been made in the early fifties. When 
criticism was directed at the management, it was argued that capital 
had not been made available for money-saving at that time, thus 
uneconomic lines started to lose even more money. 
Many people, not only those in railWBJ" management, believed 
there should have been Government subsidies for uneconomic lines in 
the South-West. After all, roads, power, water, education,_postal 
and telephone services all benefit from Government-assistance in rural 
areas, so why not rail transport~ It has been argued5 • that railWBJ"S 
are not in a position of monopoly, like the Post Office, for example, 
and they should not be expected to support uneconomic lines by charging 
high fares elsewhere, thereby losing a fair proportion of profitable 
long-distance traffic. Against this;, it was said that rail transport 
in rural areas was fast becoming unnecessary in view of the increase in 
car ownership. However, lines frequently affect far more people than 
those who actually use them becaus_e of the ancillary services a line 
provides. Hardship could be caused to many more_ people· than those who 
actual~ use a line. Those advocates of subsidies believed that the 
value of a service should not be measured in terms of revenue and 
expenditure and the number of regular users but in terms of personal 
hardship. For instance, most rural car owners are male, and women and 
girls are made dependent on public transport. 
!• See Map 14 in Chapter -Fiy~,Pp.79/80. 
B See Chapter nina on "Transport Policy" (Comd. 3057) 
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The loss of services could cause strife in families and accentuate 
the drift from the country-side. 
This situation clouded the responsibilities of the 
railway management and, as we have seen, the aims of running a service 
were conflicting. Many top officials in the South-West had joined 
the old Great Western or London ·and South Western Rail~s when they 
had a near-monopoly in public transport. The~ had been little 
mobility in staffing and so many of them believed in •social r transport. 
These beliefs, however, do not exclude the post-war manage-
ment from blame for the economic situation. Even if they believed 
~hat all lines should have been retained, they·should have attempted 
to make those lines as economically viable as possible. Instead, the 
amount of waste in the South-West was scandalous in its proportions. 
It has been estimated that over £1 million could have been 
saved on Western Region lines alone in the South-West w·ithout 
closing a single line and withdrawing only twenty per cent of the 
traffic2• If this had been realised, less inconvenience and hardship 
would have been caused to the public later, and there would have been 
little harm to the railway interest. Time-tables should have been 
re-cast to suit demand, and diesel multiple-unit trains should have 
been introduced as soon as possible as they were more economic than 
steam trains. The accepted cost of running a multiple-unit is·only 
6s. a mile, while the cost of steam operation is 15s. per mile. 
The first diesel _multiple-units on·B.R. were introduced in the 
Birmingham and Leeds areas in 19541 the fi-rst regular services in 
Devon and Cornwall did not appear until 1960. In addition· to this, a 
' few wayside stations should have .laeen closed and others reduced to 
un-staffed halts. Signal boxes, especially those on branch lines 1 
should have been closed in scores. 
Undoubtedly these measureswould have improved·the situation 
if they had been introduced in the early fifties, although they would 
not have transformed the losses of most branches into a profit. 
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Some closures were clearly justified, bearing in mind their cost to 
the community, but they should have taken place much earlier than 
they did. At least, economies should have been enforced long before 
the end of their lives. Three examples illustrate this point:-
1. The Exe Valley Branch •. 
B,y their submissi~n to .the Transport trsers' Consultative 
Committee, the Western Region stated that by closing this line they 
hoped to save an annual sum of £46,900. The line, in fact, did close 
in October, 1963; but, if economies had been introduced five years 
previous to .the closure, the total working loss would have been reduced 
to about £16,000 per a.nili.un. Thus the total loss over the five years 
would have been £80,-000 instead of ~bout £230,006. 
2. PLymouth, Tavistock and I.e.unceston. 
The Western_Regi~n originally wished to close this line in 
1957, but it was found to be impossible to provide acceptable bus 
replaceme~ts for several of t:b..e intermediate stations. Also, there 
was a disagreement with the Southern Region over the handling of 
milk at Lifton and freight at Tavistock South. The annual loss was 
said to be £61,000, but-this could have been reduced to £28,000 if 
economies had been made. This would have resulted in a total saving 
of £165,000 before the eventual closure of thi~ line in December, 1962. 
3 • The He ls ton Branch. 
This was a border-line case. At first the line was closed 
only for passen@er traffic (9/62) and the Western Region stated that 
this would bring a saving of £9,000.pa. If economies had been 
introduced, particularly in the introduction of diesel ~lltiple-units 
operating a revised time-table, then the operating loss could have 
been reduced to between £1,000 and £2;000 a year. Whether this would 
have resulted in a justifiable case for closure is questionable, for 
the line was quite well-used, especially in summer when several hundred 
people used the trains each Saturday. The inconvenience after closure 
was considerable, especially to Cornwall County Education Committee, 
The Royal Navy, the Post Office, the holiday industry and the @eneral 
PLATE SEVEN. 
E E VALLEY BRMiCH. The 12. 30 Dul verton-Exeter St. DaVid's ent ers 
Bampton sta t i on on 25th. Sept ember,I963 ,headed by Cla s s 'I4J X' 
0-4- 2 tank engine No. I442.Th e Ex e Valley branch wa s built in t wo 
parts .Firs t t o b e complet ed wa s the Ti v er t on & North Devon 
Rai l way , which was op ened i n August,I884, between Ti v erton a nd 
Hor ebat h Junction, wh ere it j oined t h e Taunton-Barnstapl e line of 
t he Devon and Somerset Rail way.Almos t a y ea r l ater, th e G. W. P. . 
opened t he s eco nd secti on of the l i ne,from Stok e Canon, on t h e 
Taunton- Exet er main L .ne , to Tiverton. Cl os ure of t h e Exe Valley 
came shor t l y aft er t hi s pho to graph was t ak en ,on 7th .Octob er,I963 . 
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the general/ 
public. Transport expenditure on their p~t .has had to be 
increased by a far greater amount than British Railways would 
have saved in closing the line. 
In the negotiations ieading up to these closures, 
many public viewswere ignored. l'To:b only standard complaints about 
lateness, filth and Victorianism, but also constructive criticisms 
by local experts, were ignored by the railway management and Govern-
ment officialdom. The top railway staff 11ad no business-type approach 
and public relations besides overall e·fficiency were poor. No 
economists were employed and the recruiting of the right men for the 
job was .lacking. There \vere vast gulfs between local officials, 
staff and head-quarters. On the other hand, the regional jealousies 
perpetuated the wasteful antagonism between the ex-Great Western 
and ex-Southern Railway officials. This would bave been avoided if 
the railways in the $outh-West had been allocated IN TOTO to either 
one region or the other. 
With the confusing management structure, it is not sur-
prising that so much waste was allowed to continue undetected. 
Frequently lines were re-laid or re-signalled before their closure. 
All lines were steam-operated through~ the fifties and dieselisation 
came too late. Time-tables were in most cases badly-compiled 
and confusing. The schedules of many branches could have been reduced 
to about four specialist trains each way daily, all making good main 
line connect ions at juftations. In the economy cuts that were made, 
there was too much odd pruning without invest~gation into the demand 
for individual trains. Fle:i.ght occupation of single-line branches 
could have been reduced to two hours per day thereby allowing such 
lines to be worked on the none-engine-insteam" principle, and obviating 
the need for passing loops. Passing loops and signal boxes on 
single lines were extremely expensive. For two men working a branch 
signal box for a six-daY week, it costs £1,300 - £1,500 a year. 
~vel crossings are also expensive, for each requires e. keeper if 
there is no signal box. 
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To economise· on this, either continental automatic crossings should 
have been introduced, or British Railways should have sought light 
railway powers for many of their lines, thereby allowing level 
crossings to be without gates. Yet, despite all these glaring 
instances of waste, officials were seemingly reluctant to make 
economies. 
It is clear that administration was at fault. Sometimes, 
small branch lines had several station masters who regarded each other 
as rivals. Each branch could have been worked as a single section of 
line based on its junction. Responsibility for the line could have 
been vested in one-man •••• a "line-master" •• -•• who would have been 
directly responsible to Head-quarters for the efficient running of 
his line. Sta.."'l.dardisation would have been achieved by regarding the 
junction as an integral part of the branch. Connections to the main 
line trains could have been improved, and if the branches were allowed 
to stock the junction's excursion tickets, it would have saved re-book-
ing at the junction. Frequently, the necessity to re-book at 
junctions detracted from the real revenue of the branch lines. 
Thus, if one line had been regarded as a single unit, run 
on the "one-engine-in-steam" principle, and was the responsibility 
of one official, the the necessity for the above economies would have 
been realised. Rationalisation and efficiency would have cut the 
enormous deficit on many lines, and the appalling situation which was 
exposed to a shocked public by the Beaching Report4• would have been 
much milder in its impact. That economies were not made is to the 
shame of the officials concerned, for the capital costs of such economies 
would have been small. One feels, however, that in many cases the 
railwaymen as a whole were protecting their own interests, encouraged 
by the trades unions. Widespread redundancy was feared if economies 
were made, and undoubtedly a la.rge part of the answer lay in the cutting 
down of staff and facilities. 
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ii). Differences Between Ex-G.W .R. and Ex-S .R• Lines, 1947-62. 
From a geographical viewpoint, perhaps the most shocking 
of all managerial deficiencies was the division of the lines in the 
South-West between the Western Region and the Southern Region at 
Nationalisation, in the way which has been described above.! The 
former G.W.R. lines differed ver.y much from their Southern rivals, 
both in mode of operation and in character, espec;i.ally west of Exeter. 
West o~ Exeter, the Great Western had owned the main line 
from Paddington to Penzance and some sixteen branch lines which 
diverged from it. Only one of these lines, the Plymouth-Launceston 
branch, was over twenty miles long, and eleven ~ere under ten miles 
in length. All these branches were normally served,. except in 
summer, by trains operating from the junction stations. There was one 
exception, that of the busy Kingswear· ·branch,· which was double -tracked 
from Aller JunctionB to Goodrington Sands and had the status of a 
secondary main line, with regular,- well-patronised services to London, 
the Midlands and the North of England. However, the b~sis of the 
regular train services on the G.W.R. was the main line to Plymouth 
and Penzance. 
In East Devon, the organisation of the Southern Railway 
services was very simi·lar, with branch trains serving J.iYme Regis, 
Seaton, Sidmouth, Budleigh Salterton, and Exmouth. West of Exeter, 
however, t:b.e situation was different. The s.R. system west of the 
Devonshire capital was nick-named "the withered arm", because the main 
line from Waterloo petered out at Exeter Central and split into 
several sections. The main line was regarded as one running north 
of Dartmoor to Plymouth. From this diverged, at Yeoford and Okehampton 
a series of secondary lines serving North Devon and Cornwall, running 
to Ilfracombe, Torrington, Bude and Padstow. These lines were of 
some length and the S .R. had few short branch lines.2.in this area. 
!.· p .4I. 
B. Near Newton Abbot 
C. i.e. Similar to the G~W. 1 s branch system. 
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•••• only the Torrington-Halwill line, the Bodmin North branch, and g( 
the CallingtonjTurnchapel branches. These last-named examples 
were operated on the normal branch line principle of a separate 
train connecting at junctions. But most of the S.R. services 
were based on through connections with Waterloo. West of England 
expresses were usually divided into sections at Exeter Central; 
on every train there was a section for PlYmouth or for Ilfracombe. 
In addition, there might also be sections for either ~ude, Padstow, 
or Torrington. Because of this peculiar operating method, the 
lines in North Devon and Cornwall \~re always regarded as miniature 
main lines rather than branch lines. This idea was initiated 
by the L.S.W .R.·, which self-consciously arrived late on the scene, 
and developed these services in the vain hope of attracting some 
of the G.W.R. clientele away from the South_Coast.! 
The geographical zones·served by the two systems were not all 
alike. The· Great We~ tern's network served ~he densely-popula.ted 
rural districts of South Devon and West Cornwall. Along the Channel 
coast, the holiday industry has always been more prosperous than 
on the rugged Atlantic Coast. The Great Western, realising the 
potential of the holiday industry, was swift to develop the facilities 
at the coastal towns it served. But the L.S.W.R. came too late, 
and its territorj west of Exeter was less attractive to the potential 
holidayma.ker than its rival's; as the North Coast is rugged, exposed 
and has few sheltered beaches. Only Ilfracombe of the North Coast 
resorts served b,y the s.R. rivalled places like Torquay and Newquay. 
~reas the G.W. lines served EXeter, Torbay and Plymouth, the s.R. 
served no comparable centre of population in North Devon or Cornwall. 
In Cornwall, the G.W. ·system serves several large towns w?ich are 
fairly close together. In the ex-St.R. zone, there has always:.been 
a problem of rural--de-population, accentuated by the lack of 
alternative employment in industry. Against·this, the Ex-G.W. area 
is a comparatively stable zone, with large towns, industries and 
a dense rural population. 
A See· Chapter two. 
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Thus the potential trafficsfor the two systems differed 
enormously. Before the Second World V/ar and the expansion in road 
traffic, the G.W.R. main line was assured of a~ least 10,000 passengers 
per week, even without the addition of feeder traffic from the branch 
lines. Much freight traffic was handled, and large yards were 
necessary at Hackney (1-Tewton Abbot) and in the Plymouth area. Many 
experts have suggested that some of the G.W.R. branch lines did not 
PBS' from the time of their opening. In view of the area the Southern 
system served by contrast; what was the financial situation iilce in 
the wilderness north of Dartmoor? Almost all stations on these 
lengthy single lines had expensive passing loops and signal cabins, 
plus a station-master and a full staff. Except on summer Saturdays, 
traffic had always been light, with the possible exce~tion of the 
main line to Plymouth Friary, which served -okeha.mpton, Tavistock, and 
the densely-peopled Tamar Valley. The potentialities for freight 
traffic were small, the largest sources being china clay from Wenford-
bridge, and ball clay from Petets Iviarl~d, near Petrockstow. 
After Nationalisation, both managements continued to provide 
the same patterns of services that had been provided in the days of 
monopo~. As we have stated already' the attitude of railway 
officers was that they had a duty to the public to provide services, 
however unremunerative. After the 1953 re-organisation, however, 
there was a little ch,ange in policy in that ex-Great Western men began 
to realise that most of their branch lines were losing money and served 
little useful purpose. Cuts were at last discussed without a guilt 
complex. Although after 1953 (to 1958) Southern lines west of Exeter 
were absorbed by the Western, there was no mass change-over of 
local officials. Thus, although ·ex-G.W. men realised the writing 
was on the wall for much of their dense ·network of branch lines, 
closure was seemingly an unheard-of expression-, almost an obscenity, 
in ex-s.R. circles. The "withered arm" was still regarded as a 
semi-main-line syste~an artery of Waterloo. 
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The maintenance of the service was regarded as essential, and 
although trains were slow and infrequent, the rural populatio~of 
North Devon and Cornwall were very close to their railways and 
regarded them andthe l~oal staff, and their renowned courtesy, with 
some affection. 
In the post-war, pre-Beaching era, only one ex-S.R. branch 
was closed, that from Plymouth Friary to Turnchapel!* which, like the 
Yealmpton branch of the G.W.R., was a victim of the disastrous 
decline of the Plymouth area suburban traffic.. All the other lines, 
including the Halwill-Torrington service of two trains each wa;r a day, 
remained open. Much of the old G.W'.R. system; however, had crumbled 
long before the publication of the Beeching Report.4• From 1956, the 
Western Region closed the Teign Valley line (1959), the Moretonhampstead 
branch (1958), the Ashburton branch (1958), the Plymouth-Launceston 
line (1962), the Princetow.n branch (1956), the Chacewater-Newquay 
line (1963), and the Helston branch (1962). Yet it is probable that 
all the losses on these lines would hat .. have exceeded the loss on 
the s.R. lines in the North.! 
The survival of the lines in North Cornwall and Devon 
for so long displayed the inefficiency and complacency of operating 
technique. But it also highlights the geographical dilemna.. 
If economic and geographical limitations had been recognised and 
the lines closed, it would have brought about the downfall of these 
already debilited areas. On the ex-G.W.R. lines, it was-found that 
the provi=sion of adequate bus substitutes was fairly easy. The 
branches were short, and usually paralfJ"d by reasonable roads. Hard-
ship was fe 1 t at closures)ut only in very limited areas. On the 
other hand, the ex-S.R. lines were long and served a poor rural area, 
where there are pgor roads and a sparse network of bus services. 
Even the bus services run at a loss. These secondary lines, therefore, 
were regarded as the life-blood of the rural wilderness, and it is 
difficult to imagine what the future \Vill be like now they have gone)! 
A*.From I0.9.5I -
A. Closed Bude and Wadebridge lines on 3rd. October, 1966. 
B. See Table in Chapter four. 
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CHAP.rER FOUR 
THE BEECHING CLOSURE PROPOSALS 
i). The Report 
The report by the British Railways Board entitled 
"The Re-Shaping of British Railways"!. popularly known as the 
'Beaching Plan' , burst like a bomb on the transport scene in March, 1963. 
Its proposals were· far more devastating than any others which had 
previously been mooted, for it aimed at a complete rationalisation 
of the existing railway system, and a step forward from Victorianism to ~ 
modernised, efficient system. Its aim was summarised in the following 
quotation:-
"The thought. underlying the whole Report is that the railways 
should be used to meet that part of the total transport requirement 
of the country for which they offer the best available means, and that 
they should cease to do the things for which_ they are ill-suited". 
Railways have a high fixed-cost for their rou.ways, but there 
is a low cost per un~t if there is dense traffic. Thus routes with 
the denses"tjltraffic are the most economic. By the·se criteria, many 
of the railways in the South-West fail to justify their existence. 
Studies in the Report were made with the advantage of high-density 
routes in mind. The proposals contained in the document were then 
laid with a view to making the railways competitive by building up the 
us~ of well-loaded and fast routes, and by closing down the lightly-
loaded lines. In the South-west, this proposal was the word of doom 
for the branch-line system. 
No break-down of figures was given for particular areas, 
but it was obvious that the economic situation in the South-West, with 
its tenuous system of branch lines, was much worse than the average 
situation throughout the whole country. It was revealed that, on A. . . 
British Railways as a wp.ole, over 50% of the passenger services did 
·not cover the cost of their routes alone. 
! Figures for 1960. 
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Also, the cost of more than 50% of the stations was greater than their 
revenue. stopping trains, on main and branch-.lines, were the 
principal cause of these losses. Fast inter-city trains are the best 
solirCE5 of revenue, but summer extra t:nains are heavy loss-makers, which 
was a blow to the South-West. Suburban services were not economic, 
and most of the freight traffic was dealt with in a way which was 
unsuitable for rail transport. The reason for this was that most of 
the freight was conveyed in single wagon-loads. Even coal-class traffic 
just paid its way, as two-thirds of this was conveyed in wagon-loads 
instead of block trains. It was also noted that there was a substantial 
proportion of freight sundries traffic in the country which could have 
been moved profitably by rail, but which was on the roads. The 
possibility of liner trains ••••. fast freights between selected urban 
centres ••• was introduced. 
The report, it must be realised, was made as a summary of 
British Railways from a strict~ economic point of view. Even so, 
its release 
Cornwall. 
uninformed 
caused an explosion of popular reaction all over Devon and 
Many of the vehement criticisms that were offered were 
and confused, but this must be attributed to the cold 
objectiveness of the Report itself. Undoubtedly, the essence of the 
studies was true, but in detail the Railways Board used the statistics 
to suit their own point of view. For instance, £2,500 was given as the 
cost of running a country station for a year, and this figure was used 
in many of the tables. No suggestion of any possible economies was 
offered, yet it was obvious to any school-boy that the costs of many 
country stations could have been ~Uimised by their relegation to the 
status of unstaffed halts. Yet complete closure was the sole solution 
offered by the Board, in most cases. 
Many hypothetical and actual examples of unremunerative 
services were given in the Report. In these examples, there was no 
detailed analysis o1· operating methods, particularly in respect of 
branch-line working on the •one-engine-in-steam• principle. 
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No mention was made of chargjng of higher fares and whether this 
would help the revenue of little-used services. Rail-users were 
regarded as merely statistical units, groups of people who could 
simply be switched to a parallel bus service i·f a railw~ were closed. 
In actual fact, rail users are well-defined in their travel habits, 
and cannot simply switch to buses, as has been illustrated by the 
numbers of people who change jobs or buy their own transport, following 
the closure of certain lines. Most of the regular bus travellers 
were captured in the thirties and rail users are in a completely 
different category. 
Despite these criticisms, it cannot be denied that the 
Report revealed the real truth about the terrible state of the railways 
in rural areas, and tbAt,although stated strictly from the B.R. 
point of view, it was an extremely competent economic document in 
maJly WSJTS. As Dr. Beaching! pointed out afte:r the publication of 
the Report, it was really a set of recommendations, and the future 
of the railways lay firmly in the hands of the Government and the 
British people. This paternal advice was qualified, however, by the 
following words: "If this is going to be done, it is well that it 
should be done quickly". ~bvious ly, the railway mMagemen t placed 
great faith in the implementation of their proposals. 
ii). The Proposals. 
The proposals to rationalise and modernise the railways 
were summarised under fifteen counts:-
1. The discontinuation of most stopping passenger services£ 
2. The conversion of the remainder of these services from 
steam power to diesel multiple-units. 
3· The closure of;high percentage ot· small stations~ 
4· Improvement of inter-city passenger services and the 
rationalisation of routes. 
-
J. 
!!_ Dr. Richard Beaching, Chairman of the B.R.B. former Chairman of I.C .I. 
B~ Newspaper reports on Press Conference given by Dr. Beaching (28/3/63) 
c. See Table 16 for details 
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TABLE I6. 
BRANCH RAILWAY CLOSURES FROM !960. 
Beaching Proposals. 
Tiverton Jc. - Tiverton 
Liskeard - Looe 
Taunton- Barnstaple Jc. 
St.Erth - St.Ives 
Okehampton - Plymouth: 
Bere Alston - Okeliampton 
Bere Alston - St.Budeaux 
St.Budeaux(Victoria Rd.)-
Devenport Jc. 
Barnstaple Jc. - Ilfracombe 
Okehampton - Wadebridge 
Halwill - Bude 
Barnstaple Jc •· - Torrington 
Axminster - . Lyme Regis 
Seaton Jc. - Seaton 
Sidmouth Jc. - Sidmouth 
Tipton St.John's - Exmouth 
Exeter Central - Exmouth 
Bere Alston - Callington: 
Gunnislake - Callington 
Bere Alston - Gunnislake 
Halwill - Torrington 
Bodmin Rd./Bodm:i.n N. -
Wadebridge - Padstow 
Losvdthiel - Fowey 
Closure 
Date. 
Under Consideration at 
time of R~port. 
5.!0.64 Tiverton Jc. - Hemyock 
Reprieved Exeter St. DaVid's -
3.!0~66 Dulverton 
Reprieved Churston - Brixham 
Brent - Kingsbridge 
For !968 Reprieved Plymouth - Launceston 
6.9.64 
Reprieved 
3.I0.66 
3.!0.66 
4.'!0 .-65 
29.-II;65 
5.2.66 
6:3.67 
6."3. 67 
Reprieved! 
7 .II.'66 
Reprieved 
I ~·3. ~5 
30.!~67 
30.II~64 
Chacewater - Newquay 
Gwinear Rd; - Helston 
l Closure 
Date. 
9.9.63 
7.I0.63 
4.5.64 
I6 .9 .'63 
3I .I2.62 
28.1.63 
5.II.62· 
TABLE I?.· 
STATION CLOSURES FROM I960~ 
Station. Closure Date. 
Bow 
Brent 
Broad Clyst 
Bugle 
Chacewater 
Churston 
Copple stone 
5~I0.64 
5.-2.66 
5.I0.64' 
Reprieved 
.. 
. . : 
5.I0~64 Cullompton 
Dartmouth( ferry 
Doublebois 
from Kingswear) · 
Exeter St.- Thomas 
Exminster · 
Grampound Road 
Gvd.near Road 
H~le and Bradninch 
Kingskerswell 
King's Nympton 
L.oswithiel 
Luxulyan 
· i'larazion 
Menheniot 
Morchard Road 
Newton St. Cyres 
North Tawton 
Pinhoe 
Quintrel Downs 
Roche 
Sampford Courtenay 
Scorrier 
Seaton Junction 
Sidmouth Junction 
Silverton 
Star cross 
Tiverton Junction 
Whimple 
Yeo ford 
Sampford Peverell Halt 
Burlescombe 
5.I0.64 
Reprieved 
3I.'3.65 
5.J:0.64 
5;.10.64 
5.'10.64 
5.'I0.64. 
Reprieved 
5~'I0.64 
Reprieved 
5.-2.66 
ReprievEid 
5.10.64 
5.2.66 
6.'3.67 
5.''I0.64 
Reprieved 
•• 
5~I0~64 
5.-Io.64 
~· Stations as listed in Beecliing Report;where no date 
is shown,no proposals have been formulated at the 
time or writing(July,I967). 
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5 • A damping-down of seasonal holiday traffic and the 
withdrawal of corridor stock held for them. 
6. The co-ordination of suburban services with other means 
of transport. 
7. Co-ordination of parcels services with the G.p.o. 
8. Increases in the number of block freight trains. Arrange-
ments would be made with the N.C.-B. for loading at the 
collieries and for the establishment of a system of coal-
distribution depots at key points. 
10. 
Reduction of uneconomic freight traffic. 
SldU.,j-to-
Attraction of more~siding-traffic, suitable 
tabled through tral·fic movement. 
11. 'l'he in:troduction of liner trains. 
for time-
12. Concentration of freight sundries traffic on about 100 
main depots throughout the country. 
13. Withdrawal of obsolete freight wa,gons. 
14. Continued replacement of steam by diesel locomotives. 
15. A rationalisation of the fleet of road cartage vehicles. 
By these measures, it was hoped to eliminate the railways I 
d.eficit by 1970. In the South-West, it meant that the whole railway 
map would be changed. The ex-Great Western system would be reduced 
to the main line to Penzance, with branches only to Kingswea.r, Newquay, 
and Falmouth. On the ex-Southern syste.,.,only the main line to Exeter 
from Waterloo would remain, with extensions to Barnstaple and Okehampton4 
It is not surprising that the proposals of such magnitude caused such 
consternllation, eclipsing the impact of the more progressive parts of 
the Report's proposals. 
iii). Implementation. 
In 1962, the former British Transport Commission was abolished 
and the railways' interests were vested under the control of the 
British Railways 1 Board under the chairmanship of Dr. Richard Beaching. 
v1hereas the Transport Act of 1947 mationalised all main-line railways, 
London Transport, and much of the road transport, docks, inland waterways, 
!• See Map No.lO. 
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waterways ,f 
and ancillary undertakings, and placed t:b.em under the control of 
the British Transport Commission, the Act of 1962 has abolished the 
controlling body and created four separate nationalised Boards to 
administer respectively the railways, London Transport, Docks and 
Canals. The Act also created a Holding Company to control all 
nationalised road transport, both passenger and freight (other than 
railway collection and delivery services,- and London Tr~sport bus 
and coach services), which were previously owned by the Commission, and 
most of the ancillary undertakings controlled by them, such as 
Thomas Cook & Son Ltd. The Holding Company also holds shareholdings 
in other undertakings· ·previously held by the Commission. Thus,tbs-. 
1962 Transport Act was the prelude to widespread re-organisation 
throughout the country. 
The British Railways Board began to operate on 1st January,l963, 
and on this date the control of all ex-Southern Region lines West of 
Salisbury was handed to the Western Region. At this time too, the 
Western Region lost considerable mileage to the London Midland Region 
in Central Wales and the :Midlands, and was divided itself into four 
operating Divisions •••• London, Bristol, Cardiff and Plymouth. The 
Plymouth Division covered the whole of the South West Peninsula, 
with eastern boundaries at Weymouth, Salisbury, Westbury and Brid,g· water. 
By this management rationalisation, the Board r~d set the scene for the 
implementation of the Beaching Report, which was published two months 
later. 
Re~ponsibility to carry out proposals was vested in the 
Minister of Transport. Formerly, such-decisions had been made at the 
recommendation of the Transport Users' Consultative Committee, following 
a public enquir-.r to discuss a closure ·case. This procedure was 
changed by Section 56 of the Transport Act, 1962, ·which detracted 
from the powers of the T. U .C .c 1:;- which had originally been set up by the 
1947 Transport Act.! 
! Both Acts published by H.M.S .0. 
P TE EI GHT . 
iO~ TEHOE BA.JL . The viev; fro m the carria e window as 'Battl e of 
Britain ' Class 4- 6-2 No . 34072 ' 257 Squadron ' attac ~s t h e gradien t 
with the I 2 . I5 I lfracombe- Exeter Central on a J uly day in I 9 62 . 
dortehoe Baru , two miles at I in 36 , is one of the steepest inclines 
on British Railways . The ascent begins at the pl atforr.l of Ilfrac omb e 
station , high above the town . Steep ba~~s such as this are a major 
obstacle t o railv1ay oper a tion in the South est . 
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The 1962 legislation again mandated area committees to arrange 
hearings of objectors, but they only allowed to discuss possible 
hardship. The local committee•s-report on hardship would be 
forwarded to the Central Transport Consultative Committee in London, 
who would forward recommendations, based on possible hardship, to the 
Minister of Transport. The ultimate decision on the closure of a line 
lay with the Minister himself. 
Considerable criticism has been directed against this system 
and the way in which public enquiries have been held, in addition to 
the ~neral indignation against the losses of so many branch lines. 
The limitation of the powers of the Committees has seriously reduced the 
value and purpose of the public enquiries. Objectors at the enquiries 
feel that little notice is taken of what they say, even within the 
context of hardship. Neither the railwaysror the M:?-zlistry of Transport 
appear to be concerned with the preservation of public goodwill. 
Certainly justice is not being seen to be done and it should be. At 
hearings the Chairman has constantly to remind speakers from the floor 
that the Committee are limited to the consideration of hardship, which 
confuses and antagonises the objectors. 
Closure procedure itself is extremely long-winded. Six 
weeks before a proposed closure date, the railway must display a green 
public notice on the stations concerned to inform the public of the"ir 
inte~tions. Objectors are given a statutory period of six weeks in 
which to forward written objections to the area T. U .c .C. ~ssuming 
objections are received (Exminster Station is the only case where there 
we:re none), the Committee arrange a public hearing and the closure date 
is postpo}'led. If the Minister ultimately decides to close a line, six 
weeks notice must be given of closure.. Thus, the mechanics of closing 
a line may take many months; in serious cases where closure is inevi-
table the line may be losing a great deal of money unnecessarily during 
this period. 
A Only •regular' users are advised to forward objections. 
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On the whole, closure proposals have been made in too piecemeal a 
fashion, making it difficult for planning on a regional scale, 
particular~ in the provision of adequate road replacements. In 
fact, the closure of a railway is the largest change in land use not 
requiring planning permission. 
Despite the statutory requirements of t~~ 1962 Act, no 
straightforward public statement is made about a closure. A "brief11 
of a closure proposal is sent to local councils and t~£ T.u.c.c., yet 
the Press may oil~ obtain such information by request. The public 
are informed by the Victorian-type "Public Notices" on local stations, 
or by notices in local newspapers, which is somewhat unsatisfactory. 
Objectors are invited to spend time and money in forwarding statements 
of hardship to the Bristol office of the South Western Area T. U .c .C. 
before a public hearing is arran5-ed. Copies of the objections are 
forw·arded to the railways, who prepare their own carefully-worded replies. 
Only •regular• travellers are invited to forward objections, no criterion 
being placed on regularity of use • 
Thus , the phblic hearings have the aura of farce • To many 
people, they are a platform for putting the railways' view to the 
public. Before each enquiry, the T.u.c.c. Secretary forwards to each 
objector a 1Heads of Information' leaflet, in which the railways' 
replies to the statements of objection are entered. At the hearing 
rail and bus operators are frequently called upon to proclaim the 
suitabUity of the alternative s~rvices. With the hands of the T.u.c.c. 
I 
tied, except on hardship, and the ultimate decision in the hands of the 
Minister, then it is no wonder that the hearings appear to be so one-sided. 
But what is hardship? Distinguishing hardship from in-
convenience is extremely difficult. Apart from this, however, the 
closure of branch lines causes varying degrees of dislocation according 
to the numbers of people affected and the alternatives. The hardship 
(or inconvenience) discussed at enquiries is only that which concerns 
regular travellers; 
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travellers;/ 
the effect of closures on local areas and the region as a whole is 
overlooked and is not investigated in any detail. ·Despite the fact 
that closures are economic decisionsby the ra~lw~s, the questions of 
finances are not allowed to be raised in enquiries. The T.U.C.c. 
receives few firm details from B.R.!, and financial information is reduced 
to a plain statement of total revenue, expenditure, and loss. No-one 
may question these figures, nor the estimates for the costs of simpli-
fied services where these have been given. The Helston branch was a 
case in poin~; no-one conceded the right to point out that the estimate 
for a simplified diesel service was higher than that for a similar service 
on the Plymouth-I..a.unceston and Teign ·Valley lines, both roughly three 
times the length of the Helston line. This decision was the consider-
ation of the railways. and the Ministry of Transport, but not of the 
T.u.c.c. and the public, yet it is the public which suffers when the 
trains cease running •••• just as it is the public who paid the bills 
when the railways were losing unnecessary moneys in the fifties. 
The financial information is·usually based on a census of 
passengers taken by the Railways Board. An estimate is made, with the 
local bus company, of the alternative bus services necessary and also of 
alternative parcels facilities. In principle this procedure is simple 
but it has led to a good deal of confusion. Many branch line services 
were irregular and ran withouttrue relationship to local demand, or to 
connect with main line services. The problem of omnibus connections was 
thus complicated. More confusion is caused by public speculation, or 
by denial by the railways of an expected closure before the public 
notices are placed. In August·, 1964, the prospective Labour candidate 
for Tavistock, Dr. John Ellswort~~, forecasted that the railw~ys wished 
to close the lines between Okehampton~and Plymouth, including the 
Callington brabab·. This was promptly denied by Mr • .D. Pattinson, 
the Plymouth Divisional Manager, yet the closure was announced, albeit in 
a modified form, only_twq months later. 
,L_ See "Guardian" 25•10.63 • 
.!.:_ See Chapter three • 
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At the time of writing, over 75% of the Beaching closure 
proposals have been·acted upon. Few cases ~Ave survived the public 
enquiry, although the railway management has reprieved the lines to 
the Tamar Valley, plus the·stations at Exeter St. Thomas and Starcross, 
and the Minister has reprieved the lines·to Looe and St. Ives. 
Swiftly and efficiently, the railways have forwarded their proposals 
to the Minister, and the original strong public reaction has lar~~ 
wilted in the face of economic reasoning, which·they have been unable 
to question. The reprieves are gratifying, but one regrets thet bad 
cases of Bideford, Tavistock and Bude ·being allowed to proceed.· .All 
are regional centres, and Bude was a much better railhead than 
Okehampton for its hinterland in North Devon and Cornwall.! 
With the public being virtually powerless to intervene, the 
social geography of many parts of the South-West has been radically 
altered within two years. Even the Labour Government, with its 
election promises of. 1964, has proceeded with closures. The future 
will prove the righ~ess, or otherwise, of such decisions. If there 
is blame to be laid, then it must be vested in the politicians and the 
railways, who were responsible for the 1962 Act, a slight on the 
principles of democracy. 
i v). Effects of the Report on the Public. 
The most general effect of the closure proposals on the 
public would s_eem to be the loss of goodwill. It has been 
explained in the above section how the closure procedure has confused 
and angered the public. In many cases, even railwaymen and responsible 
public bodies have stated that there has been a deliberate attempt to 
run-down services in order to inflate the working loss and to present a 
good case for clo~ure • British Rail can withdraw, within the law, 
all but one train on a particular line without reference to the local 
T .u .c .C. Apart from this, there have been many cases of 'jumping the 
gun 1 •••• in the removal of excursion fares. The T.U.C.cs. are unable 
to prevent this, and thus the public has had little confidence in them. 
~ See list of closures in Tables 16 and 17. 
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Traffic removed from the railways by closures has inevitably 
to use the roads. In Devon and Cornwall the road network is very 
dense, but the quality of the roads is generally poor. Even main 
roads are narrow and vdnding; the main A30 and A38 trunk routes 
have both been called "country lanes". The main problem is the congestion 
of the main roads during the summer months by holidayma.kers, especially 
at week-ends, when queues of over five miles are by no means uncommon. 
Most rail travellers are forced to use bus serv1ces, which in most 
cases are unsuitable alternatives. Generally they are slower, more 
expensive, and less convenient for through connections, than the trains. 
In addition, most rail travellers fall into well-defined categories 
of people who can not have a bus-service as their alternative, due to 
inadequate roads. 
In addition to local travellers, holiday-makers and hoteliers 
are also affected by rail closures • The rail traveller is a valued 
. guest in most resorts because he is usually based in the same spot, 
and has a tendency to spend more!. This is contrary to the "holidays-
on-the-cheap" trend, where people live as cheaply as possible by 
touring the area in their cars. Vlliere rail connections to resorts have 
been lost, hoteliers have complained about a decrease in revenue~. 
Ex"tra co-ordination is necessary in the summer months to off-set the 
loss of branch lines. For instance, the closure of the Bude line leaves 
a thirty-mile gap between the rail-head at Okehampton and Bude. Will 
this affect the numbers of rail travellers visiting Bude? A thirty-mile 
trip by bus from Okehampton after a long ~r.ain journey· is not 
particularly inviting. 
Where railways close, the alternative means of transport are 
often bad. On the Loswithiel-Fowey branch, the intermediate settlement 
of Golant is served only by a minor road leadfng down a 1 in 6 hill 
from a 1B1 class road. Former rail travellers had considerable 
difficulty with this hill after the closure of the rail service, although 
a minibus service w~s introd~ced. · 
!.:. See Chapter two, part i v. 
~ Perranporth is a good example of this. 
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Bad road and bus services affect both local people and holidaymakers. 
The latter have the additional problem of luggage; most buses have 
no facilities for the conveyance of heavy luggage, although the use of 
trailers is now permitted. Through the increase in private transport 
and the decline of the surmner extra trains, only" one ·fifth of the South-
West's holiday traffic now arrives by rail. However, it should be 
remembered that though this is proportional~ small, it represents a. 
considerable number of people4 the majority ·of whom travel on the 
peak Saturdays. Are these people to be treated like cattle? The 
danger of complete confusion is very real. Traffic congestion worsens 
every summer, and one feels thatthe ·decline in rail usage will halt. 
Whether British Rail like it or not, they still have a role to pl~ in 
the movement of holiday traffic. 
Yet the railway services to busy resorts like St. Ives and. 
Looe were considered for closure. The Looe branch is admittedly a. 
difficult line to work, but it conveys thousands of passengers in the 
summer. In two years (1963-5), the working loss rose mysteriously from 
£1,000 to £19,000. St. Ives was a difficult case because it has 
possibly the most notorious traffic problems of any resort in Cornwall. 
British Rail stated that bus services could handle the branch line 
traffic with ease, but this view was not upheld by the Minister of. 
Transport, Mrs. Castle, when she repriev~d the line in August, 1966. 
On several Saturdays during the summer, two trains arrive within an 
hour with over five hundred people aboard. The prospect of the con-
gestion that would have been caused by an alternative fleet of buses is 
somewhat staggering. 
One would imagine that the losses in these cases was not 
large enough to justify closure. The important matter which is not 
considered in such cases (e.g. Helston~) is the cost to the public of 
making alternative arrangements and of providing road improvement. 
tor most of the year, the additional traffic could no doubt be borne 
by the road system,. 
~ See Appendix on Torqua.y Survey of Holida.yma.kers. 
b_ See Chapter three • 
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But in summer, the holiday traffic, which is already nearing 
saturation point, just cannot absorb any extra load without road 
improvements. Although this enigma exists for only three months of 
the year, it should be remembered that the holiday industry is the 
most important aspect of the South West's ec·onom;y, whatever local 
bus ine.ssmen may like to think, and ·this in -turn is part of Britain's 
biggest earner of foreign currency. The comfort of the visitor and 
the impression he obtains of the region is all-important for the future. 
In the retention of uneconomic lines for social reasons, 
the question of subsidy is again raised. The present Labour government 
clearly supports the principle of subsidising socially necessary 
transport facilities. As yet, the form of subsidy has not been stated. 
~~ experts have argued that it would be wrong for subsidies to come 
wholly from the Central Government. Why sho1tld all British tax-payers 
pay for remote branch lines they personally never use? The answer 
to this, of course, is ·that the continuing life of rural areas is 
essential to the well-being of the national economy. In the provision 
of recreational facilities and as a source of primary products, the 
rural areas of the nation complement the activities of the densely-
populated local authorities, but the responsibility is clearly that of 
the Central Government. 
With little more oga.."lisation, it would be possible to retain 
a considerable amount of rail facilities for holidaymakers. Yet 
British Rail have discontinued advertisements for resorts in national 
newspapers, and have toned down the information displayed on local· 
stations. At the enquiries held 1u the T .u .c .c. the ·census figures 
for line usage have frequently ~gnored holiday times. 
The local members of the public are affected in a different 
way, as not only does the railway concern its regular users, but also 
other residents of rural are~, who depend on trains for the deliverie·s 
of mails, newspapers, and parcels. 
PLATE NINE . 
BUDE . Bude was typical of the neat seaside termini on the ex-
$outhern Railway system in the South- West . The resort received its 
first train on IOth . August,I898 . Business was brisk for the suQIDer 
season but was light during the res t of the year . Daily through 
coaches from London I!Jaterloo were a feature of the timetable 
until I962 . In this view a s p ecial three-car diesel multiple-
unit stands at the platform on the last day of operations,Ist . 
October,I966.The station is crowded vnth railway enthusiasts and 
other sight- seers . On this day 73 miles of line in North Devon and 
Cornwall, from Okehampton- Bude and 1/adebridge , were closed to 
all traff ic . 
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If distribution is to be entrusted·to road transport, deliveries 
become irregular and less reliable. In bad weather the railways 
have often been the only· means of public transport available, partic-
ularly in North Devon and around Dartmoor. 
For the urban areas, h0\7ever, the closure of branch lines 
is an advantage. With less line occupation by local trains and less 
stations, main line expresses may be··· speeded up. Between Plymouth and 
Paddington the fastest time has dropped below four hours and will prob-
ably be reduced to 3t hours. After the closure of several stations 
on the Cornish main l~ne in October, 1964, the Plymouth-Fenzance 
journey was severed to two hours. Against this, however, one must 
consider the overall possibility that closures cause damage to the 
holiday industry and to the rural economy. 
v). Effects on Staff. 
Obviously; with such a large amount of closure proposals, 
there wou-ld be a reduction in the numbers of staff required. This was 
anticipated in the Report1•, which included a table to prove that there 
had been a progressive reduction in the numbers of starr! throughout 
the country since 1948. On a nation-wide basis, there is a high 
wastage rate among staff in the industry. Thus, it was anticipated 
that the threat of redundancy was not serious and that most of the staff 
displaced could be found alternative jobs. Those workers who had to 
move down a grade when moving elsev;here were promised that they would 
retain the higher grade of pay for up to five years. The small 
numbers of men who could not be accol!llllodated or who would not move, 
were given adequate notice and re-settlement pay, ·payable as a lump 
sum and in weekly instalments for a year. One solgtion to the problem 
in the South-West was to Offer early retirement to men of sixty and 
over. As Mr • .J). Pattinson was quick to explain, there were 13% of the 
railway workers in Devon and 12% in Cornwall in 1962, who came under 
this age grouping. 
A. Opp. Cit., P.50 
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This simplification clouds the iss~ in the South-West, 
for the structure of employment and earnings is different to other 
parts of the country. In the South-West, the average 'V'Teekly wage 
rate is far below rates in other regions. The high wastage rate 
quoted for the railway industry is due to the high proportion of 
workers in Londo?, the Midlands and the North who leave the railway 
for higher-paid situations in industry. In the South-West, railway 
employment is still something of a tradition. Some families in.rural 
areas can boast generations of railway service·.- One has only to 
consider a place like Halwill Junction in North Devon, which existed 
for the railway, to realise the i~portance of railway employment. 
Almost all the workers in that settlement worked for the railways; 
Halwill was the junction for Bude, ·::eadstow, and Torrington, yet now 
all these lines have disappeared. 
In rural areas then, it is evident that the wastage rate 
is low, yet it is here that sweeping redundancies are inevitable. 
For instance, in the proposals for the closure of the line between 
Bere Alston and Okehs.mpton, it was stated by B.R. that the redundancies 
would include three from Bere Alston, nine from Tavistock, one from 
Brentor, three from Lydford, plus thirteen train staff, and thirty-
eight from the Engineering Department. bany of these men are late 
middle-aged and alternative employment will be hard to find. 
It is r.a.rdly surprising tha.t in the South-West there is much 
ill-feeling among railway staff towards the management. Many feel that 
the branch lines are being deliberately run down. Suggestions by 
the staff to the management seemingly fall upon deaf ears. The 
rivalry between the ex-G.W .R. and ex-S·.R. staff still persists. 
Ex-Southern men have held that, sinqe the regional boundary changes 
of January, 1963, the Western Region is murdering the old Southern lines. 
Meanwhile, the Western men are amazed at having-taken over the Southern's 
expensive white elephant v~st of Exeter. The transfer was not 
enthusiastically received, and many felt that the divisional head-quarters 
should have been set ~P in Exeter and not at P~outh. 
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Nevertheless, it waa an administrative decision which should-have been 
taken at Nationalisation. 
The matter of staff redu9tion must be faced honestly. 
Whether lines ·were closed or not, railways in the South-West could not 
cont·mu.e to operate efficiently without a severe pruning of staff. 
A smaller staff should lead to increased efficiency and also to better 
pay for those who remain. The new ma.nS.gement have done their best to 
help the Unions and their members, and co-operation has improved. At 
Laira locomotive depot in Plymouth, thirty drivers agreed to premature 
retirement in 1963, sc that their comrades could retain their jobs. 
In return, these·drivers received a lump sum and 52 weeks on two-thirds 
pay. The management also delayed the closure of the Plymouth-La.unceston 
line so that new jobs could be found for the ~taff. 
:Most of the redundancies have been piecemeal, but there 
have been large cases where mass-unemployment has 'been the threat. 
Until its reprieve in December, 1965, Meldon Quarry, near Okehampton, 
was threatened with closure and many men would have lost their jobs. 
The biggest blunder, however, was inflicted on the salaried staffs when 
the Plymouth Division was disbanded in 19~5, only eighteen months after 
its foundation. In June, 1963, the old divisio~al offices at Exeter 
(Western and southern Regions), Newton..-Abbot, and Plymouth were eliminated 
and staff were moved to the new £500,000 block of offices at Plymouth 
station. At Exeter, only 28 out of two hundred people were left behind 
and £3-400 per person was involved in the move to Plymouth. 
Yet in 1965, came the startling news that the Plymouth Division 
would be absorbed by the Bristol Division, and that most of the expensive 
office accommodation at Plymouth would be let. The ~stery of this 
decision increases when one considers that the Divisional offices at 
Bristol are over-crowded and will have to be housed in new premises, 
which have not yet been built,. Following the decision, there· was a slow 
run-down of staff at Plymouth until only·a quarter of the divisional 
staff are now left there, in the Devon and Cornwall Area offices. 
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The hardship caused has been considerable in some cases. :Many men 
and their families had only just moved to P~outh from Exeter and 
had bought new houses. Since their arrival in Plymouth, the prices 
of houses dropped. Several families lived in the same street in 
one suburb,and a.lVfaced a considerable loss of money when all their 
houses went up for sale a.t the same time. Much resentw.ent was caused 
by the decision, and the management was almost--overw'helmed in finding 
new jobs for large numbers of staff. · A typical case is that of a 
clerk from Plymouth Goods Offices, who was found a. job at the Laira 
:Motive Power Depot Offices. After two months there, he was told that 
his new post did not exist! 
It is small wonder that the railway staff in general have 
become demoralised. The meas~es recommended in the Beaching Report 
are being implemented at a fast rate and the impact on the staff has 
been hard. Again, one must point to the mistakes of the past. If 
staff had already been reduced by phased economies, then this impact 
would have been less hard. 
vi). Effects on Indust_a. 
Much of the hysteria which greeted the Beaching Report 
concerned the loss of passenger· facilities. This tends to cloud 
the fact that a considerable amount of railway revenue, even in a ncn-
indus~rial area like the South-West, is derived from freight. In 
addition to losing passenger services, many lines have also been closed 
to freight traffic, and this has been condemned'at public meetings as 
a discouragement to industrial development. 
Local govermment officials and businessmen seem to overlook 
the fact that the South-West is not primarily an industrial area. 
Industrial growth is-concentrated around·certain points and these are 
around the South Coast of the peninsula!. From the railways' point 
of view, the carriage of freight in the region was highly uneconomic 
~ See Chapter one. 
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high~ uneconomic/ 
as too much of it originated from small country stations in single 
wagon-loads. In future, the traffic that the management will pu.rsue 
will be only that which is suitable for block train-loads. 
Tradional freight in the region will continue to be handled 
if there is a sufficient qua,ntity. When l~azion station was closed, 
the horticultural traffic was diverted to St. Erth and Penzance. From 
November to June, however, the station will be re•opened for the 
special brooco~~ trains. If the Tamar Valley Rationalisation is 
completed, through vans of horticultural produce will be·despatched to 
Plymouth for the main line. Tr..ere may be some difficulty in North Devon, 
but it is hoped that a new fr~ight handling centre at Wadebridge will 
help. In the immediate future, china clay will probably continue to be 
the most important.commodity handled, and it is hoped to capture more 
traffic from the ro.ads. Through milk tra~ will continue to be an 
important feature of the freight train pattern. 
Obviously, some farmers and industrialists will be adverse~ 
affe.cted by the changing pattern in freight handling, but there is 
unlikely to be any large-scale dislocation. The chief sufferers would 
appear to be the fish trade and the holiday industry. ~he latter 
has been discussed in res~ct of passenger traffic, but in 1965, the 
fishing industry was delivered a crushing blow by an increase in 
carriage rates. In Cornwall, there was an increase of 50% and later 
Brixha.m was affected by increases of up to 350%· Fishing is a declining 
industry and its produce has become increas~ngly uneconomic for rail 
transport, unless in large quantities. 
Since the seconlWorld War, the industries which have been 
attracted to Devon and Cornwall have been of the 'light' variety. 
Very few of th~se firms use rail transport at all, and some are not 
near a railway line. At E:t;neset~le, Plytnouth, there are several 
factories beside the ex-Southern Region main line, yet none has a rail 
siding. 
-72-
Thus there would seem to be little reason fqr alarm. Morbid 
forecasts have been made of a 11 vicious circle" ••••• t:b.at "if the 
railways were shut down, no industry would be attracted to the area11 • 
This argument overlooks the fact that there has been no proposal to 
weaken the main line network. If industries require rail transport, 
then they naturally choose a site near a main railway line. Whatever 
optimists may hope, no substantial changes are likely to be made to the 
existing 'industrial structure. - lVIany lines which are on the closure 
lists l~ve not affected development for over fifty years, and are hardly 
likely to now. In addition, there are unlikely to be any new 
discoveries of natural resources. 
No doubt new industries will come to the South-West, but 
few of these will depend on rail transport. Only increased efficiency 
and a rationalised system of freight handling will encourage 
industrialists requiring rail transport to come to the region. The 
showpieee of the new system will be the liner train depot at Plymouth, 
and it is hoped that this will be an enco.uragement to new developers. 
1. H.M.S.O. -The Re-ShaPing of British Railways, 1963. 
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CHAPl'lliR FIVE 
THE POST-BEECHING PERIOD 
i). The Plymouth Division; Efforts at Rail-Road Co-ordination. 
The South-West was one of the worst hit areas under the 
Beaching programme of line and station closures. With this and the 
stagnant economy of the region in mind one might have expec.ted the new 
officers of the Plymouth Division, appointed in January, 1963, to sit 
back and watch the inevitable disintegration of the Division. Instead 
there was a strenuous pursuit of fresh traffic and of more economic 
methods of working by the young management force. A new team spirit 
emerged at Plymouth and in the Exeter sub-office, despite the regional 
boundary changes. 
Line. and station closure plans outlined in the ·Report had 
"C;! . 
envisaged a reduction in the number of places of railway business 
from around 300 to 50. There was a careful scrutiny of all cases with 
a view to reducing losses. New business was sought vigorously. At 
the instigation of British Rail a South Wales Miners' Holiday Camp was 
established near Looe. Each Friday in the summer a special N.U.M. 
train from South Wales was booked to Looe returning with those who had 
finished their fourteen days. At Looe the goods yard was converted 
into a .money spinning car park. All signalling and point-work was 
removed from the station and the branch was worked on the "one-engine-
in-steam" principle with a diesel railcar. Economies were also made 
on the Newquay branch but after the 1964 summer it was thought that 
the measures were too stringent and so the 1965 service was augmented. 
On closures which were inevitable there was a drive to 
establish rail and road direct passenger links at the rail-heads. 
The Divisional Manager, Mr. David Pattinson, was also a director of three 
1bus companies in the region - The Devon General, The Western National 
and The Southern Na tio:n.C!l 
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Thus, his position approached the ideal of being the area transport 
manager. For connections the railways succeeded in getting many 
•buses diYerted to station yards. 'Bus services were re-timed to 
connect with long-distance trains. If trains were late a stipulated 
period of time for holding the 1bus was arranged. If the period of 
lateness was exceeded a duplicate service was run. Experiments were 
first conducted on the Taunton-Minehead branch where the last train was 
replaced by a connecting •bus. Perhaps the most significant measure was 
that from summer 1964 many •bus connections were shown by a symbol in 
the railway time-table. A number of •bus services to rail-less resorts, 
including Brixham, Helston, Perra.nporth and King;bridge, were displayed 
in the tfme-tables. Through fares to these places were made available 
from railway stations all __ over the Country. 
Advertisement was essential, for the railway management had to 
break down a great deal of consumer resistance to 1bus services. 
In a way, the railways were walking a tightrope as on some connecting 
•bus services some loss was inevitable at first. The railways were 
pledged to reimburse to the 1bus companies 1 losses made on alternative 
•bus services, a provision made in the Transport Act, 1962. Luggage 
was a problem. In the old G .vr .R. ar..d pre-Beaching time-tables the 
•bus connections advertised were always qual;i.fied with the notice 
"Heavy Luggage not Ccnveyed". IJ.•he railways sought to overcome this 
problem by reserving the rear group of seats· in a vehicle for luggage 
storage. The Western National had already tried this with some 
success. Now it is hoped that luggage trailers will be attached to 
'buses1 as Parliamentary sanction has been granted. 
To encourage customers car-parking facilities have been 
improved at many stations. At Plymouth an automatic car park with 
slot machines for coin and season-ticket tokens was installed and 
became an instant success. Many new travel inducements were introduced 
aimed at selling rail travel to the business man. 
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Some anxiety has been expressed a~ the future influence of 
the railway in the rail-less towns. The answer will most probably 
be a chain of rail marketing offices in such towns to sell both 
passenger ~~d freight facilities on behalf of the nearest rail-head. 
The Plymouth Division received a commission for ~his from Paddington, 
to be used as an experiment for the whole of the Western Region. 
Another way in which the railway hopes to retain its influence in 
such areas is to have an S.T.D. enquiry service in conjunction with 
the G.P.O. By dialling a code customers may have their enquiries 
answered by a competent trained staff at one of the main enquiry offices. 
Such_enquiries may easily be turned into lucrative railway business 
by the astute enquiry officer. By these measures and by better public 
relations and advertising it is hoped that the influence of the railways 
in the So~th-West will be as strong as ever before. Certainly, there 
has been established a precedent in road-rail co-operation. 
ii). Faster and Better Passenger Trains. 
In the passenger field there was little hope of attracting 
any completely new traffic to public transport. Traffic flows were 
already well defined. Owing to the distances involved and the pre-. 
dominant rural population, there was little requirement for long-
distance public transport in some areas, particularly in the North. 
Because of the elongate s:b.ape of the peninsula most long-distance 
travellers travelled between west and east. Communication between 
north and south was difficult and slight. Thus, the publicity campaign 
devised by the P!ymouth Division was aimed at those people who were 
already travelling long distances but by other means of transport. 
Speed and comfort were the main theme of the drive for business. 
For many years Plymouth businessmen had demanded an efficient 
air service to London. After successful test running with 2,700 h.p. 
diesel hydraulic locomotives the railways countered this demand with the 
"Golden Hind" express train.This left Plymouth at 07.05 hours each 
Monday-Friday and reached Paddington at 10.55. 
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The 3 hours 50 minutes running time now includes stops at Newton 
Abbot, Exeter st. David's and Taunton.. The return leaves Paddington 
at 17.25 and arr.ives in Plymouth at 21.15. By this service, for the 
first time ever, the Plymouth businessman ha8 been able to reach London 
before eleven o'clock and return home during the evening after a good 
day's business. From Newton Abbot there is another train, making 
four stops, which leaves at OG~25 and arrives in London at 10.30. 
Soon it is hoped that the "Golden Hind" may become a Pullman service 
when the "Birmingham Pullman" diesel sets are released after the 
Euston-Birmingham electr~fication is complete.· New trains like these 
beat traffic congestion between the London airports and the central 
area, especially when the ev~ning rush hour bars roads to Heathrow. 
For air travellers the Western Region introduced a new facility -
through boo'kings to the airport via~ Slough in conjunction with B.E .A.!· 
Travellers on the main line to·~~terloo may also reach the airport 
via. Basingstoke. 
In .time, it is hoped to reduce the Plymouth-London time to 
3ihours or less. On 3rd June, 1965, a special seven-coach train was 
run from Paddington to Plymouth, hauled by two 1,750 h.p •. diesel 
electric locomotives, which reached Plymouth in 3 hours 16 minutes. 
The return journey was made via. Bristol and was completed in 3 hours 
26 minutes. West of .f'lymouth too it is hoped to make improvements 
in timing on the difficult Cornwall main line. The way was paved by 
the closure of five intermediate stations on 5th October, 1964. 
Previous to this an experiment had also been made with a test train, 
stopping at the ten stations to ·remain, which completed the Plymouth-
Fenzance run in 2 hours 5 minutes. 
Cross-country services had always been notoriously bad. 
The improvement has now begun, and communications with South Wales, 
the Midlands, and the North-are better than ever before. F~lf an 
hour has been cut from the journey to Bristol, so that it is now reached 
in tl'l..ree hours • 
~ Now via. Reading. 
PLATE TEN . 
PLY OUTH STATION . A symbol of the new era in South ~estern railway 
development ,a ' Warship ' class 2 ,200 H. P . diesel - hydraulic leaves 
Plymouth with the I0.30 expr ess to Paddington on a bleak January 
day i n 1965 . 
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Plymouth passengers may _now leave their city at 06';•35 hours and be in 
Cardiff by n.oo or Sheffield by 14.00. 'l'wo -and a half hours have 
been cut from the marathon journeys to Manchester and Liverpool. 
At Bristol, connections are made with the accelerated services to the 
Midlands and the North-East. These improvements are only the 
beginning, however. One sees no reason why the Plymouth-Bristol 
journey should not be reduced to 2t hours, an_d the Plymouth-Manchester 
run to six hours. :Much more progress could be made on the ex-Midland 
Railway route to Birmingham, Sheffield, and York, v;hich is badly-affected 
by coal-mining subsidence in West Yorkshire. One idea worth trying 
would be to extend one of the daily Newcastle-Bristol services to 
Plymouth in both directions, to speed the journey up and to lessen the 
need fur changing trains.!· At present, the fastest way to get between 
Newcastle and Plymouth is via London, taking nine hours, compared with 
1~ hours·-· via. the Midlands. The route from South West to North East 
has considerable traffic potenti~l and is w-orthy of development. 
Traffic flows are constantly being studied with a view to 
time-table planning, and the railways are more flexible to demand 
than ever before. For instance, there was a constant demand for 
an evening train to Paddington from Plymouth later than the 16.30 
hours. In order to exploit the passibility, B.R.- experimented with an 
18.30 departure en Friday evenings. This move was apparently un-
justified, but it 'is something that may be tried again in the future. 
Another example of the new attitude is afforded by the staff who 
reported that the Sunday 16.30 Plymouth-Paddington lvas often over-
loaded beyond Newton Abbot. Sometimes 250 people '"ere sta.."'lding when 
the train reached Paddington. To meet this increased de~d for 
Sunday travel, an extra train now departs from Paignton on Sundays at 
17.00 hours, and Newton Abbot at 19.30 hours, and the problem of 
overcrowding bas now been solved. 
~ At the time of writing, this is done on Saturdays only. 
With the 10.45 Newcastle-Plymouth. There is no balancing train 
from Plymouth. 
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The biggest potential problem facing the Plymouth Divisional 
officers was that of the summer peak. But this problem has largely 
soav.ed ·itself,s because the numbers of travellers coming to the South 
We$t by rail reduced itself by 10% per annum in the early sixties. 
Now the railways handle only 20% of the holiday traffic. When new 
roads become available, this proportion may yet become still smaller. 
At the moment, large numbers of people still use the railway services 
to beat traffic congestion. The railways' answer to congestion, 
the car-carrier train, has yet to prove itself economically, but it is 
hoped that its popularity will continue to increase. The poor 
economic ·situation is not really due to the operating method of these 
trains, but to the traditional habits of starting and finishing holidays 
on Saturda.Ys. It is essential that the peak must be spread if the 
railways are to remain in the holiday business. Pressure has been put 
on hoteliers ~~d boarding-house-keepers to accept mid-week bookings 
and also for employers to stagger holidays and to let more workers 
start mid-week. If this were done, then B.R. might start to combat road 
competition by going into the car-hire business, guaranteeing the 
holidaymaker a car to tour the area from the moment of his arrival in 
the South-West. This would not cut the railways' throat, as rail 
closures have limited the scope and value of the traditional "Holiday 
Runabout" tickets, whose sal.es a~ now dropping. 
Local services are not being neglected where they are to be 
retained. Complete dieselisation of all branches has now t~{en place, 
and most services have been accelerated. Better connections are made 
with lon~-distance trains. Exeter St. David's is an excellent example 
of a focal point, where numbers of inter-connections may be mad~. 
To accompany the revolutionarJ changes in train services, a 
new time-table booklet was designed for the Western Region of B.R. 
It is much simpler than the old ones, uses the twenty-four hour clock, 
and explains most facilities by the use of clear symbols. Instead 
of separate summer and w-inter time-tables, one book will suffice for 
a whole year. 
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The first issue of the new-look time-table was issued in June, 1964, 
but this unfortunately smudged its public image by remaining in 
circulation a mere six months. Closures and vast numbers of train 
alterations caused a reprint to be necessary. In June, 1965, a 
new issue was published and this lasted its advertised course, until 
April, 1966. The original time-table produced a stor~ of public 
criticism, but the new edition was infinitely momacceptable. 
Now tha1{1;he pattern of .railways in the South-West becomes 
settled, these new time-tables will become symbols of the revolution 
in rail passenger transport in the region. Despite closures and former 
confusion, there is great hope for the future. 
iii). The Drive for More Freight Traffic. 
Industry· in the South-West is at a low level of development, 
and although the government has promised expansion, there is little 
likel~hood of there being any substantial changes in the industrial 
structure of the region. Almost all the possible new freight potential 
lay in existing business which was moved by alternative means of 
transport. Ironically, to improve services to move freight suitable 
for rail transport, it was necessary to discard most of the small goods 
stations, which handled freight mainly by the wagon-load. Thus, a 
great deal of traffic suitable for rail transport was travelling by road, 
whilst the railways were handling large amounts of traffic which could 
be bet.ter handled by road. 
In recent years, the main outlJi_ng product has been china clay. 
Most of the railway share of the china clay traffic takes the route 
from St. Blazey to the docks at Fowey. Before the formation of the 
Plymouth Division in 1963, it became evident that the service to the 
clay industry was not efficient enough for modern conditions. There 
was a threat of a new deep-water harbour at Par, which would be served··_ 
by road. One of the first major tas1(8 of the new organisation was to 
modernise the railways r docks at Fowey and to improve the rail services 
from the clay-pits. _ 
i 
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China clay has certain problems of transport. It must be conveyed 
in clean wagons and cannot be air-blown. To solve this problem, the 
railways assembled 845 specially-maintained trucks for the clay traffic. 
After experiments with nylon and polythene, glass-fibre proved to be 
a satisfactory wagon lining. Such improvements have increased the 
export of clay from the docks by 250,000 tons per annum. Increased 
efficiency has also led to a rise in clay traffic at ~arsh Mil~ 
near Plymouth, to ·which the clay is piped from the pits at lee Moor, 
on the edge of Dart moor. 
Much of the internal trade in china clay is maintained by 
road transport. To win back some of this traffic, B.R. have introduced 
a selected block train to serve three rai1-heads in the Potteries, plus pi.o.ce.s 
in Lancashire .and Scotland. In early 1967, the "Clayfreighter" block 
train, from St;;!: Bla~ey to paper mills in Kent, was also introduced. 
For the first time, tank wagons are being used to carry liquid Slurry. 
Other such trains may follow, and more traffic will be won back from 
the roads. 
The other important gToup of products leaving the region by 
rail is provided by farming and market gardening. Milk is the most 
regular traffic, as there are two daily milk trains to London from 
West Cornwall and one from North Devon. Rail-served milk depots are 
situated ~t St. Erth, Loswithiel, Saltash, Totnes, Torrington, Hemlfock, 
and Seaton~. Recently, production has been increasing, but the railway 
wagon fleet is largely obsolete. The continuance of rail transport 
in this field depends on the acquisition ·of new vehicles; ·:eo give 
41\o£ 
a greater capac·i ty per trainl\per vehic!J;~;o Equipment to match the 
flexibility of the road vehicle is also desirable, either in the form 
of road vehicles mounted on flat wagons, or an adaptation of the road-
railer idea. 
Meat is another similar traffic which arouses business 
possibilities. At the moment, almost all the South-West's meat 
production is taken away by road, but a block train could be successful, 
considering the predominance of livestock in the region's farming 
structure and the great numbers of cattle auctions and abbatoirs. 
PLATE ELEVE • 
HEHYO • Iilk is one of the most important frei ght traffics on 
the railways in the Sout h - · est .In this s c ene , Class 'I4 X' truL~ 
engine No .I462 shunts tank wagons at the Hemyock milk depo t on 
Sunday, I 2 th . February , I 96I . Hemyoc is the termi nus of the 7~--mile 
Culm Valley line from Tiverton Junction on the Taunton- Exeter 
main line. Wh en this view· was tru: en, the line boas t ed a passenger 
serVice,but this VIas discontinued on 5th .October,I964 . To the 
r ight can be seen the former Barry Railway coach which sufficed 
for the meagre patronage. 
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Among the prototype liner train equipment introduced in 1964 was a 
25 r 911 insulated meat container, which is more· than a match for the 
high capacity refrigerated road wagons. A daily block meat train 
could be run from mid-Cornwall to London, reversing at Exeter St.David 1s 
and continuing via. the ex-Southern main line. Several new meat depots 
;Bave been opened on the latter route between Sali:G.bury and Exeter. 
. -, 
The economics of transporting fruits, flowers and vegetables 
depend on the seasonal fluctuations in flow· of the different commodities. 
However, witp the use of adaptable vehicles, competitive rates, and assured 
arrival in Londc~ and other centres, the railways can continue to 
provide an attractive service. The first action of the new management 
in 1963 was to conduct a drive for increased traffic in broccoli. 
Br~ccoli had always been a traditional traffic in G.W.R. days but much 
of this trade had been lost to the roads. This was trlS result of 
bad handling in London rather than mis-management in Cornwall. Now 
the broccoli traffic is beginning to increase again, thanks to the 
business efficiency of ~~e Varketing and Sales Department of the Division. 
To show how seriously the railways regard this traffic, the example 
must be quoted of th~ railway representative who grows all known types of 
Cornish broccoli in his garden at Redruth, so that he can anticipate 
when to move for the business. A similar agricultural representative 
is responsible for Devon, and·there is also a special representative 
for the clay _industry who"has actually worked in the industry himself. 
Provided the rail vehicle is a flexible unit, the railways 
should maintain a sizeable share of the traffic in other market 
garden products. Knowledge of the industry is essential, so that 
potential business deals may be anticipated. An example of the 
advantages of rail transport over road in the swift transport of 
produce in bulk is afforded by the handling of early French potatoes 
at Millbay Docks, Plymouth, on Easter Sunday, 1964. The vessel 
bringing the potatoes docked at 08.00 hours, and by 13.55 two long-
distance freights were on their way •••• one to Crewe and one to Newcastle •. 
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This is but one example of what can be achieved with continuous-
braked trains and diesel traction. Wherever suitable business is, 
the railways now seem keen to find it and to·handle it efficiently 
at short notice. 
iv). Centralisati<m of Freight Facilities. 
The South V'!est is primarily a freiBbt-receiving area, and the 
old system of distribution was extremely uneconomical. Most of 
the produce came in single wagon-loads in slow, loose-coupled freights 
which served a multitude of small goods stations and yards all over 
the peninsula. Under the proposals of the Beaching Report, most of 
these small goods stations will be eliminated and frei~t handl~ng will 
be concentrated in large stnrtegically-placed depots, relying on road 
haulage for the final distribution to the consumer. What is more, with 
more efficient working, it is thought that the network of distribution 
can be maintained without a sizeable increase in the road haulage fleet. 
One of the main reasons for the existence of the old network 
of small rural goods stations was the demand for agricultural products 
as and when the customer required them. 'l'here is still the saMe 
pattern of demand, but the marketing staff are gradually convincing the 
customer that the advantages of rail can be made cheaper if he collects 
his produce from a rail concentration depot, served with supplies by 
scheduled block trains. In February, 1964, a train of animal feed was 
introduced to run every Friday to Cornwall from ·British Oil and Cake 
Mills \varehouses at Avomnouth. This fifty-wagon train of 500 tons rtms 
non-stop to Plymouth, then calls at St. Austell, Truro, and Penzance. 
From Truro, a portion is tripped to a depot at Penryn. A year later, 
a similar train was introduced from Joseph Ra~k at Barry. If trains 
of this type can be run with the co-operation of. agriculturalists, the 
railways can_charge competitive rates and remain in the farm business. 
As wlth• outgoing traffic, the flexibility of the wagon fleet is 
essential, and this is being achieved. 
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For instance, when B.R. were faced with a shortage of GRANO (Grain) wagons 
to service three grain mills near Exeter, they adapted CovHops 
(covered hopper wagons) for this purpose, an experiment which was 
a success. 
All fuel supplies for the South-West must be imported to 
the region, and this affords the greatest opportunities for block 
train working. Coal, the traditional railw~y freight, comes mainly 
by sea, and it will be a difficult matter to compete with coastal 
shipping. Despite this, the railways are hitting back. With the 
co-operation of the N.C.B., a coal-concentration depot has been 
successfully established at Taunton, and more are to follow •••• at 
Exeter, P~outh, Newton Abbot, and several places in Cornwall. These 
depots will be served by liock trains of special wagons, with doors in 
the bottom, so that the coal can be off-loaded on a staithe, equipped 
with automatic weighing and bagging apparatus. Oil distribution 
depots will be set up in a similar fashion by contracts with the Oil 
Companies. The pioneer unit was established at Heathfield on the 
Newton Abbot-Moretonhampstead branch, where·there is also a F,yffes' 
Banana depot, served from Southampton docks. 
ltiscellaneous goods handling is to be revolutionised under 
the National Sundries Plan. Large new goods depots will be set up, 
served by road transport. The largest depot in the South-West will 
be at Friary Station, Plymouth, and it is hoped that this depot will 
be a terminal for liner trains •••• continuous-bral~d trains travelling 
at express passenger speeds. In this new plan, there is provision 
for the use of vehicles which can be adapted for either rail or road 
use. Freight h~dling throu~ut the South-West will be concentrated 
into just a few depots. 
One problem that must be overcome ·is that of the steep 
gradients between Newton Abbot and Plymouth. The working of heavy 
block freights on this section of main line is complicated by the 
exertion of strong forces on the drawbars of wagons when such a train 
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such a train/ 
is ascending a bank. One answer may be to copy the American method 
of putting a 1slave 1 locomotive in the centre of the train, the 
performance of this locomotive being geared to the train engine 
to distribute the force exerted on the drawb~. However, a simpler, 
and possibly more economic, solution migh be to limit the size of 
freight trains taking this section of line, and to split them where 
necessary. 
As far as possible, freight train working in the future will 
be concentrated on the main lines, although branches and sidings will 
be maintained for industry wgich requires a rail link and can justify 
it in volume of traffic, like china clay. It is hoped that a swifter, 
more efficient service will tend to attract industry and dispel the 
fears of those who prophesy.that branch line closures tend to discourage 
it. Undoubtedly, British Rail mean business and they have plenty of 
scope. In Cornwall, it has been estimated that there are 13,000 
separate industrialists, including farmers, and most of these use 
road transport. The railways ha.rldle considerable volumes of milk and 
horticultural produce, but they could also handle more clay and stone.! 
Although carrying 75% of the products of Cornwall 1 s main engineering 
firm, the railways bring only 30% of the coal entering the county. 
Marketing and sales staff obviously have a tremendous task to change 
the traditional ways of freight handling, but it is anticipated that the 
good results achieved so far will convince more local industrialists 
of the advantages of modern rail transport. 
v). Other AsPects. 
Although the drive .for more busines~ is proceeding satisfactor-
ily in the South-West i tsel1', more promotion is necessary in London, the 
Midlands, and the North •••• both to attract passengers and to 'sell' the 
region to industrialists. The tourist industry has been neglected by 
the new management. 
~ Fact revealed by s.w. Export Assoc. 12/64. 
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In conjunction with local authorities, the railways used to display 
holiday posters all over the country, and all advertisements in 
national newspapers for resorts on the South~West would carry the 
slogan "Travel by i:rain". Something more should be done along these 
lines to promote the South-West as a holiday area, and to publicise the 
advanta@es of rail travel to the area in these days of traffic congestion. 
At home, however, the Western Region undertook,in 1964, a 
survey seeking to link new industry with rail transport, to show the 
railway flag where new industries are likely to arise, and where it can 
co-operate with local authorities in their bids for development of 
this type. Where lines close, the·railways are selling land to 
attract industry. In cases of threatened closure the area served by 
the line is studied as a future prospect in the hope that it can be re-
tained. The news of the survey was enthusiastically received in the 
region; one local newspaper reported that it could "spark off economic 
development in Coi:Tlwall on a large scale". Other lines of enquiry 
were made as to wl1at kinds of industries would be attracted and what 
their traffic prospects were likely to be. 
Modernisation of equipment has proceeded apace since the 
new regime assumed power. Steam traction has now "been abolished and 
dieselisation is complete. In this respect, the South West was one 
of the first areas in the country to achieve a complete changeover. 
Trains aFe now clean, swift and.efficient. Diesels have quicker turn-
around times and thus a smaller locomotive fleet is necessary. In 
addition the number of locomotive depots in Devon and Cornwall has been 
reduced, from 10 in 1960 to 3 in 1966, at·Newton Abbot, Laira (Plymouth) 
and St. Blazey. 
Signalling and telecommunications are being improved also. 
Many intermediate signal boxes on main lines have been closed in 
addition to those on branch lines. The Plymouth area is practically 
controlled by one signal box at P~outh station. 
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. Ci.r\cl. 
In the near future it is hoped that re-signallingAsimplification 
of the layout will be ·started at Taunton. At Exeter, with its key 
role in the South-West's rail network, a traffic control centre 
has been set up to assume the functions of the old Western and 
Southern centres. Eve~t.ually, the whole of the control of the 
South-West will be invested in two centres. 
Despite these glowing reports of modernisation, 
efficiency, and progress, the initial wave of success seems to have 
abated, by a series of strokes of mis-management from above, bad luck, 
and by a measure of local inefficiency. The first blow was the 
transfer of the Divisional ~anager, Mr. D. Pattinson, to London 
Division in September, 1964. This was a great disappointment, as 
ldr. Pattinson was the figu_Tehead of the railways 1 comeback bid. 
1~ local authorities and businessmen had become accustomed to 
dealing with him, and he had gained a tremendous amount of respect. 
Almost a year later, this news was fo.llowed by the incredible 
decision that the Plymouth ··Division was to be abolished and absorb-
ed by the Bristol Division. However, it was·pledged that "a 
strong management team will remain at Plyinouth", and Mr.J .J .Donovan 
was appointed Manager, Devon and Cornwall· area. The latter 
proviso, needless to say, did not cool the angry reaction of the 
local M.Ps. and the fears of the staff and the public. There has 
always·been a resentment of Bristol's role in the affairs of the 
South-West, imposed by the central government. 
Between these two blows, the second stage Beaching Plan, 
'" l 11'rhe Development of Trunk Routes" • was introduced in February, 1965. 
Included with this plan was a map, which showed routes for which 
development was proposed. On this map, the main line in the 
South-West was shown as ending at Plymouth, and this caused an 
immediate outcry in Cornwall. Many local bodies interpreted it 
as a plan to retain only the lines actually shown on the map, and 
suggestions were even made that Cornwall should assume control of 
her own transport system. 
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In fact, what the map did show was the routes which had been 
selected for "intensive development" only. The aim of the report's 
proposals was to streamline the railways' network of trunk routes, to 
cause an expanding market for both freight and passenger traffic. 
The report was not the 'prelude for closures on a grand scale', but the 
basis for better planning. Eventually, route costson the trunk routes 
would be reduced to about half the 1965 level, by concentration on 
cheap bulk movement. Only by lowering costs on the main trunk routes, 
would it be possible to justify the large sums of money necessary for 
maintenance, renewal and improvement of all existing through routes to 
be retained in the future pattern. 
Another cause of concern was that the Reading-Taunton section 
of the Paddington-Penzance main line was also. omitted,~ plus the 
Salisbury-Exeter main line. This was interpreted by the public as a 
proposal to 'divert all Plymouth-London trains via. Bristol and to close 
the Reading-Taunton line. M.Ps. angrily pointed to the large sums 
of money which had already been spent on the improvement of the existing 
route via. Westbury. The logic of the map, however, can easily be 
interpreted. Between Paddington and Bristol the selected trunk route 
also carries traffic from London to South Wales; between Bristol and 
Plymouth it carries traffic between the South-West, the Midlands, South 
Wales and the North. The comp~at.ively lightly-used Westbury route 
does not require much more cieve lopmen t. The mast pleasing feature of 
the map was the inclusion of the route from the North-East to the 
South-West via. leeds, Sheffield, Derby, Birmingham and Gloucester. 
Despitethis, the ·adverse publicity given to this Report was a bad blow 
to the public ima~ of the railways, especially in Cornwall. 
Another cause of public disapproval has been the spate of 
diesel locomotive failures, which at one stage reached 15-18 per week. 
In the early days of diesel traction, it was possible to attribute such 
failures to •teething troubles~ but this is no longer an. adequate excuse, 
especially in an area where there is great nostalgia for the days of 
steam traction. 
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Most of the diesel locomotives employed in the South-West differ from 
those elsewhere on B.R. in that they have hydraulic transmission 
equipment. Diesel-hydraulic locomotives have high-speed engines and 
these appear to be moresusceptible to failure than the normal diesel-· 
electric engines. With steam, it was possible im most cases to get a 
train to where an ailing locomotive could be replaced, but the diesel 
in trouble too frequently stops dead miles from the nearest depot. 
On the first day of diesel traction on the Plj~mouth-Tavistock run, the 
locomotive on an early morning train failed twice and passengers took 
three hours to reach Tavistock. A similar occurrence on the first 
day of diesels on the Callington·branch caused over one hundred workers 
to be late at Devenport Dockyard. Despite many fine performances 
and accelerations., the diesel is hated ·by many people. The image is not 
improved .bY the fact that.many of the main line diesels run in a 
filthy condition, due to the lack of cleaning staff at depots. 
The public has also suffered two -increases in ordinary fares 
since the publication of the Beaching Report. However, the increase 
in day return fares in February, 1966, provoked a public out-cry. 
Even to professional economists, these increases are incredibly bad. 
Workers from Saltash to Devenport faced an increase of over 100% 
on their daily rail fares, from lld. to 2/-; seven-day season tickets 
also increased from 4s. 7d. to 10/-. All over the South-West day 
fares increased from 50,% to 75%· It is early yet, but the effect of 
such increases can only be to drive local customers away. By ~~ch, 
1966,- Plymouth Argyle A.F.C. had reported a marked decline in the 
numbers of Cornish Supporters attending their home matches. 
By such measures imposed by the national railway management, 
the sparkling new image spread by the Plymouth·Division has been clouded. 
Greater morale among the staff has been crushed by the abolition 
of the Plyt!!outh Divj_sion. 
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The prophets of doom again maintain that the railways have no future 
in the South-West, and that ·the economy is being strangled. 
Successive General Managers of the Western Region have pled~d that 
the railways are to stay in the South-West for good. After all, 
over £30 million was spent on modernisation in the area between 1960 
and 1965. But if the railways ~ to stay, they must be used. 
This aim is contradicted by the increases in fares and freight r~tes. 
The imposition of rates charged in other regions of the country will 
not do for the South-West. Better results would be obtained if the 
local mana~men"b) were allow·ed. to state their own rates. From w:b.a.t 
has happened, it would appear that too much· national interference may 
do a great deal of dama~ to the ef1"orts of the men on the spot. 
MAIN REFERENCES USED IN CHAl=TER FIVE. 
1. ·H.M.S.O. "The Development o{ Trunk Routes", 1964. 
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CHAPrER SIX. 
OMNIBUS SERVICES 
i). Development of the Omnibus Network 
The first mptor bus services in the South-West appeared 
before the turn ~f the century and the present system b~ developed 
almost completely by 1930, a rate of expansion which was comparable to 
that of the railways! almost a century before. Growth was concentrated 
into the years following the First V/orld War, which biDd acted as a 
stimulus to mechanical development. Services were evolved by five main 
types of operators in the South-West:-
1. Territorial Companies •••• large companies operating tb..roughout 
the whole region, of which there are two main groups: 
2. 
(a) The Western and Southern National Omnibus Company, the 
largest group, with its Headquarters at Exeter. 
(b) The Devon General Omnibus Company, of Torqua.y, which 
operates over much of south and East Devon. 
Newcomers •••• ex-servicemen with gratuities, 
and business-people who sa.lf!/ a future in public 
transport. 
) 
) PRIVATE 
) 
Village . carriers who started to expand, sometimes ) 
COMPANIES 
in association with a garage. ) 
4. Railway Companies, especially the Great Western Railway. 
The pioneer bus operator was the LYnton and Bar.nstaple Railway 
but the Great Western Railway bought out their vehicles 
and developed railway bus operation with a service from 
Helston to the Lizard in 1910. 
5. . Municipal undertakings •••• with buses and trams. Plymouth and 
Exeter both have large omnibus fleets. 
~ See Chapter two, Part l. 
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Daring the rapid expansion of the twenties, the railways 
originally regarded the omnibus companies as allies. They also 
began to experiment with their own feeder bus services and many branch 
and light-r~ilway schemes were abandoned,! for it was realised that 
the omnibus was the cheapest form of short-distance transport in the 
South West with its areas of sparse population, especially around the 
moorlands and in the northern part of the peninsula • .!! The Railway 
Management hoped that local bus services would stimulate travel and 
traffic for the long-distance trains but as the bus companies expanded 
they became a serious rival to the Railways in the region by the end of 
the twenties. Not only did the bus companies duplicate the rail services; 
of the dense network of branch lines, but they also started to ~perate 
long-distance services with the Royal BltieQ express services to the 
South Coast and London. 
Events during the period 1928-30 decided the whole form of 
transport in the peninsula and are at the bases of many of the problems 
which exist to-day. The government of the time and the railways were 
jointly responsible. When the railways realised that the omnibus 
companies were making vast inroads into rural traffic they made two 
mistakes; firstly, they maintained branch-line and stopping-train 
services in full~ and even constructed many new halt stations in rural 
areas instead of conceding that the omnibus was more economic in such 
places; secondly, they began to invest in the omnibus themselves, 
seeking some of the rewards. By 1927 the Great Western Railway was 
carrying more than 8,000,000 passengers a year ·on its omnibuses •••• 
over two million in the South-West. The following year all the 1big 
four• railw~v companies obtained powers to more fully engage in railway 
operations themselves. The Great Western joined with National Omnibus 
Company to develop road services; at this time the National already 
owned a substantial mileage in the South West. 
~ The last built was the Halwill-Torrington light railway (1925) 
B. See Map 4· 
.£:.. Developed by Natiomil Company 
1k See Chapter two, part 2. 
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In fact, this step was taken with the deliberate aim of protecting 
railway capital and must be regarded as a ··commercial decision. 
Public need was a secondary consideration. 
During 1929, the two largest territorial omnibus groups in 
the country •••• Tilling and British Electric Traction •••• joined with the 
railways. By this the railways became part-owners of most provincial 
omnibus companies whose strength was augrnente~ by railway capital. 
In the south-West this meant that the railways became mlf-owners in the 
Western and Southern National and the Devon General Omnibus Companies, 
for the National was acquired by Tilling in 1931 and the Devon General 
was part of the B.E~T. Group. With well over 1,200·vehicles these 
companies together dominate operations in the region. However, by 
their actions at this time the railways committed economic suicide, 
as we have seen.! 
The most lJI:Ominent event in the history of road transport was 
the Road Traffic Act of 19301!... In the twenties entry into the industry 
was unrestricted and no licence was required. ·· The 1930 Act set up the 
Traffic Commissioners to be responsible for licencing and the entry into 
the industry of newcomers. Devon and Cornwall became part of the 
Western Traffic Area with its Headquarters at Bristol, one of eleven 
such areas in the country, each controlled by a panel of Commissioners. 
The panel consists of several part-time Commissioners under a paid 
Cr~irman, who is effectively responsible for all decisions on licencing. 
A senior official, the Certifying Officer, is responsible for the 
structural and mechanical safet;y of all public service vehicles. Two 
licences are required for their operation: 
1 •. Non-Discriminatory Licences - These provide for the 
construction and operation of public service vehicles to be 
controlled strictly in the interests of public safety. 
Each driver has to possess an additional driver's licence 
besides the ordinary driving licence before he can drive 
a bus or coach. 
· A. See Chapter two, Part 2. 
~ Road •r.raffic Act, H.M.s.o. (1930) 
Conductors must also hold a special licence. Both 
men hold licences subject to tests of competence and 
certificates of medical fitness and: good character. 
Before a bus or coach is operated for hire or reward, 
its ovmer must hold a valid p.s.v. licence for it. 
These licences are given in the interests of the consumer 
and are not transferable • 
2. Discriminatory Licences - Apart from the licences 
listed above a vehicle to.be used for a regular advertised 
service requires a road service licence. This authorises 
a service of stage or express carriages or a group of 
excursions or tours. A watertight definition of such 
services is difficult and thus the issuing of such a licence 
depends not on objective factors but on opinions or mis-
conception. Out of this licence has arisen a system of 
protection which characterises the Road Traffic Act. 
The Traffic Commissioners have discretipnary powers to 
grant or refuse a road service licence after hearing representations 
from local authorities and existing operators. They must consider 
•the suitability of the route and the extent to which it is already 
adequately served' and •the extent to which the proposed service is 
necessary or desirable in the public interest' and 'the needs of the 
area as a whole'• The latter is to include •the provision of adequate, 
suitable and efficient services, the elimination of unnecessary services 
and the provision of unremunerative services'. The Commissioners 
must also secure that •fares. are so fixed as to prevent wasteful 
competition with alternative forms of transport' and they must have 
regard to •the co-ordination of all forms of passenger transport 
including transport by rail'. 
These clauses represent a set of conditions deliberately 
weighted against the newcomer. Existing operat.ors have priority over 
the new applican~ and the established operator has a right to protection 
from new competition. 
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In practice, this means that public need is placed a.t the bottom of 
the list. Applications are discussed at •traffic courts' at which 
the Commissioners preside. Attempts are made to prove as fact matters 
of opinion and the objection lodged by existing operators usually stands •. 
Thus, holders of road service licences have obtained almost complete mon-
opolies for their prescribed routes. Effective competition has been 
eliminated and the object appears to be to protect the railways and the 
territorial bus companies from lower-cost competitors. 
of the consumer is not really involved. 
The interest 
When this monopoly had been established.) the companies with the 
largest route mileage, i.e. the National Companies and the Devon General, 
encouraged the small concerns"to sell up. In this way, the big 
companies accepted a fair quota of unremunerative services, in typical 
public spirited martyrdom, as the railways had done before them. 
The principle of 'using the fat to keep the lean' was born. How 
mistaken this policy was is now only too clear. 
In 1948 the newly-formed British Transport Commission purchased 
the Tilling Group and so the capital of the Western and Southern National 
became railway owned. The B.E.T. Group, which had split from the 
Tilling Group, had railway members on its Board but the railways had a 
minority share. However, the advent of Nationalisation meant that the 
railway share in the territorial companies was perpetuated. 
With the passing of the Transport Act of 1962 a Transport 
Holding Company was formed to hold the railways' share ih the omnibus 
companies. The object of these measures was, in some degree, to 
promote co-operation between road and rail services. In actual fact 
this did not happen. Iri many places the services of the Western and 
se.utherii National and the Devon General continued to compete with the 
railway services. However, this·cannot be described as •free' 
competition, as together the railways and the territorial companies 
possessed a virtual monopoly of the services in particular areas, 
especially in South-East Cornwall and in the Southern Coastal Districts 
of Devon~· 
!.:. See Map 17., Pp. !02/!03. 
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Competition between means of ·transp·ort has been described 
by many schools of thought as wasteful. Vlhen competition is limited 
to two persons this is in practice the case. Of the private stage 
service operators the great majority were formed before the 1930 Act 
and possess only small fleets of buses working on small, localised 
routes outside the established network of the Natio~l and Devon 
General Companies. inside this network private operators have found 
it virtually impossible to exist. The lucrative traffic of South 
Devon and around most coastal resorts has remained in the hands of the 
territorial companies. Only in the more remote areas is the private 
operator common, except aro~d CambornefRedruth, Falmouth and Truro, 
where there is open competition with the large firm. The suitability 
of the small, private operator for services in remote areas is undoubted, 
but the fact remains that in the established areas of territorial 
influence there are mahy routes which could be operated more profitably 
by the smaller man, with ~tter service to the customer • 
. One would not argue that the territori~~should not operate 
interurban services on mai:t:l roads serving the villages en route; but 
many of the shorter routes terminate in villages and a local operator 
would be more suitable on such routes as he would be able to run, at 
lower costs, the services which the local population would require. 
Too often on such routes the morning service to the nearest large town 
is too late for a shopping trip. The biggest omission is in the absence 
of late buses from large towns to such villages making visits to 
cinemas and other places of entertainment impossible. 
Under present conditions the private operator in Devon and 
Cornwall has but a minor function. The territorial companies have a 
virtual monopoly over large tracts of countryside and the thriving 
private concerns are located mainly in the geographical~ remote areas. 
The former take the cake; the latter the crumbs. The si tua.tion arises 
because of the peculiar incidence of public demand. In the remote areas, 
such as North of Dartmoor, much of the service to the rural population 
is provided by inter-urban routes. 
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~ihere villages are too far from these routes they are served by the 
private operator for the large companies find these services to be too 
uneconomic. This is in contrast to the situation in many other areas 
of the country where private operators can operate on practically the 
same routes as the territorial companies. County Durham is a good 
example of the densely-populated, industrialised region where there is 
sufficient demand to be absorbed by both the· large companies AND 
private operators.! 'The former cannot possibly cope with the total 
demand. In the South-West the only parallel would appear to be 
in West Cornwall, where there are a number of private stage operators. 
Most of these firms were established before the 1930 Road Traffic 
Act and they operate in an area where· there is a fairly dense population 
and a spread of industry to create demand1 from the CamborneJRedruth 
complex to the St. Austell cl~ area. For the most part, however, 
the private operators are concerned with rural routes; in this they 
perform an important function. 
Thus the monopoly of the large companies has been maintained 
ever since 1930. Small independent operators have frequently failed 
to gain licences, being crushed by the objections of the territorial 
groups. The interests of the consumer have apparently become a 
secondary consideration. A State-owned transport monopoly is seen as 
a desirable objective and a truly competitive framework is seen to be 
contrary to this. 
ii). Unprofitability of Rural Services. 
Throughout the thirties and after .the SecondWorld War, bus 
services over much of the South-West wore the cloak of false prosperity, 
hiding the mistakes which had been made in the 1930 Road Traffic Act. 
The expansion in the industry up to 1939 continued after the end of 
the war. Petrol rationing continued also and cars were scarce. 
Most country people depended on public transport. After the long war 
travel itself was a form of amusement in the days of rationing. 
!.:. See Map 18. , Pp. I03/I04. 
PLATE T \I1EL VE . 
PLYi':OUTH BUS & COACH STATION .Buil t beneath a traffi c viaduct, the 
Bretonside bus s tation in Plymouth i s t he largest i n the South ·'est . 
I n the for eground are t hree Ply lmouth Cor oration Transuor t 
vehicles on local servic es in and around the City .B eyond them 
is a Devon General omnibus awaiting d eparture to Torquay.This view 
was taken in vinter;in summer the _arking area is packed with 
motor coaches. 
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The holiday trade began to revive. Few British holidayed abroad and 
the South-West re.ceived early benefits from tourism. Bus services 
thus became an extremely necessary part of life in the region •. 
Moreover, travel was cheap as bus fares remained at pre-war levels 
until 1950. 
After the 1950 fares increases the problems which beset 
rural buses began to be manifest. The most telling of these was the 
increase in private car ownership, which doubled between 1951 and 1958. 
. A 
The extent of the increase is summarised in the followtng table:--
.. - - ·---- - ·- ---- ·-- . ----- ·-- ·- - _,. 
TABLE 18. 
INCREASE IN PRIVATE CAR OVv'NERSHIP IN THE SOUTH-WEST, 1951-1965. 
I 
Cornwall 
Devon 
TO'l'AL 
~--- -
1951 
27-,053 
56,591 
83,644 
1965 
73,110 
167,840 
240,950 
I 
I 
.._J 
J 
There was an especially rapid increase di:.l,ti;n:·~ the rural areas;: 
the next table shows the differen_ces in numbers of people per car in 
1964 and shows the discrepancy between urban and rural areas ~ 
TABlE 19. 
Licencing Authority People/Car 
Devon c.c. 5-5 
5.1 
7.6 
6.1 
s. West average is 5.3 people/car 
Cornwall C. C. 
P!3111outh C .B.C. 
Exeter C .B.C. 
A.:. Figures supplied by the M.O.T. 
" 
II II II II 
England " is 6. 2 " 11 
Gt. Britain " is 6.4 " Ill 
--I 
r 
I 
I 
----i 
l 
--' 
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Cars also took more customers from the bus companies as 
motorists w·ould give lifts to family ,neighbours and friends. A 
country person waiting at a bus stop would often be picked up by a 
passing friend in a car. 
In many parts of the South-West the indigenous rural population 
has fallen. Vfuere population in rural districts has risen, especially 
along the Channel Coast, a large part of the increase can be accounted 
for by retired and business people who usually have their own transport. 
Local transport as an amusement has declined and rides to entertainments 
have been abandoned in favour of television. The necessity for 
shopping expeditions de.cr.e.ase.d as mobile delivery vans visited even the 
smallest hamlet, although most country wives prefer an occasional trip 
into the nearest l~ge town to shop for the largest commodities. 
During the period 1951-1955 all companies (and in particular the 
large ones) were faced with L~creased costs·and decreased loadings, which 
forced them to increase fares still further; this in turn caused 
further declines in the nambers of passengers. In addition, ordinary 
stag-e:.serv.ices faced increased competition from private· hire and 
excursion vehicles which did not require road service licences. 
Great varieties of coach tours became available for the holiday season. 
According to the Jack Report1; the passenger peak for 
omnibus seryices in this country was reached in 1955 and the mileage 
peak in the foll?wing year. However, it is suggested that the peak 
year for,rural services (i.e. ~Pe South-West) was 1951. Most rural 
services _in, the South-West outs.ide the network of the terri to.rial 
companies are operated by small firms with fleets of 1-24 vehicles,~~ 
passenger journeys by such firms over the whole country reac:hed a peak 
in 1951, four years before all other operators. The next table, 
based on Ministry of Transport "Public Road Passenger Transport 
... . 
Statistics••, was used in the Jac.k Report:-
L_ See Appendix !l I 
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TABIE 20. 
STAGE SERVICES - ALL OPERATORS EXCLUDTiifG LONDON TRAI~SPORT AND 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
~ Passen~r Journe~s (Millions) Vehicle Ivliles 
UE to 2~ vehicles Over 2~ Total UE to 2~ over 2~ 
1948 5,004¥ 
1949 B.,275¥ 
1950 5,446¥ 
1951 338.56 5,164.94 5,503.5 98.65 966.55 
1952 329.84 5,222.78 5,552.6 94.91 981.83 
1953 322.09 5,197.61 5,519.7 91.16 983.30 
1954 302.87 5,279.12 5,581.99 87 •. 67 994.01 
1955 283.65 5,348.11 5,631.76 81.36 1,008.22 
' 
1956 276.00 5,287.36 5,563.36 79.08 1101~.09 
1957 268..48 4,87{3.~3 5,142~41 75.60 951.80 
1958 258.24 4,847.42 5,105 .. 66 75-40 975 • .59 
1959 240.05 4,818.05 5,058.10 72.04 977.46 
(Millions) 
Total 
N/A 
1,0293:: 
1,04-r 
1,065.2 
1,076.74 
1,074-46 
1,081 •. 68 
1,089.58 
11092.17 
1,027.40 
1,_;050.99 
1,049.50 
¥Before 1951 no figures for operators of less than five vehicles are 
available. Figures of operators with more than five have therefore b~ 
scaled up to give approximate totals. 
. . -- ., ... -----· . -- - ------- _,. ____ -- ---,---. 
After 1951 the humber of passengers in the U.K. declined at a 
rate of 3-4% per annum, and there is no reason to suggest that conditions 
differed in the South-West. The gravity of the problem has only been 
realised in recent ye~s due -to the sudden puplicity given by the 
Jack Report! and <:>ther documents to a shocked public. · As with the 
railways, the situation had been disguised by the lucrative inter-urban 
traffic which subsidised the more unremunerative routes. In the 
mid-fifties-the Western ~d Southern National managed to reduce costs 
by increasing the load per vehicle, converting fleets to diesel 
traction, introducing single-manned services and by improving methods 
of cleaning and maintenance. By such measures they attempted to 
obtain the maximum possible savings but it was really too late. 
! Opp. cit. 
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Later a bigger_ pe~c~n·~age of increased costs was passed to 
the public in the form of f~ increases to which consumer resistance 
was growing. Travel by bus became directly comparable to the cost 
of motoring and more persons were encouraged to buy their own transport. 
No research was conducted· into t~ problems of- the industry in rural 
areas. Like- the railwa_y managemen~ omnibus operators held the 
belief that eventually the Government would help, especially in the 
remission of fuel tax. The ind:u.stry beca.Ill:e too self-reliant and too 
little fact-f~ding was attempted. 
The big companies c_ontinued the familiar _policy of cross-
subsidisation using the profits from inter-urban routes to finance the 
.. . . . . ~ . 
strictly rural services. In 1962 it was estimated that £4-5 mil-lion wo.s 
. : . . . .. . 
lost on rural ~cutes throughout t_he co~try,; of this probS;bly ~t 
million was lost in the South-West. Exact figures are not available 
as the bus companies express income and expenses in pence per ·mile taking 
·~ " 
an average for a complete district or a group of routes. This form · 
of accounting is much too rough and ready for a sup~osedly mode~ 
industry. 
A bus service is unremunerative if it is not earning enough 
to cover its average expenditure, excluding overheads. However, if 
the bus is run during 'la_yover r time then wages become an overhead. 
The situation then is marginal for even if the revenue yielded may 
come below t_he average cost, the operator might induce losses on 
other routes if he abandoned an uneconomic feeder route. This 
practice, however, seems to be rare in the South-W"est, especially during 
the holiday season when almost all buses are needed and the amount 
o1· 'la_yover' time is small. Indeed, the point remains that many rural 
services cannot possibly be run profitably by the larger companies, 
even as feeder routes, under present conditions. It would seem that 
they could be handled by-smaller independent operators who have lower 
running costs. The fact that the Western and Southern National 
Companies are unwilling to surrender their rural routes to independents 
h See Chapter three 
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to independents/ 
suggests that many of them are not so great a liability. In fact, 
the Traffic Commissioners have granted exclusive licences on many 
profitable routes on the understanding that the operators shall bear 
some of the essential uneconomic mileage. It should be realised, 
however, that an operator may give up a licence for an uneconomic 
route at any time without any permission or the giving of notice• 
There is no enquiry by the T.U.c.c. as is held for rail closures. 
• 
The point remains that a considerable proportion of omnibus 
routes in the South-West is uneconomic. To preserve their monopoly 
the territorial companies hold on to their uneconomic routes. There 
is great danger that this situation cannot exist in years to come. 
Without obligation the large companies could abandon tracts of rural 
areas without independent operators to cons~ the business. 
Irreparable dama@e could be caused by the time-lag between the abandon-
ment of routes by the territorials and the appointment of independent 
operators. 
jjj), Cqntraction and Its Problems._ 
In present circumstances, contraction of the rural bus 
network seems inevitable, and indeed this process has already begun in 
North Devon and North Cornwall where the population density is 
extremely low and in a state of decline. In the Rural Districts all 
over the region it would appear that the indigenous local population 
is declining, although in some cases this is disguised by the spread 
of urban population into surrounding R.Ds.,-especially in Devon. 
For instance, in the R.Ds. in North and Mid-Devon there was a 1951-61 
decline in population averaging 2.'.%~ Eight out of ten R.Ds. 
in this zone experienced a decline, whereas ·in the South Devon R.Ds. 
there was an increase o1· 9-C% during the same period, especially in 
Plympton and St. Thomas, which gained overspill population from Plymouth 
and Exeter respectively. In Cornwall there was a general decline in 
R.Ds., particularly in West Penwith, Ca.melford, and Truro. 
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The areas of decUning population to some degree coincided with the 
areas of contracting omnibus routes. 
This trend is also .nlus·trated by the map of population 
densities!. In Devon (1951-61) almost ali areas·registered a 
decline in population density, or remained static; this was also tr1~ 
of Cornwall. There were three main areas of concentration which 
were exceptions to the general rule, i.e. Barnstaple/Bideford, the • 
Plymouth area and a belt from Exeter-Torbay. In North Devon the 
density of population is 115/square mile, but in the whole of the County 
of Devon it is 224/square mile. The North has lost far more bus 
routes than the South. Hence there would appear to be a relationship 
between declining population and the contraction of bus routes. We 
are not suggesting that declining population is the only cause of 
contracting routes, but it is a strong contributory factor. On the 
other hand, the absence of bus services is·a factor which causes people 
to leave rural areas. A vicious circle is in operation cauSing demand 
for the country bus to subside. The only answer the bus comp~~ies 
now hav~· is to increase fares, but, as VIe have mentioned, there is 
growing consumer resistance to this. 
Who will be left to create any demand for rural services in 
the more remote areas? The basic activity in the areas of marked 
population decline is agriculture. Most farmers possess their own 
private transport and do not use public transport on comparatively 
rare excursions from home. Also, the agricultural worker lives 
practically on the job and usually does not have to travel far to get 
to work. Besides agriculture, there is no other activity of. any 
size, except in certain localised examples, such as the slate quarries 
at Delabole (Camelford R.D.). North of Dartmoor there is little 
hope of attracting any industry. Immigration from other areas is small. 
In South Devon and along the- South coast the employment 
structure is more diverse. Although agriculture is somewhat more 
prosperous than in the North it is overshadowed by tourism and other 
industries. 
A See N"Ja.p 4. 
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Most of the manufacturing or iight industries are concentrated in 
the South, especially around Plymouth, where the Naval Doc~ard 
employs nearly 20,000 persons. In Mid-Cornwall the main activity 
is the quarrjing of kaolin. Thus, the basic need for public transport 
increases in the South where the population and industry is concen-
trated.. The two most important regional centres, Plymouth and Exeter 
are in this area and great numbers of people from surrounding districts 
commute to these places for work. Some Devenport Dockyard workers 
come from St. Austell. These regional centres also draw people 
for shopping and entertainment. When Plymouth Argyle F.C. are at 
home,supporters come from as far as Penzance. Despite this activity 
the.pr.oportion of people using public transport decreases. In the 
more remote parts of South Devon, away from the main roads, there a_~ 
many unremunerative bus routes which are in danger of closure. 
UndoubtedLy, closure of routes causes inconvenience and a 
measure of hardship to a large section of the community. In North 
Devon and Cornwall the problem is accentuated by that of isolation 
from the rest of the region. Women, young people and the aged are 
vitally affected by the contraction in ihe bus netw·ork, particularly the 
last for whom there is no escape. Even if every family possessed a 
car the need would still exist for public transport and a certain 
network of bus services would have to be maintained. Most services 
would be unremunerative, however, and increasingly unattractive 
to the operators. 
How can a satisfactory pattern be maintained •••• free from 
financial strain? There would appear to be two answers to this 
problem ••• subsidy •••• or the talcing over of most routes in the more 
remote areas by the independent operators, but, as we have seen, the 
large companies would seem to be opposed to the latter as it would 
break their monopoly. They are also opposed to subsidy systems based 
on independent assessments of social transpo~t requirements and on 
competitive tendering between operators to fulfil necessary unremuner-
ative services with the aid of subsidy. 
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They themselves prefer to assess the public need and seek an all-
. wowl.c£ 
round abolition or reduction of ~ ~uel tax, whichAenable them to 
honour obligations in rural areas. Above all, ·they object to any 
subsidy system, as recommended in the Jack Report!, which would 
favour small-scale operators at the expense of the big companies·. 
The Jack Committee recommends:-
"Once the County Council had decided·that a particular 
service was needed, its next step wculd be to publish details of what 
was required, together with an invitation to operators to tender 
for it. ~he successful tenderer would then apply to the Traffic 
Commissioners for a road service licence which presumably would be 
granted unless there were overwhelming reasons against it. 
The financial assistance in this case would be provided in 
a number of ways. One would be an 'Undertaking to make good the 
operator's loss; another would involve a fixed sum paid to the tenderer •• 
The second method would be simpler to operate and would have the addit-
ional advantage that the amount of financial assistance would be 
definite, and not, as in the first case, a.n·uncertain quantity. In 
fixing the contract, regard would doubtless be had to its reasonableness 
in relation to the services to be provided. The Traffic Commissioners 
might be asked to certify that the tender was in fact reasonable." 
If this plan were adopted the Countjes would be responsible 
for the planning and provision of all rural amenities, including 
public transport. The provision of transport in remote areas would 
come within the scope of the County Development Plans. Devonshire4 
in particular,has a strong rural settlement policy involving the 
establishment of 'key villages' into which future development will be 
concan tra ted. Where population is declin~.it is regarded as 
ec~nomic to concentrate the provision of ame?ities such as new housing, 
sewerage, water supplies, etc. into one village, rather than spread 
resources wastefully over a numbe:,r of smaller settlements. 
~ Development Plan (First Review), D.C.C. (1964) 
HAP I9. 
NOTES ON THE MAP 1TRANSroRT AND SETTLEMENT IN DEVON' 
This map has been drawn with regard to the County of Devon's Rural Settle-
ment Policy outiined in the 'Analysis of Survey' of the First Review of the 
County Development Plan (1964). Among the aims of such a policy is to make an 
adequate system of public utilities services in rural areas a practical objective 
The se~vices of groups of villages will be shared where possible and concentrated 
into Key settlements. Developments in rural areas will be concentrated in these 
communities. It is essential that these settlements must retain a public · 
transport service, subsidised if necessary. If nationalisation of 'bus routes 
must proceed then the network should not be permitted to shrink beyond the 
routes shown on the map. These routes could be operated by the territorial 
companies, leaving other routes to private companies where possible. 
Index to Towns 
REGIONAL CENTRES 
1 • Plymouth 3. Exeter 
2. Tor bay 4. Barns taple 
KEY INLAND TOVITNS 
s. Bideford 1 o. Plympton 15. Ottery St. Mary 
6. South Molton 1"1. Kings bridge 16. Honiton 
7. Holsworthy 12. Totnes 17. Axminster 
a. Tavistock 13. Paignton 18. Tiverton 
9. Okehampton 14. Torquay 
OTHER TOWNS 
19. Braun ton 21. Plymstock 
20. Gt. Torrington 22. Cullompton 
SUBURBAN TO"WNS 
23. Ivybridge 24. Crediton 
COASTAL TOWNS 
25. Lynton/Lynmouth 28. Salcombe 31. Teignmouth 
26. Ilfracombe 
27. Northa.nv' 
29. Dartmouth 
30. Brixham 
32. Dawlish 
33. Exmouth 
Westward Ho! 
34. Budleigh 35. Sidmouth 36. Seaton 
Salterton 
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Devon's policy takes into account, among other ~hings, the contraction 
of public transport and includes in its ai~ rto make an adequate 
system of public transport services in rural areas a practical 
objective•, and to maintain a convenient distributio~ of readi~ 
accessible villagp centres, particularly in areas of rural de-population. 
The key settlement distribution would provide a basis for the future 
provision of public transport on the lines described above. 
In accordance with this policy subsidies should not normally 
be offered to routes outside the key settlements. Places off these 
routes should be within access of a key settlement ••• and a bus route. 
Before the buses came to the more remote villages people would often 
walk two or three miies to the nearest railway station or main road: 
where there are infrequent bus services this is still the case. 
However, if there were sufficient demand a small operator would find 
it convenient and remunerative to run a feeder service from a remote 
village to a key route, particularly in association with a garage 
business. Objections to this might be lodged by the big companies, 
but if they were receiving subsidies on certain routes their grounds 
for cbmpl~int '-would be diminished. Besides, they would not gain 
anything by the operation of consistently unremunerative routes where 
a small operator might profitably take them over, especially if they· 
were to be feeder services to the main routes.! 
Thus, we would recommend that the future pattern of bus 
services in the South West should take the following form:-
(a) Municipal Services ••• in Plymouth, Exeter and in 
the.future County Borough of Torbay; 
{b) Inter-urban Services on main roads; 
(c) Subsidised rural services to key settlements. Here we 
would suggest that Cornwall's rural settlement policy 
. . 
should be aligned with that of Devon. 
A. See Map 19. 
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(d) Other services operated where profitable by the 
territorial companies or by p~ivate enterprise. 
Large-scale measureslike these would not be sufficient 
in themselves. lli'lany small economies could also be made. One-man 
buses, run on the 1pa.y-as-you-enter1 principleJhave been a succes~ 
with the Western and Southern National Companies, and this mode of 
operation could·become general on all routes except inter-urban ones. 
In the most remote areas provision might be made for Post Office vans 
to convey passengers. The National buses also convey parcels and 
newspaper~ and more provision could .be made for this type of traffic. 
As with other forms of transport the omnibus companies are 
faced with the problem of the summer··peak in the South-West. However, 
this summer traffic is increasingly handled.by private operators with 
excursion and touring licences rathe~ than ordinary stage services. 
Certain measures would help. On services connecting with railway 
stations heavy luggage is not conveyed. Legislation has been passed 
to allow buses to attach luggage trailers and it is hoped that this 
.measure will soon be adopted. Time:-table matters and public 
relations need streamlining as regular interval services will not be 
possible in future in many areas. All operators should be shown in 
one timetable. 
As long as dema..'ld continues then measures should be taken 
to halt the contraction of rUral bus routes. Modifications of the 
Road Traffic Act are needed to help small operators break the monopoly 
of the territorial companies where it would aid the community. 
Responsibility for the situation must be assumed in full by the Govern-
ment, which should delegate this power to the County COQ'lcils and 
also to the Traffic Commissioners. Policy decisions made for transport 
in general do not necessarily apply to rural areas, let alone Devon 
and Cornwall. 
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In 1961 fuel tax was increased and this hit the rural operator 
particularly badly, leading to a disastrous increase in costs just 
when inflation was bad. Thus, the public has been subject to a series 
of staggering fare increases to which there has been considerable 
consumer resistance, causing a decrease in loadings. It is difficult 
to see where this trend will end without some form of legislative 
action to maintain a basic network of services offering realistic 
fares. Urgent action is needed from the Government or lar@e tracts 
of countryside will be left without any public transport. 
i v). The Need for Bus Services. 
From the discussion so far, it becomes obvious that there 
is still a sizeable need for bus services in the more remote parts 
o.f the peninsula. Mr. D. St. John Thomas! sumrnarises this need under 
three counts:-
1. to provide all rural amenities up to town standards; 
2. to preserve a healthy balance of population between 
rural and urban places; 
3. to enable a full life to be led by those living in 
the country without their own transport. 
Above all, transport is essential if a reasonable standard 
is to be maintained. V!ithout transport :fJhe old become isolated and 
the young drift awa;y. De-population cont:L"rJ.ues and the character of 
rural life collaP.Ses. ~~intenance of country life is essential in 
the South-West as the attraction of the countrjside is of benefit to 
the tourist industry in relieving the congested coastal areas. This 
does not mea"l that the population level should be waintained by 
immigration because when the 'adve~tious 1 population exceeds a 
certain proportion the rural community loses its character, e.g. as 
has happened in the dormitory rural districts near Plymouth ••• Plympton, 
Plymstock, Torpoint and Saltash. 
The Rural Transport Problem- D. St. J. Thomas (Routledge 
& Paul, 1963) 
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De-population in many parts of Devon and Cornwall has been disguised 
by an adventitious swell, especially on urban and coastal fringes. 
Most of the immigrants are business and retired people who do not 
use public transport and who enjoy the amenities provided by the 
countryside at less than economic cost. A network of public 
transport, hewever, is still required for the primary, indigenous 
population. The present generation in the country cannot be abandoned. 
It is a fallacy .to suppose that every rural dweller can have his own 
personal means of transport. 
The pattern of services suggested in the above section, 
with the degree of subsidy, would go some w~ towards the solution 
of rural bus problems. The old pattern of country bus services 
which has descen~ed f;rom, the. horse-drawn carrier's cart·, cannot be 
perpetuated •. It is in no-one's interests that this pattern 
should be maintained in full by subsidy. In the South-West there is 
a substantia~ network of inter-urban services connecting the small 
market towns and skilled management could adapt them to all sorts of 
local requirements involving the key settlements. Rural transport 
is not dead: a drastic re-appraisal of its form is needed in 
accordance with demand, for despite car ownership,works and school 
buses are still required and country buses and coaches .remain popular 
for all forms o.i' community activities. 
Technical illegalities imposed on such services by the Road 
~raffic Act must be removed. With more freedom allowed to independent 
operators and a measure of subsidy on key routes a more casual pattern 
of services might play a useful part in rural life and give an accept-
able living to operators. The advantage of the private car is that 
it is completely flexible to demand. Bus services cannot match this 
but they should. be as flexible as possible. Off bus routes,· the 
traditional willingness of Westcountry people to help each other out 
would solve most problems. 
PLATE THIRTEEl • 
~ INI-BUS AT FO VEY. A mini- bus operated by Messrs . G. & E. A. 
Bartlett waits to depart f rom the yard o f Fowey station for 
Loswi thiel. When the Loswi thiel- Fowey rail service was 
discontinued at t he end of I 9 64 , The Western National Omnibus 
Company began a substitute bus service . Ev en \ri t h a subsidy f r om 
Briti sh Rail , this service was unremunerative , an d so, i n the 
Spring of I 967 ,the West er National agreed to tra sfer the 
r oute to the mini - bus company . 
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In short, a planned rationalisation of country routes would not be 
the disaster that maxcy- people forecast·; provided that legislation 
enables some form of subsidy on key routes and .free competition 
outside the basic network. 
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CF.APrER SEVEN 
OTHER ROAD PROBlEMS. 
i..) Long-Distance Haulage •1 • 
With the rationalisation of rail and bus services, a 
great deal of attention has been focussed on the adequacy of the 
alternative means of transport by road. The very factor whichhas 
killed so many rural rail and bus -routes, viz. the private car, 
continues to increase in numbers, while at the same time the road 
building programme proceeds at a snail's pace. Growth of car ownership 
is an inevitable process; ~ local authorities, however, alle@e 
that withdrawals of rail and bus services are one of the most important 
causes of this increase, and that former passengers are being r forced' 
onto the roads. In isolated instances this may be true!, but the 
main cause of the rise in car ownership is simply the universal desire 
to possess one's own personal transport. If the road syste~ was 
adequate, then the problem caused by this basic de~and-would be 
minima~; however, traffic continues to worsen each year. 
There are many general statements and ideas promulgated 
as to how to ease traffic congestion. Private motorists, sickened 
by the urban disorder and summer traffic jams (seasonally very important), 
seek out all manner of scapegoats. One of the most persecuted of 
these is long-distance lorry traffic, which is said to choke the main 
arterial roads, causing traffic congestion and accidents. Wbat is the 
role of long-distance haula@e il). the South-West? 
In Devon and Cornwall, there are few really large industrial 
entities, and most of the freight traffic which is generated in the 
region is in small units, which are more suitable for road th~ rail 
transport. As we have seen in Chapter three, there are few regular 
flows of bulk freight traffic. Because of this, a large proportion of 
the freight traffic in the South-West is conveyed by road. 
~ See Chapter six. 
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Most of the traffic, for shops and factories, is conveyed 
by rc • licenced vehicles. There are nevertheless a large number of' 
private road haulage firms. The largest fleet of privately-owned 
haulage vehicles in the regi9n is owned by English China Clays 
(Lovering and Pechin) Ltd. who convey most of the internal china cla.Y 
traffic leaving the peninsula, in addition to other forms of haulage 
work. E .c .c. also have interests in several other haulage firms. 
Of the pure haulage concerns, British Road Services are the largest 
group in the region, with haulage depots at Exeter and St. Austell and 
parcels depots at Plymouth and Perranporth. ·of private firms, the 
largest single unit is Drake Carriers of Plymouth, with 120 vehicles. 
There are a great number of small haulage firms!, some of which are 
descendants of the old country carriers. 
Drake Carriers (see above)' w~ the first private firm to 
move towards co-operation between road.and rail transport. In 1964, 
a modern depot and warehouse was opened on an eleven-acre site at 
B 
Crabtree, on the eastern boundary of Plymouth.- From this depot, 
eighteen vehicles now provide a long-distance service to London, 
Birming~~m and Manchester, and twenty-seven vehicles are used for 
daily distribution services in Devon and Cornwall. Con tracts have 
been established with several national food and household goods firms, 
and the warehouses distribute several hundred tons of such articles 
per week, which arrive in bulk. A most significant factor is that 
the depot is rail-served, by a siding from the nearby marshalling 
yards at Tavistock Junction. The site at Crabtree will be suitable 
for expansion· in the near future and it is probable that a small 
industrial estate will.develop there in conuunction with the transport 
facilities. 
Co-operation of this type is-essential in the future if 
freight mov~ment by road is .not to be choked by traffic congestion. 
!.:_ See Appendix ~I • B. P late I4. 
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In the 1950s a great deal of raUt traffic was transferred t?· road 
haulage, partly because of railway inefficiency and partly because the 
rail freight charge increases became prohibitive. :Por instance , 
in 1950 91% of the- market garden produce from West Cornwall travelled 
by rail, but in 1964 72% went by road.! Road haulage expanded at a 
tremendous rate during this period. Those private motorists who 
criticise road haulage argue that the expansion is being accentuated 
by the closure of rail branch lines to goods traffic. In fact, as we 
have seen~, the policy of the railways is to discard traffic which is 
unsuitable for rail haulage and could be handled more efficiently by 
road. It is a mistake to say that ALL long-distance road traffic 
should be transferred to rail, because a vastproportion of it is not 
suitable for rail haulage. 
However, on the other hand, there are considerable amounts 
of traffic on the roads which are sui table for rail haulage. In 1960, 
in preparation for the Beaching Report£, the railways collected 
detailed information~ about th,e volume and nature of freight traffic 
entering and leaving the South-West. The surveys were divided into 
two groups •••• general. freight traffic ar~ coal-class! •••• and were part 
of a. nationwide investigation of freight. From the information, the 
amount of general trafi'ic sui table to rail but not on rail was calcul-
ated. It was esti~ated about 40,000 tons of such traffic converged 
each week on the Exeter area from the East. Of this, about 25,000 tons 
was destined for Devon and the remainder for Cornwall~ Out-going traffic 
was much less and amounted to about 20,000 tons per week •••• evenly spread 
between the two counties. 
!:. B.R. Statistics-
B. In Chapter four. 
f.!_ Opp. cit. 
Q.:. Unpublished Survey material collected by Rail Traffic lVf.anagement 
E. Coal and all heavy mineral traffic. 
!.:.. Exact figures not available •. 
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A separate survey was made of coal and it was estimated that over 
2o,ooa~¥~ached the region every week, mainly by sea. 
I~:l:uch of this road traffic paralleled rail routes, and was 
deemed to be eminently sui table for rail haulage. Suitability in this 
respect was determined by l~d, regularity of flow, distance travelled 
and terminal requirements. Traffic was divided further into 
possible consignment sizes passing under the most favourable rail 
conditions. Some was found to be suitable for Liner Train traffic, 
especially to South Devon and the Plymouth area. 
A great proportion of road freight is conveyed by 'C' licence 
o~ners and co-operation from these firms is essential if rail-road liason 
is to be established on a large scale. Distribution and collection of 
the bulk of incoming foods must be organised into large rail depots 
ser-17ed locally by road vehicles and owned by either the railways or a 
road haulage firm. Road haulage would retain a considerable amount 
of its present importance but for its proper role, that of local 
collection and distribution. The whole process of freight movement 
should be regarded strictly as a service to the consumer and efficiency 
should be the principal target. 
Coal traffic entering the South-West comes mainly by sea 
from North-East Engl~~d and South Wales. Qu~te a considerable amount 
con:es by road from the Midlands, but this is being absorbed by the 
railw·ays, transporting the coal in bulk from the collieries to concan-· 
tration depots. Bulk commodities of this nature are. more suited to 
rail transport than road on a long-distance haul. This principle 
is applicable, also, to much of the freight traffic ~nerated in the 
South-West. Most of the china cl~ and stone traffic could be 
transferred to rail. 
While there is conflict between private motorists and road 
haulage, there cannot be an efficient service to the consumer and the 
situation can only worsen. 
~ See Chapter five. 
PLATE FOURTEEN. 
RAIL ~ROAD INTEGRATI ON . The Bass,Mitchell & Butler ' s Brewery Grou~ ' s 
distribution depot a t Crabtree ,near Plymouth ' s east~rn boundary. 
All produce is brought by rail from the !1:idlands , then distrubuted 
throughout the South- West by road . 'l'h e private rail siding cam be 
seen in the background.This siding also serves the depot of 
Drake Carriers Limited , one of the largest road haulage firms in 
t he region. 
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An overhaul and rationalisation of the road haulage system is vital, 
in conjunction with the railways' freight mode!1lisation plans in the 
South-West. Road haulage still has a yital.part to play but i~ 
should withdraw substantially from the lpng-dis~ance sphere, where 
it would be much more economic to transpori; materials in bulk by rail. 
The private motorist's view of road haulage cluttering up 
the· main roads is selfish and distorted. On the contrary, a more 
correct view w9uld be that the-congestion caused by private motorists 
. is detracting from the value ·and efficiency of long-distance road haulage. 
As the traffic problem increase.s, so the efficiency of the road haulage 
network decreases in proportion. Yet, in this worsening situation, 
there is no. apparent drift from road to rail haulage , Ll'l. spite of the 
fact that most industrial firms have reasonabie access to the latter. 
The principle cause of this anomaly is the difference in road and 
rail freight rates, which oversr...a.dows the improvements ;in railway 
"I 
efficiency in the freight field. In the near future it is hoped 
that the South-West will have regular Liner Train services! to the 
main industrial areas, but there is scepticism about their success,as 
local businessmen may continue to use the cheaper long-distance lorry. 
Around 80,000 tons of material~ per week moving in and out of the 
region are suitable for rail haulage.but are.conveyed by other means. 
If this continues into the seventies, then the modernised rail system 
will be wasted as the cost to the community of road congestion 
grows larger. 
There would appear to be two main answers to this problem: 
the fixing of more competitive freight charges by the railways, or 
Government legislation to persuade business men to use rail transport 
for long hauls. llifany of the loads in transit would appear to be 
too small as units for rail transport, but concentration of goods from 
each area i.rito a rail freight depot soon creates a train load. 
~ The first depot will be at.Plymouth and services should start in 
the winter of 1967-8. · 
B. From B.R •. figm:re~,1960. 
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At the time of writing, there is much talk of road-rail co-ordination, 
to be imposed by government legislation.. Although the problems of 
freight movement would appear to be minimal compared to those in the 
large industrial areas, the problem is nevertheless a most pressing 
matter. The roots of the matter are not solely economic; the 
geographical configuration of the region exerts·a strong influence. 
Here one must again emphasise that the South-West is a peninsula and 
the main traffic flows are along the 'spine' in an East-West orientation. 
Because the flows are channelled onto the two main trunk roads to and 
from the region, there is no spread of congestion, no alternative 
route. This is not only due to the restrictions caused by th~longate 
peninsula; walled by the sea, but also to the fact that there are only 
two routes suitable for long-distance lorries ~~d both the A30 and the 
A38 are barely suitable for this role. The hilly nature of the land 
is itself most unsatisfactory for road development.! 
In this situation, some form of plann~ng and co-operation is 
vital in order to keep f~ght on the move, also to ensure that the road 
haulage industry is not strangled. The aim of the tr~sport industry 
as a whole should not be merely to achieve profitability (albeit 
a worthy intention) but also to provide the best and most efficient 
service to the customers. 
ii). Adeauacy of the Road Ne~work. 
With mo~ and more vehicles coming onto the roads each year, 
there is an increasing burd@n on the strained road network. Devon 
and Cornwall have one of the densest road networks in the country, 
yet the sta."ldard of these roads for modern traffic condi tiona is 
extremely poor. After the Second.World War, only the City of Plymouth 
built new roads on a large enough scale to absorb the flow of modern 
traffic, 2 •but even .now road usage in the City Centre at rush hours ·, 
is as great as any main street in Central London. 
~ See Chapter one. 
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The road system in the city has become out-dated by the phenomenal 
increase in traffic and an urgent re-appraisal of land-use and traffic 
problems has recently been necessar~· Over the rest of Devon and 
Cornwall, progress has been slow, and schemes undertaken have usually 
consisted of modifications to existing roads. Little money has been 
available for large scale works, either from oounty funas or from the 
Ministry of Transport, who administer the trunk roads!: As a result 
few lengths of dual~carriageway have been constructed. 
Main traffic flows in the South-West were concentrated 
on the A30 London-Penzance road and the A38 Derby-Bodmin road.~ 
These two routes converge on the Exeter by-pass, which is one of 
the most notorious traffic bottlenecks in the whole country. 
The A38, carrying heavy flows of traffic to South Devon, Plymouth, and 
East Cornwall (via. the Tamar Bridge) has truly earned the n:ick-name 
of "the longest country lane in England". Improvements to both 
routes are badly ~eded, yet schemes are tendered only for separate 
pieces of a few miles in length. The present programmes of 
improvements for the Exeter-Plymouth stretch of the A38 will still leave 
21 miles of this road without dual carriageway by the late seventies. 
The main traffic problem in the region is that congestion, 
although on a tremendous scale, is concentrated into the summer holiday 
season, for three months of the yea:r, and particularly at weekends. 
Government ministers are, therefore,loth to spend money on a road 
system which might be under-uaed for over half the year. Policy is 
directed at providing motorwa.y links between the main centres of 
population &ld industry, and tourism does not apparently count as 
iB 
an industry. Current plans.;;. provide for an extension of the M5 
Birmingham-Bristol motorwa.y to East Brent, near ·Brid,91_water in Somerset. 
The ~0 (supposedly London-South West) motorway will terminate at 
Basingstok.e. Later, it is intended to extend a dual-carriageway 
whue. 
road from East Brent to Exeter,~it is intended to have a by-pass to 
the by-passL 
A~ See Map ?1. lh, to 12/66. 
a. II II II 
PLATE FIFTEE1L 
RIDGEWAY. PLYMPTON. The A. 38 trunk road is knovm as ' the longest 
country lane in England 1 . Between Exeter and Plymouth,this 
reputa tion is deserved, for there are many bottl enec:-s. The 
Ridgeway is the main street of the town of Pl ymp ton, n ow a 
subur b of Plymouth . This vie·.-J shows through traffic pi citi n g its 
Vlay pas t par!.-ed vehic l es on the twenty- foot carriag e,way . Attempts 
have be en ma d e to div ert through traffi c via t he s pine road o f a 
nev1 h ousing esat e to the north of t he town . This diversion is so 
0-conside~bl e , however, that t h e to wn ce1tre is now regard ed a s a 
shor t cuttA new by-pa ss has been a p proved by the E inistry of Trans-
port , bu t will not be started until 1969 . 
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The A.38 between Exeter and Plymouth will eventually be dual-
carriageway in the seventies, but a similar road t.hrough CornVfall may 
not exist until the eighties, far too late. rn·December, 1965, 
the Committee of Si~ gave an assurance that it was possible to build 
a 1spine r road from East Brent to Penzance by 1975. Undoubtedly, 
this would be an extremely expensive venture; it was estimated 
that £50 million~1ould be required for the East Brent-Exeter stretch 
alone , for vrhich no line has ;y-et been determined. The Committee 
stated that they would be opposed to the introduction of tolls, but 
this would seem to be a hasty decision in view of the likely costs. 
The urgency of the need to improve the main routes to the 
South-West is undoubtedly very pressing. At the moment£, the increase 
in road improvements is far outstripped by the proportionateincrease 
in cars. Ideally, the solution would be tc extend· the M5 to Plymouth 
and the M3 to Exeter for a start. The A.38, in particular, must be 
replaced. Not on~ is it the main access to Plymouth and the popular 
South Devon resorts, but it is also an important link to Cornwall via. 
the 1'a.mar Bridge • These basic improvements are essential for the 
survival of the tourist industry. Traffic congestion is bad publicity 
for the region, and not only the tourist industry is in danger. The 
g~vernment has declared its intention to attract new industry to the 
South West by the designation of Development Districts;Q_ in West 
Cornwall and North Devon. Without an adequate road system, there is 
little hope of realising such plans to the full. Meanwhile,: as talks 
continue, the number of private cars continues to increase and also the 
amount of traffic congestion,which. itself costs a great deal of money. 
It was estimated tl1at the basic improvements outlined above would save 
the community £3,000 miliion a year by 197~, by the prevention of 
traffic congestion. 
!:. The Councils. of Devon, Cornwall, Somerset, Dorset, Plytnouth & Exeter. 
B. At the above Conference 
c. In 1967 
&, Areas where Board ·of 'l'rade ·assistance will be given to new industries 
~ Road Research Lab. figures. 
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In the cities and towns, local authorities face the 
universal problem of traffic versus the environment. In Plymouth 
and Exeter at leastjperimeter parking will be necessary and parking 
fees may have to be increased to discourage private motorists from 
taking their cars into the City Centres. Parking fees are a useful 
source of revenue for road funds; it is an unfortunate fact that the 
protesting motorist will have to contribute still more in the future 
to the cost of the facilities he uses. In Plymouth, it will probably 
be impossible to accommodate the demand for road space in the City 
Centre3 • and i€50 million will have to be spent on perimeter parkinga)2 • 
for by the year 2010, it is estimated that~ 193,000 vehicles wi~l be 
registered in the City. For other towns, the Council for British 
Archaeology has listed several places in Devon and Cornwall which they 
would like to be traffic-free to preserve their potential as tourist 
attractions~ The preservation of such places is deemed to be essential 
for the attraction of foreign tourists. In 1964, for instance, 
although the South-West handled 20% of the British holidaymakers, 
only 7% of foreign visitors to this country visited the region~: 
For the benefit of tourism and all other basic induatries 
a bigger road building progTamme is essential. Improvements in the 
E. 
near future to the trunk routes would mean a long-term saving-
The financial burden could be borne, at least in part, by tolls, as on 
the "Highway to the Sun" tourist route in Italy.£: 
~ Plymouth Corporation figures. 
B. Based on M.o.T. estimates of·increase in car ownership. 
C • Falmouth, Looe , Penzance , S t • Ives · 
D. B.T.H.A. figures 
E. See above 
~ Runs from Milan - Naples through the Apennines 
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The success of the Tamar Bridge indicates the value of tolls and few 
motorists begrudge the bridge tolls for the evasion of delays and 
congestion. As the costs of the structure have been paid, so the 
totls have been ife:duced. Now, in some instances ,the tolls are lower than 
the old ferry fares.! Whatever method of p~yment is adopted, speed 
is essenti:!l for the future prosperity c£ the region. Already there have 
been instances of ·25-mile traffic queues ,1! and of "too many cars and 
too few visitors''. Two new toll motorways could be constructed by 
the late seventies. Costs would directly and indirectly be repaid 
quick:cy. For the visi t~g motorist, driving on a good, well-landscaped 
motorway would be part of the pleasure of being on holiday. Funds 
would tr2n become available to modernise many of the other notorious 
classified routes which carry a hea~3 burden of tourist and regional 
traffic. Planned development of the roads should proceed side-by-side 
with that of tourism and other industry. 
iii). Sample Studies. 
From what has been stated in the previous section of this 
chapter, it is clear that the principal road problems in the South West 
hinge on the movement of through traffic along' th~ajor trunk roads during 
the holiday season. The trunk roads in the two counties, however, 
account for but a small percentage of the total road mileage. I'9any 
important settlements are not served by the trunk routes, and are quite. 
unlikely to receive the benefit of a.TJ.y large-scale road-building 
programmes for some -time to come. The sample studies which follow are 
attempts to assess the importance of road transport in the three main 
types of settlement in the region; a small coastal resort, an inland 
mar!cet town, and a country village. Each settlement is examined in 
terms of the current transport situation, and of the possible problems 
tha~arise in the future. 
~ Saltash ferry closed in October, 1961. 
~/1964 traffic was queued from Torquay-Exeter by-pass 
August 
(a) LODE: 
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* A Small Coastal Resort. The settlement of Looe 
consists of two entities, East and ¥!est Looe, ivhich straddle the 
estuary of the River Looe at its mouth. Of t:b..e two, East Looe is the 
more important, where is situated the Guildhall, the Fish Quay, and 
most of the shops and places of business. At the northern extremity, 
a fine arched bridge links the twin towns. In its entirety, Looe is 
typical of many s~ll South-Western resorts, an attractive clutter of 
buildings vying one with the other for the limited space at the mouth 
of steep-sided river valley. Its population is small •••• about 4,ooo& 
and the annual rise in population is low. Development on. the valley 
bottom has reached saturation point and -ne\'V ·b"t;tilding proceeds mainly 
on the plateau to the East (Sunrising Estate). In these conditions; 
Looe has a perennial problem of oveTcrowding which attaL~s ni~marish 
proportions in the height of the summer seaso~. 
Looe's main road link is the A387, a branch from the A38 trunk 
road at Polbathic_, six miles to the east, through Looe to Polperro. 
This route carries most of the through traffic from Plymouth and' points 
further East. It app~~hes the town from a northerly direction, along 
the floor of the East Lo?e valley. At Sandp~ace, two miles to the 
North, where the A387 enters the valley, it is joined by the B3254 
from Liskeard. At Looe the road crosses the river bridge, widened in 
1961, and proceeds to Polperro, an extremely popular tourist attraction 
four miles to the West. The only other classified ·road to serve Looe 
is the B3253, a direct cut-off route from the A387 at Widegates, three 
miles to the North-East. The roads in the town itself are extremely 
well-maintained, but suffer from narrowness. 
Demand for public transport has declined markedly in recent 
years, and the present facilities would. appear to be adequate, despite 
the infrequency of the buses. Five routes are operated by the Western 
National Omnibus Company; two to Liskeard, two to Torpoint and one to:; 
P~~outh, via. the Tamar Brid€9. 
* See.Map 22(over). 
A. 1967 estimate. 
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The services to the East do moderate business, but those tc Liskeard 
are under-used and are operated on the P.A.Y.E. ·Principle. The 
most important service in the area, however, is operated by a 
pri~ate company, Messrs. l~arce, who operate a frequent service from 
East Looe to Polperro; Polperro is nt served by the Western National. 
The Fearce bus co~~cts at Looe station with the branch 
line passenger trains. Looe station, at East Looe, is the terminus 
of the 9-~ mile branch line from Liskeard on the Plymouth-Penza.nce 
main line. Passenger services consist of nine trains in each direction 
on week-days, and six each way on Summer Sundays. Freight traffic 
ceased in 1963, when the former goods yard was converted into a car park; 
most freight and parcels traffic will in future be distributed from 
the Friary depot at Plymouth. The passenger service makes good connect-
ions with the main line trains at Liskeard and is reasonably well-
utilised, being worked by one diesel unit. Despite this, British Rail 
proposed to close the line in 1966, but the reque.st was quashed by the 
Minister of Transport because of possible road congestion between 
Liskeard and Looe. Thus, the future of the line seems to be assUred 
for some years to come. It is making a loss, but this is probably 
considerably ~ess than the £19,000 estimated by the railway management 
in their c:losure proposal. 
The fairly healthy state in public transport is not echoed 
by the situation on the roads. Looe is in grave danger of being 
slowly strangled by the motor car. Fore Street, the main thoroughfare 
of East Looe, is the crux of the problem. Although it is the principal 
street of the tow-.a, there is no room for two vehicles to pass each 
other. During the daytime, a no-waiting limit is imposed and a one-
way traffic system is controlled by traffic lights at either end of 
the thoroughfare, manually-operated by a traffic warden stationed at 
the southern end. Most of the main shops are situated in the street, 
which also provides access to the main bathing b.each,and the Fishing Quay. 
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Thus, almost all traffic in the lower part of East Looe has to 
use Fore Street • Considerable congestion is the result, uhich the 
.) one-way system and the waiting restrictions have only partially 
solved. Natnrally, traffic conditions are worst at peak holiday times, 
but the basic problem is a perennial one. Many of the retired people 
who live in the area come to Fore Street by car to shop, especially 
on Saturdays. At such peaks, traffic in the· older parts of both East 
and\\/ist Looe reaches saturation point and the narrow, twisting streets 
become clogged ·VIi th vehicles. 
To view the situation on a Summer Saturday, it would be. 
easy for any expert to confess defeat. However, with good management 
Looe could breathe again. This hope is expressed after an examination 
of the car parking facilities existing at the commencemmt of tha 1967 
summer season. There are fci~.ain car parks, which are as follows: 
(No. oi' car spaces in brackets) 
I. Mill Pool (1 ,_000) 
'. vSea Front (100) 
4. Railw~ Station (90) 
2. Town, East Looe (250~ 
Of these, the Mill Pool and the Railway Station parks are not used 
in winter. Yet, on a peak· day in summer, the Mill Pool park handles 
over 2,000 cars per day; 8-900 cars per day park elsewhere in West 
Looe; and over 200 cars per day use the seafront park in East Looe. 
It would appear, therefore, that a solution to the off-peak problem 
vrould not be difficult to devise. 
The Borough Surveyor Is Depaxibment a:t Looe has shown 
considerable enterprise in attacking the car-parking problem. Since 
1960, the Mill Pool car-park has been enlarged by 250 spaces per 
ro1num to a total capacity of over a thousand. This entailed t~2 
filling of part of the boating lake, a controversial decisimn, but 
one which has been justified by. the success of the giant car park. 
Efforts are being made to increase the number of car parking spaces 
by 50 during 1967. Plans are also afoot to extend the Mill Pool 
car-park to 1,500 capacity, but filling more of the boating lake. 
A.Nurnberered I-4 on Map 2 
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In fact, it would be a simple matter to achieve a future capacity of 
over 2,000 spaces by this method. The total gain in spaces would 
exceed the total capacity of all the other car-parks in Looe. 
If this expansion at Mill Pool could be achieved, then ~he 
solution to congestion in East Looe would be to close the tow.n 
completely to traffic south of the Town car-park. This measure may 
be considered to be drastic, but the situation demands such action. 
A similar approach to the traffic problem in Polperro is being 
considered by the Cornwall County Council at the time of writing. 
Obviously, such schemes are bound· to cause argument and inconvenience 
at the outset, but the long-term environmental benefits must surely 
outweigh the rather selfish claims of individual private motorists. 
The narrow, twisting streets of Looe and resorts like it all over 
the South-West were not built for heavy streams ·of traffic. This 
basic fact should be aclmowledged. .Any compromise in favour of 
the motor car only serves· to aid the destruction of the amenity value 
of such resorts. Quaintness, including a jumble of narrow streets, 
is the primary selling factor of tre small resort. Motorists flock 
to Clovelly and admire its steep cobbled streets leading down to 
the harbour. Freedom from the car is part of Clovelly,~.:s attraction. 
Surely the banishment of the motor car from other similar towns and 
villages would add to their attraction for summer visitors? 
One other suggestion for solving the traffic problem in East 
Looe is that the Quay could be opened to traffic and a one-way system 
could be set up. This, however; has the disadvantage of being a 
temporary measure. In addition, the amenity value of the Fish Quay, 
a magnet for visitors to see the catches of the shark-fishing boats, 
would be destroyed. 1be only ultimate solution must be faced eventually. 
Local car-o\vners and traders in East Looe could be provided 
with some form of permit to enter the restriction zone for unloading 
or garaging purposes. 
-123-
Similarly, the few hotels in the area with garages could provide their 
customers with a permit to enter the zone. However, if the ban on 
traffic was to be imposed strictly throughout the day, then simple electric 
trolleys could be on hand for the transportation of goods. 
: Although Looe has a serious traffic ·problem at the time 
of writing, the town is fortunate for, with a little determination and 
sacrifice, the problem can be solved. To retain the charm and beauty 
of the South-West's small resorts is essential. for the future health 
of the tourist industry. 
(b) TAVISTOCK: An Inland :Market Town. Ta.vistock \s typical 
of the many market towns which are spread throughout the South West 
peninsula.. It straddles the River Ta.vy on the western edge of Dartmoor, 
occupying an ancient ·Site where the river valley widens. The settlement 
dates from .the year 974,. when a great Benedictine Abbey was founded 
there, which became the largest and richest Abbey in the South-West 
during the Middle Ages. Borough status was attained during the 12th 
Century when Ta.vistock became interested in the tL~ trade. In 
1305, it was established a.s one of the Stannary towns in Devon (along 
with Ashburton and Chagford) where all tin won in Devon was to be 
weighed, stamped and put on sale. Tin declined in the 17th century 
along with a considerable local cloth trade, but this was replaced by 
speculation in the copper mining in the Tamar Valley~four miles away. 
The height of this trade was reached in the mid-nineteenth century; 
loA& 
a canal" built from the town to Morwhe llam Qua,y on the ~·amar in 1817. 
This became:disused in the 1890s, when the mines d~cl;i.ned. 
Despite this recent history of decay, Tavistock remains 
to-day an attractive and thriving market town with a population of 
just over six thousand and a large hinterland. The present character 
of this pleasant town owes much to the efforts of the Dukes of Bedford 
in the nineteenth century, when they owned most of the land in and 
around the town •. 
* See Map 23(over). 
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The second Duke remodelled much of the town centre during the 1840s, 
including the erection of the gothic-style Guildhall (1848) and the 
pla.lllling of the fine Plymouth Road. These spacious nineteenth century 
layouts have co~iderable significance to-day, as VTe shall see. 
Tavistock is a market and shopping centre for a large area 
of West Devon. It is also a nodal point for five main roads: the 
A386 from Plymouth, the A390 from Callington, the A384 from Launceston, 
the A386 from Okehampton, and the A384 from Princetown. The principal 
route is the A386 Plymouth road, which carries twice as much traffic 
as any of the other routes. Plymouth, with its population of 247,000, 
is onlY fourteen miles distant, and although Tavistock retains its own 
character and trade, it nevertheless falls into Plymouth's sphere of 
influence. Many people living in Tavistock work in Plymouth. 
Devenport Dockyard is the largest single employer, but there are 
many business and professional people who commute daily by car. There 
is a not inconsiderable flow of business into the city, and many 
Tavistock folk look to Plymouth for entertainment and shopping excursions. 
Long-term planning proposals for the area include a dual-carriageway 
from Plymouth to Tavistock. 
The latter is the only major roadwork envisaged for 
Tavistock. Certain minor improvements and widenings are being under-
taken, but in general the main roads into the town and the streets within 
its boundaries are well-maintained and absorb the flow of modern traffic 
to a high degree. The main exception is at the East end of the town, 
where Juke Street and Brook Street constitute a·troublesome bottleneck. 
Most traffic leaving the town for the Okehampton main road has to 
use this narrow street. Recently, a no-waiting order has been introduced 
for the period 8 a.m - 6 p.m. and this has effective~ reduced the 
measure of congestion. Should the situation worsen in the future, no 
doubt a one-way system could be devised, using Narket Street or Dolvin Road. 
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In a town so well-served by road, it is hardly surprising 
to find that the use of public transport-is declining. Until 1962, 
Tavistock had two railway stations, IDavistock South and Tavistock North. 
The former was closed from 30th Dece.mber, 19621 and ·was the principal 
intermediate station on the former Great Western Railwa~y branch from 
Plymouth to Launceston. Passenger traffic to Launceston was light, 
but it was of steady proportions on the section to Plymouth until the 
early fifties, wheri car-ownership began to increase. South Station, 
opened in June, 1859,- was the original station in_Tavistock and was 
unchallenged until 1890, when the North Station, on the hill overlooking 
the town, was opened. This station was on the main London and South 
Western Railway (later Southern. Railway) line from Plymouth to Waterloo, 
and provided Tavistock with through services to Exeter, London and 
Southern England. North station has a considerable physical disadva:r.rtage 
in that it is situated atop an extremely steep hill, and thus loses 
many potential local travellers to the omnibuses. At the time of 
writing, the railway is under sentence of closure, although no specific 
date has been announced. The train service has been reduced from 
25 weekday services each way in 1964 to 7 services each way in 1967 
(2 on Sundays). All through services beyond Exeter have been withdrawn, 
and the choice of trains is so limited as to make the service 
practically unusable. When the station at ~avistock closes, the nearest 
rail-heads will be at Plymouth, Bere Alston, or_Okehampton. 
In respect of omnibus services, Tavistock is well-served 
by the Western National Company, which has a small bus station and 
garage in P~&nouth Road, adjacent to the town centre. 
The following routes are operated by·the Company: 
Route Number 
82. 
B3/83A 
84/84A 
113 
115 
118 
132 
152 
153 
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Destination 
Liskeard 
Plymouth 
Whitchurch 
Princetown and Yelverton 
Yelverton 
Okehampton 
Plymouth and. Bideford 
Calstock 
Metherell. 
On the surface this would seem to be a dense network of 
routes linking 'l'avistock to the surrounding c01mtryside. No exact 
figures are available, but from personal observation over the last 
few years and from conversations with residents in the area,. it is 
apparent that there is a steady decline in the use of the bus services. 
The busiest routes are those to Plymouth and the Tamar Valley, especially 
the former. Other routes tend to be under-used, the most significant 
example being that from Tavistock to Ol~hampton, which will be augmented 
to replace the train services. This service has been observed on 
several occasions crossing Blackdown with no passen@Brs at all. 
One of the reasons put forward. by British Rail in their closure case 
for the adjacent railway·line was the under-use of the section between 
Tavistock and Okehampton; figures were produced to substantiate 
this. The bus service runs through the same territo~J as the railw~ 
and fulfills a similar function, although making more stops. Despite 
its comparative cheapness to operate (there is no conductor), this 
service ca."l surely never succeed where the rail"l'lays failed. When one 
considers the sparsely populated cmmtryside to the North and. East of 
Tavistock, one speculates on the future prosperity of the bus services. 
' However, most routes are along main roads, are s~cially-necessary and 
may be retained by subsidy, according to Government policy. 
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There is one private bus service, operated from Tavistock 
to Bere Alston, operated by Messrs. A.H. Sleep. The future prosperity 
of this route seems bright, for it will assunie the function of the 
railway when that closes. 
Car-ownership in the area is high and naturally continues 
to increase. Despite this, Tavistock can face this increase with 
consideraply more confidence than the coastal resorts. The main 
reason for this has been mentioned; the planning of the Duke of 
Bedford, which gives the town enough space to absorb its traffic. 
A lar@S proportion of the flow is through traffic. This does not re ach 
uncomfortable proportions in summer, as Tavistock is not an important 
fuourist centre and is well away from the principal holiday trunk routes. 
Most through holiday traffic by-passes Tavistock on its wa.y to 
Cornwall via. the A30. Queues over seven miles are common at Okehampton, 
but unknown in Tavistock. The other main holiday flo':~ travels via. 
Plymouth and the Tamar Bridge, which, when it was opened in 1961, 
captured a considerable amount of through traffic which formerly passed 
through the town en. route to cross the Tamar at Gunnislake Bridge. 
Except on the A386 to Plymouth, for which provision will be made (see 
above) no serious problems are envisaged on the main roads leading 
into Tavistock. 
In the town itself, there is but a minor car-pa.r.king problem. 
Most of the main streets are wide enough to permit on-street parking, 
especially in Plymouth Road, ~1d the two main car-parks~"the Bedford 
and Guildhall Square Parks, are adequate. The Bedford car-park holds 
approximately 250 vehicles and is rarely filled to capacity. 
Obviously, there is bound to be increasing pressure on the present 
.facilities, but there is plenty of room for exp~sion when the occasion 
demands. One possibility that springs tc mind is the site of the 
railv.ra.y station after the closure of the railway has been implemented •. 
!.Car parks shown on Map23:No. I Bedford;No. 2 Guildhall; 
No. 3 Cattle ~~rket. 
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There is evetY hope that in the future Tavistock will 
remain the friendly, pleasant market town it is today. Traffic 
problems do exist, but their solution is possible. For this happy 
situation Tavistockl~s to thank the inspiration of the nineteenth 
century Bedfords in providing spacious streets. In terms of traffic 
generation too, the town is fortunate in that it is the centre for 
a large rural area and thus the majority of traffic is of a 'local 
nature. No flood of vehicles clogs the streets in summer-time, and 
traffic is, therefore, more predictable. 
* (c). HOLBETON: A·Srnall Conntry Village. Holbeton lies 
thirteen miles to the south-east of ¥lymouth and is set in·lush rolling 
countryside at the head of a short, steep-sided tributary valley of 
the River Erme. The village is protected from the prevailing 
south-westerly winds by high ground which almost surrounds the settle-
ment to the north, west and south. To the east is the estuary of 
the River Erme, approached by a lane through the·tributary valley. 
The countryside along the estuary is magnificent; this factor, 
together with the excellence of the land for agriculture, encouraged 
the erection of several large country houses on the western slopes 
of the estuary. From north to south~!_these are Flete, Efford House, 
Pamflete and Mothecombe. These houses ;vith the many substantial 
farms in the area made Holbeton a prosperous and thriving village 
of some importance. In addition to general agricultural employment, 
many of the villagers worked on these estates. 
Today the estates have contracted in importance. Flete 1 
which formerly exerted a tremendous influence on the area, is now no 
more. One wing of the house remains and this has been converted 
into flats. However, the Mildmay family (the First Lord Mild&zy" 
lived in Flete) still own most of the land in and around the village. 
The family now resides at Mothecombe House·, another Mildmay possession, 
and is headed by the Han. Mrs. Helen Mildmay-White, daughter of the 
first Lord Mildmay. 
* See Map 24. 
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(Lord Mildmay's son, the second Lord, was drowned in 1952). Despite 
contraction of tl~ir resources, the family still has considerable 
landowning interests in the parish. 
The main activity in Holbeton is still agriculture. 
A reflection of the changing nature of the countryside is that almost 
as many persons as are employed in agriculture commute to the Plymouth 
area to work. Devenport Dockyard is the largest employer of male 
labour, and most of the female commuters work in shops. As the 
population of the parish is just over 700, it is not difficult to 
assess the importance of transport in the area. 
The road sys·i;em around Holbeton is well-developed from the 
dense network of country lanes which served the many farms in the 
area. Although the roads are narrow and winding, they are well-metalled 
and provide good access to the villa~. The village is two miles 
south of the main A379 Plymouth-Dartmouth road and is connected to it 
by three routes. The main route leaves the main road at Flete 
Western Lodge and enters the village from the west via. the Bull 
and Bear cross-roads. Another narrower and more hilly route travels 
due south from Flete Western Lodge to reach Holbeton via. the tiny 
farming hamlet of Ford. For persons travelling to and from Plymouth 
there is a shorter route from the Bull and Bear cross-roads to the 
main road at Yealm Bridge, li miles west of Flete Western Lodge. 
In addition to these connections with the main road, there is one 
other important route, which travels south~west from the village to 
Battisborough Cross, l"tmiles away, where it diverges,one route going 
to Mothecombe, the other along the coast to Noss 1/fa.yo. 
Despite this rather dense network of routes, Holbeton has 
no through traffic problems, not even in summer. This happy 
situation is due to a-very short co~~cting route along the plateau 
to the west of the villagp from Luson Cross to Vfhitemoor Cross, which 
carries the brunt of the summer traffic bound for the popular Mothecombe 
beach. 
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Thus, despite its size and local import~1ce, Eolbeton remains a most 
charming, quiet place of great character, free from the ravages of 
through traffic which has spoiled other villages in the area, 
notaably Yealmpton and Bruton, on the A379 road. The roads leading 
into the village may be regarded as terminal routes, for almost 
all traffic using them has some business in the village. The only 
.real disadvantage is that all these routes enter the village by 
extremely steep hills. 
Holbeton has one omh.J:"J;.us service, the Western National 
route No. 139 from Plymouth to Iviothecombe. This route leaves the 
A379 at Flete Western Lodge ~1d runs to Mothecombe via. Bull and Bear, 
~l .• 
Luson Cross, Eolbeton and Battisborough Cross.-· Despite the populous 
nature of the aTea it serves, this service is under-utilised and 
does not run at a profit. Usage has declined dramatically over the 
past ten years, mainly due to the increase in car ownership. Other 
changes in fne way of life have alsc been contributed to the decli):le of 
the omnibus service; ~basic shopping needs are supplied by travelling 
shops and mail order representatives; television has obviated the 
necessity to seek entertainment outside the village. In addition, 
there have been a series of crippling fare increases. For example, 
in 1951 the retu_~ Plymouth-Holbeton fare was 2s; in 1967 it is 5/3d--
an increase of 163%· . Short journeys are even more expensive by 
comparison. From Holbeton to 1'/Iothecombe, just 2-~ miles, the return 
fare is 2s. 4d. 
To combat the increasL~g unprofitability of this route, t~~ 
Western National has introduced several economies. The service has 
been reduced to a basic three buses in each direction on weeY~ays only, 
with augmentations during ::.the summer months • In 1951, the se·rvice 
consisted of six buses each way throughout the year (three on Sundays). 
The effect of this has reduced the costj8~eration but it has also rendered 
the service almost unusable in the eyes of the public, and has 
encouraged the spread of car ownership. 
A. Bus-stops shown by green spots on Map 24. 
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All the workers who commute to Plj-mouth travel by car, as the first 
bus to the City does not leave Holbeton until 10.30 a.m. 
The other main economy has been the introduction of one-
man operated vehicles, which has produced favourable results. Despite 
the economies, patronage continues to decline, and the service is 
undoubtedly running at a loss. On fine dBJTS in the summer the service 
is busy, but this fails to support the service for the winter months. 
The possibility of profit is remote. 
Clearly, the service is not used by persons for going to 
work. It follows that most passengers are using the service occasion-
ally for visiting, shopping or for entertainment. Most of the patrons 
are female, plus old age pensioners and very young children. There is . 
a primary school in the village and pupils of the Secondary School at 
Ivybridge are conveyed by special coach. 
In recent years, there has been considerable fear thatthe 
bus service will not be continued. On purely economic grounds, one 
could not condemn the Western National for taking it off. However, 
the fact remains that, despite the economic situation, there is still 
a small, but steady dem~d for the service in the area. The welfare 
of housewives and the aged cannot be overlooked. Without public 
transport, this sec~ion of the community in particular would become 
isolated and frustrated by their environment. Such discontent would 
slowly undermine both family life and the. vitality of the village 
community. The bus service in Holbeton fulfills an extremely import-
ant social function. 
In a thriving settlement like Holbeton, it is necessary that 
some brand of public transport should survive, at least for the present 
generation. There are two M means of makL11g this possible. 
First, the Western National could continue to operate the route, but 
m 
as a branch route from the main road at Flete Western Lodge, Yea\Pton 
or Ermi.'"l.gton • 
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Alternatively, the Western National could give the route up for 
operation by a private individual, possibly with a mini-bus. 
The omnibus problem is Holbeton's only really serious 
road transport mat.ter. Car ownership in the area is extremely 
high (a good estimate would be a car for every 3 persons). Most 
families ovm cars, and practically every member of the community has 
access to a car in an emergency. There is little social enmity. 
A strong community spirit prevails, fostered by the active Mildmay-
White family, and local people seem willing to help fellow villagers 
to combat the inadequacies of the bus service. Those without cars find 
no difficulty in obtaining lifts to work in Plymouth. ~~ families 
own more than one car. Car ownership shows signs of reaching its 
maximum level in less than ten years time, but there is little cause 
for alarm in Holbeton. 
parking accommodation. 
SUMMARY 
There is considerable space for garaging and 
We have examined the road transport problems of three 
different types of settlement, all typical of the South-West. Two 
facts have emerged from this discussion:-
1. that the smaller the size of the settlement, the smaller is its 
traffic problem, provided that through traffic does not intrude. 
2. that the worst affected places in the region are those towns and 
villages which are popular tourist attractions. 
In our discussions, we have attempted to postuate some form 
of solution to the main problems of each place. That we have succeeded 
would seem to indicate some hope for the future despite portents of 
gloom from the Road Research Laboratory and the Buchanan school 
of planners • 
The chief priority in the South-West is the improvernen~ to 
near motorway standard of the two main trunk roads, the A30 and the 
A38, followed by the improvement of all major roads. 
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We have shovm in the three studies above that internal traffic 
problems are soluble, if only by preventative ·measures, as suggested 
for Looe. The present generation tends to sneer at preventative 
measures, but in future they will be accepted :as satisfactory and 
economic solutions to urban traffic problems in the region. 
Resources must be concentrated on the ~ter-urban roads. We have 
indicated that a settlement like Holbeton is unlikely to have a serious 
traffic problem. But what use will a car be to the villager if he 
finds that the A379 road to Plymouth is rendered unusable by traffic 
congestion of the scale now encountered by the·- London area? To 
function efficiently as a region, the-South-West must have a good 
system of inter-urban roads which by-pass the older towns and villages 
en route. 
J\.'IAJN REFERENCES USED TIT CHAPrER SEVEN 
1. Road Transport Year Book - published annually by the Road Haulage 
Association. 
2. A Plan for Plymouth, Lord Abercrombie, City of P~uth, 1943. 
3· M.F. Snell and A. Norman Plymouth and ~istrict Land Use/Transportation 
Survey. (Articles L~) Traffic Engineerin~ and. Control, July/Aug.,l966. 
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CHAPrER EIGHT. 
lila region which is almost surromded by sea, there· i's a herdtage 
of seafaring in the South-West. .ManY of the important. events in the 
ma.ri tim history or this .country have. some connection with the area. 
In Elizabethan times, Plymouth, Dartmouth and :Bidei\1rd were am"ng the 
. . 
important ports of the realm. To the region, sea transport in the 
sense of coastal shipping was ~as important .. as land transp6rt until the 
coming of the railways. Since the establishment of rail.communications 
however, there has been a steady decline in ~he importance of shipping 
. ' 
in the South-West. All around the coast.trade has been lost to rail 
and road transport and now there is little participation in world sea 
transport. Many of the smaller ports around the coasts have gone out 
or existence. ~iy two ports h&ndle substantial traffic, and the 
\ 
future of shipping in the region is now in the balance. In recent years 
however, the;re have been signs of an improvement in certain ports, and ·;. 
the following survey of ports will examine these prospects. Tbe 1965 
tonnages handled at the South-West ports are given in Appendix 4•: {see 
also Map 25) 
Exeter 
In the dqs or sail, coastal traffic was handled at several 
points in East Devon from Seaton to the Exe Estuary. Topsham was once 
or considerable impbrtB.ftCe, having quite a large general trade with 
Holland. Exeter is connected to the estuary by the Exeter Ship Canal, 
the oldest Ship Canal in the country, begun in 1564 at the expense of 
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the Chamber of the City to provide a direct sea link to the City 
against the competition of Exmouth (see below) and Topsham. The 
Canal is still in use and also the wharves at Countess Weir, despite 
the gradual silting of the est~y which killed Topsham as a port. 
Trade at Exeter, however, is mainly coastal, with the import of fuel 
as the main activity. There is no prospect for expansion and it is 
conceivable that Exeter's future as a port is limited. 
Exmou!fu_ 
Though not a large port, Exmouth handles twice the trade·of 
Exeter, due to its position at the mouth of the Exe estuary, and lesse~ 
reliance on the tides. The history of the port goes back to the 
Middle Ages and u.l'ltil recently~ there has always been a ferry across 
the estuary to Starcross. The main incoming cargoes are coal and 
timber, and there is quite a large export of sand and gravel, which 
is dredged from the English Channel. 
Teignmou& 
Here is a story of local success , for Teignmou th 's handling of 
Baltic timber, in which she specialises, is increasing. Coal is also 
an important import. Recently plans have been proposed for the 
extension of the quays and there is a possibility that ball- and 
china-cl~y will be exported from the port. These expansion plans, 
however, have been opposed by the local fishermen, vrh.o are worried 
about their moorings in the Teign Estuary if more ships should use tr~ 
port. The~is also some anxiety from those interested in the welfare 
of the holiday trade, as the estuary is considered to be a notable 
beauty .spot. 
A· B.R. discontinued the ferry service in September, 1966. 
~tmouth and Torbay 
Developments in this area are small, despite the historical 
associations of the Port of Dartmouth 1which rivalled Plymouth in 
Elizabethan times. The Dart Estuary is much too narrow for modern 
shipping and there is little commercial activity. The main import is 
coal, and there is also a small ship repairing industry. On Torbay, 
BrixJ:1.am imports coal and oil, but the main marit:i,me activity is i.."l. 
pleasure yachting. 
Plymouth 
Plymouth has always·been the most important port in the South 
West, but it has not developed as a commercial port. to the full 
potential of its fine natural harbouX. Since the late 18th Century, 
the Royal Navy has been the most important maritime influence on the 
port, and today this is still the case, with the Navy monopolising 
the best deep water berths and quay spaces. Perhaps the most 
signific~t :qon-event in modern times occurred in 1852, when the Great 
Western Railway secured the defeat in the House of Commons ·of a 
proposal by the I,ondon and South Western Railway to build a line to 
Plymouth and to extend the harbour there. After this defeat, the 
L.S.W.R., chose Southampton as its principal port, and the opportunity 
to establish.Plymouth as one of the most important passenger ports in th 
the country was lost. 
Later, the Great Western Railway opened its own docks.at 
Millbay ~"ld an ocean trade was started by tendering to the liners 
which lay at anchqr in. Cawsand Bay. There was a period of intense 
rivalry between the G.W.R. and the L.S.W.R. in Edwardian times which 
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! 
has been described in cp.apter Two. Dock facilities at Plymouth 
quickly became too small for large ships and use of the port today 
is limited; there is a considerable under-utilisation of the port's 
resourses. Compax·ed to the countr.r as a whole, Plymouth is one of 
the nation's smaller ports, but, handling about it million tons a 
year, is of substantial importance to the region. The trade is mainly 
in general coastal trade; foreign trade is mostly short-haul. 
The organisation of the port is highly fragmented, and there are 
several sets of docks. Each dock has one or more set roles. In the 
main, these are complementary to each other, but in some cases they 
cut across the roles of other main port areas. The port is now 
administered by three authorities:-
a. The British Transport Docks and Harbours Board, 
which controls the Mill bay Docks. 
b. Cattewater Wharves, fronting the River Plym. 
c. Victoria Wharves, who also control land along 
the Cattewater, including Sutton Harbour. 
Activity is fatrly evenly distributed in different parts of the 
port; most of the goods han4led are imports.~ Recently there have 
been signs of a revival in the Port's activities, and this expansion 
is expected ·to continue. The only anticipated short-term decrease 
is in coal traffic for the Catfdow.n gasworks. In any case the long 
1\ 
term decrease in coal traffic is inevitable. The nature and the 
! See Chapter 2, Section 3. 
~For details see Appendix·4. 
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precise extent of development, however, is uncertain,for despite 
recent upward trends, the overall capacity of the- port is grossly 
under-used. One reason for this is that facilities for really large 
modern ships are lacking. Also, Plymouth is- a long way from the 
nation's centres of population and industry. 
Trade at Millbay Docks has been increased recently and a t4000 
loss in 1963 was transformed into an £11000 profit in 1964, despite 
the loss of the ocean passenger business in 1963. In 1965 a new 
£50,-QOO transit shed was completed and trade in cattle was started 
between Plymouth and the continent. Trade in timber was increased 
and the possibility was discussed of a car ferry between P~outh 
and the continent. Yet the port facilities at Millbay were still way 
below their working capacity, with a surplus in quay space, craneage 
and labour. 
On the Cattewater, there have been similarly encouraging trends 
but there is also room for improvement. The most important cargo is 
oil, which is imported to the Cattedown ~~arves and distributed through-
out the South West. A considerable quantity of coal is brought for the 
Prince Rock Power Station, which is adjacent to the Cattewater. China 
Clay is the principal export, handled by the Victoria ~Vharves. Thmch 
industrial development is taking place on the waterfront which should 
benefit the shipping industry. At Pomphlett, the cement works is 
being extended to increase its capacity. On tr~ site of the old 
Breakwater Quarry, at Oreston, a new gas-plant is being built, as part 
TABLE 2!. 
CARGO HANDLED BY BRITISH TRANSPORT DOCKS BOARD PORTS·l!965. 
Port. 
Hull 
Grimsby/Immingham 
Swansea 
Grangemouth 
Newport 
Port Talbot 
Cardiff 
Hartlepools· 
Goole 
Barry 
Southampton 
PLYMOUTH(Total Port) 
Garst on 
Ayr 
}1ethil 
Middl e'trough 
King's Lynn 
Fleetvrood 
Barrow 
Penarth Harbour 
Lowestoft 
Burntisland 
Troon 
Sillotli 
Lydney 
TOTAL 
Thousands of Tons. 
9,982 
6,873 
6,546 
4,2I3 
3,922 
3,705 
2,645 
2,245 
2,053 
2,0I5 
1,926 
I,623 
I,484 
973 
873 
629 
607 
342 
300 
280 
220 
2I5 
93 
83 
34 
53,88I 
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of a 3! million plan by the South Western Gas Board to extend its 
supergrid network. This plant will use petroleum distillate and· a 
weekly tanker service will convey the distillate to Cattedown, 
which has been linked by pipeline across the Cat.tewater to the site 
of the gas plant at Oreston. 
Table 21 shows the tonnage handled at the Port of Pl;y-mouth in 
1965 compared to British Transport docks all over the country. The 
following figures (for 1964) show the tonnages handled by the three 
separate Harbour Authorities :-
TABLt: 22 
Tonna&!s Handled by Port of Plymouth 
CATTED~~ \VHARVES 
567,000 tons 
EXPORTS 5,500 tons 
MILLBAY 
159,610 tons 
5,386 tons 
VICTORIA lv.HARVES 
15,000 tons 
195,000 tons 
These figures help to show that Plymouth has a reasonably large 
capacity, and it could be much more important as a port if the port 
facilities were more extensively utilised. Unfortunately, the 
National Ports Council's Plan! for the development of Britain's ports 
excluded P~outh, but this plan only covers a period of 5-10 ye~s 
and other ports might ~~ve to be considered. Thus, Plj~outh 1 s chance 
might come, although one states this with some reservation, bearing 
in mind the present position of the port in relation to the other 
ports in this countr~ If expansion on a large scale were to be 
! Report of· the Commission qf Ingui:r.L.ir!,t.Q. the Ma.jor .. EQL't;§.. .Q.:f_Great Britain 
RochdaleJ,.epor..:t_- H.M.s.o. 1962. 
B See Table 21. 
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contemplated, however, some compromise would have to be achieved with 
the Royal Navy;, who monopolise the bas~ deep-water berths and possess 
miles of quay space. Should the importance of the Royal Dockyard. 
Q,.. 
decline in the future, there would beAconsiderable surplus of port 
facilities. 
One encouraging trend 'is that some shipping_firms are now using 
Plymouth to avoid the overcrowded facilities at London. Pl;Ymouth has 
~" advantage in that it is a day's sailing West of London. However, 
this effect is nullified by the .fact that shippers charge the same 
shipping rate for Plymouth as for London, and the extra cost of land 
transport from Plymouth becomes a disadvantage to the potential user. 
I There is a Browing·movement in the South West for the devetopment of 
Plymouth as the principal port for the South West. The South West 
Export Association encoura@Ss its members to use the port facilities 
at Plymouth. Development of eA~orts is essential if the working of 
the port is to remain economical. At the moment, the ratio of d.mports 
to exports is too high.! I.'f··-t:tte~ _p!lans · an.'ltlined above materialise, 
Plymouth should become quite an important port, with a tonnage similar 
B to that of the South Wales ports.- Owing to its remoteness from 
industrial Britain, it cannot really hope to be of national importance, 
but as a regional port, it could become a boon to the econom;y of the 
South West. 
A See Table 22. 
B N .P .C. figures show averages for Newport 1~ million tons; Cardiff 
1~ million tons ahd Swansea 3! m. tons. 
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Fowey is the most flourishing port in the South-West at the time 
of writing, due to the phenomenal in~rease in china cl~ exports in the 
last fe~v years. The reason for this has not only been an increase in 
the production of china clay in Cornwall but also that British Rail, who 
own the port, have poured vast sums of money into its expansion and 
modernisation. This was necessary for the railways to stay in the 
business of transporting china clay. Before the railway plan to extend 
Fowey, English China Clays (Lovering and Pochin) Limited formula.ted a 
plan to extend their own docks at Par to ta~£ larger vessels. These new 
facilities were planned substantially for road transport to the docks.! 
In addition to the increases in china clay production, the average 
size of the world merchant ship is rising. Thus, in addition to the 
extension and modernisation of 1he jetties, the harbour at Fowey has been 
deepened to take larger ships. Export of clay rose to over 800,000 tons in 
1965, .'and the capacity of the docks is now considered to be over a million 
tons ·per:.annum. A major obstacle at the mouth of the estuary, Ca.rne Rock, 
was removed by blasting in 1964. New facilities have cost over £100,000, 
and the five working jetties have 28 feet of water even at low tide, so that 
ships of up to 20,000 tons can now use Fomey. The efficiency of working 
the dock~as been increased by several hundred per cent, and th~re is a 
bonus scheme in operation for both doclrers and local railwaymen. 
Exports of clay proceed to most European countries, plus the United States, 
Canada and South America. Fowey is now the most important china clay port 
in the world.· 
:!.·-:·,See Chapter 5. 
PLATE SIXTEEN. 
FO WEY DOCKS.A vievr of the wharves in the china cl ay port of 
Fowey, which is t h e busiest port of its typ e in the World. The 
Dock s are ovm ed by Br i tish Rail , and were modernis ed in I 963 . 
Vessels of up to 20,000 tons may be accomodated a nd clay exports 
now total over 800,000 tons per annum. The wharves are served 
directl y by rail lin..J.,;: s to all parts of the Cornish china clay 
fields .In the f oreground ,is the s mall car ferry whic h crosses the 
River Fowey to Bodinni ck on the East bank. 
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Par. 
Par is ~other busy china clay port which 'is owned by E.C.C. 
Limited, the main china clay company. It is adequately served by 
both road and rail, but its capacity is limited owing to the silting 
up of the bay. As a clay port, it has a secondary function to that of 
Fo~ey, and will continue to absorb the increase in the clay production 
sh.ifs 
by the handling of smalle~. In addition to clay, Par handles a large 
amount of other commodities, including coal and timber. The port was 
opened for the export of minerals, but china clay has replaced this 
traffic. 
CharlestoWll 
A shadow of its former self, when it was one of the main rrdneral 
ports in Cornwall, Charlestown is now a very small port handling about 
50,000 tons per BJmum. '!'rade is mainly coastal, with china clay as.r~:he 
main cargo. There are no rail connections. 
Falmouth 
Falmouth, a.t the mouth of the Fal, has the finest natural harbour 
in Cornwall, but it is too remd!te to be an important port in the 
national structure. The econom;y of the port is too dependent on the 
large ship-repairL~g yards, which in recent years have felt the effects 
of a recession in the world shipping industr,y, causing high unemployment 
rates in the town. There is a steady coastal trade in the export of stone, 
and t~~ import of coal and oil. Oil is the only important item of foreign 
trade, amounting to some 65,000 tons per ann~ out of a port total trade 
of 224,000 tons per annum.! It is a far cry from the days when Falmouth wa.s 
the ba.se for the mail 'packet• vessels to America~ 
!· See Appendix 4 
B. From mid C.l8 to mid c.19. 
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The creeks of the Fal Estuary are still dotted with the decaying 
remains_of quays which handled a large trade in. granite and mL~eral 
exports. Truro, at the head of the estuary, still handles coastal 
shipping, mainly bringing coal imports. 
Penzance 
Penzance is the only passenger port in Cornwall, and is the terminal 
for the Scilly Isles. Two motor vessels handle the passengers and mails 
for the islands and there are daily sailings, although there is 
tf..e 
competition fromAB.E.A. helicopter service. Other trade is very general, 
the main items being imports of coal, and horticultural produce from the 
islands. 
Newlyn 
Newlyn exists for the export of stone from the quarries at Fenlee, 
amounting to over 350,000 tons a year. 
Ha,yle 
Rayle is the only survivor on the North coast of several small 
ports which handled the vast exports of minerals in the last century. 
The reason for its existence today is the import of coal and oil from 
the adjacent power station. 
Pads tow 
Pads tow was once a thriving port·, but today· trade is a mere trickle, 
(1,000 tons per annum), caused by a decline in the industries which formeiV 
used the port ••••• metalliferous mines, quarries,. etc.. The Camel Estuary 
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has gradually silted up and it is probable that Padstow will soon 
cease to exist as a port. . 
Bide ford 
Bideford is yet another example of a once-famous port which has 
been declining steadily since Elizabethan times. Activities are 
concentrated at the Town Quay, which is in the tidal estuary of the 
Riv~r Torridge. Recently there have been hopes. of a small revival and 
the Port Authorities have proposed to spend £60,000 on expansion in the 
next five or six years. In 1965, a new crane, costing £9,000, was 
installed at the Town Quay. The Labour Government promised increased 
grants for expanding ports and_also designated the pqrt hinterland as a 
Development Area, ! which induced the port authorities to go ahead with 
expansion plans. Trade, although small (16,000 tons per annum), was 
steady, with imports of sand, gravel, coal, timber and fertiliser. A 
new wharf is being built down-river to cope with i..""lcreased traffic. 
Recently the C.E.G.B. proposed to build a new hydro-e1ectric 
power station on the cliffs at Bucks, near Hartland. ~ The· plant 
necessary for this coald be brought by sea. and it is thought that the.l 
Electricity Board could make soma contribution towards port development. 
As Bideford and its hinterland is so remote from the rest of the South-
West, there would seem to be a case for ex_pa.nsion. In recent years 
there has been a loss (£1,227 in 1965), but this could be transformed 
into a profit quite easily. Bideford Bay is a nucleus of activity in 
!·i.e. eligible for industrial grants from the Board of Trade. 
~~ Using tide power on a completely new system. 
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North Devon. In addition to the Town Quay, other Qlmys are active at 
Northam, Instow (for a power station) and Ilfracombe, and there is a 
~w. 
small ship-repairAat ~ppledore. 
Although the Tawe-Torridge estuary is difficult for shipping, 
there would appear to be a future for coastal shipping here, especiaJ.ly 
with the South Wales industrial area so near. 
CONCLUSION 
The over-all picture in the South-West is one of decline, but this 
should be interpreted as a natural rationalisation rather than a serious 
dearth of coastal shipping. · There would seem to be a future for sea 
tr~~sport, but with trade concentrated into a few ports. Plymouth and Fowey 
would appear to be the growth ~oints on the South coast and Bideford in 
the North. On a regional scale, it is most vital to the economy of the 
South-West that the development of Plymouth should not be allowed to lag. 
Provided that rates are competitive, Plymouth has many commendable 
advantages •••• a good harbour, good ra11 connections, well-situated for 
the Atlantic and Mediterranean trade, and a large, skilled dock labour 
force. If the Naval Docl~ard declines, t~~ development of a 
commercial port would be a distinct advantage. 
lliiAIN R£FKRENCES USED IN CHAFTE.'R EIGHT 
~. "Renort on Pl:vmouth and Devon", A.I.C., March, 1966. 
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The National Ports Council's Interim Plan for Port 
Development (1965) envisages port expansion on a large scale, but it 
does not specify Plymouth or any other port in the South-West west 
of Bristol. At Bristol, the plan included the first stage of a major 
new liner terminal at Portbury, near Portishead. In thisl?5 million 
project, Bristol City Council and the National Ports Council foresee 
an expanded port serving the whole South.-West and most of the Midlands. 
However, the present Government evidently does not favour the 
development of a new major liner terminal and the Portbury project will 
most probably be shelved. Throughout the country thete··~will be a 
substantial growth in port investment in the next few years, principally 
towards the modernisation of existing port fac :i.li ties • The larger ports 
adjacent to the recognised centres of industry will therefore receive 
most benefit. Statistics produced by the National Ports Council-suggest 
that the majority of the country's imports and exports are generated 
close to the ports through which they flow. Thus, it is unlikely that 
any port in the South-West peninsula will be affected by the investment 
programme. 
In the light of cu~~rent policies it would appear that the future 
of sea transport in the South West is somewhat precarious. Most of the 
shipping traffic is of tlw coastwise 'variety and imports far exceed the 
volume of exports. Nevertheless, there remains a strong maritime 
tradition, and it would seem essential for the future prosperity of the 
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far South-West that there should be some measure of Government investment 
on port facilities in the region. As Plymouth has most of the advantages 
we would favour t~~ concentration of investment in that port. 
A first step in the development of the port would be the 
amalgamation of the three existing port authori~ies, thus leading to 
I 
a rationalisation of the present port facilities. Any expansion of the 
trade in the port would th~n be coupled to a programme of industrial 
expansion in the City. A great deal of new industry is needed in the 
Plymouth area. The most valuable type of industry to attract is that 
r 
which produces primarily for the export market, using the port 
facilities at P~outh. 
In addition to the expansion of conventj_onal port facilities, 
a revolution in container handling is forecast, with a marked 
L~tegration of shipping and road and rail transport. The areas which 
will derive most benefit from this boom are the packet ports on the East 
and South coasts. At present container traffic is concentrated on routes 
to France and the Low Countries, but expansion in this field need not 
necessarily be restricted to Northern Europe. Plymouth could be equipped 
to handle container traffic for the Iberian Peninsula:· and the 
Mediterranean. 
With a reasonable amount of local industrial expansion and capital 
investment, the capacity of the Port of Plymouth could be doubled to 
3-3i million tons per annum. In this a healthy prosperous port, 
contributing to the economic life of the region is envisaged, but not a 
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major liner terminal. Plymouth is too far removed from the industrial 
heart of the country for large-scale expansion, and it is unlikely that 
the capacity of the port will ever approach the 8 million tons per annum 
of Bristol. But, while not attaining this size, Plymouth could become 
an important secondary port within the national structure, with a 
similar capacity to places like Cardiff, Hartlepool or Grangemouth. 
Most of the sizeable expansions in new port facilities in Britain 
in recent years have occurred in connection with oil refL11eries. Although 
oil is one of the chief imports of the South-West ports, it is brought in 
a refined or semi-:refined state by small coastal tankers. Local press 
reports have hinted that a new tanker terminal could give an economic 
boost to the Port of Plymouth similar to that which has been experienced 
by Milford Haven. However, there is no possibility of a major oceanic oil 
terminal in Plymouth as the port is_too far removed from the centres of 
population, and also because the berths in the commercial port will not 
accommodate vessels much over ~0,000 tons. In any case, ·the discoveries 
of natural gas in the North Sea probably mean that the construction of 
new coastal oil refineries will cease. Although the demand for oil 
products in the U.K. is likely to continue to rise, this increase can be 
met by the expansion of existing refineries in other regions. 
Investment needs to be concentrated at Plymouth because of its 
strategic geogr-aphic and economic advantages. A prosperous port of 
Plymouth means that many other ports will also benefit from the demand 
for shipping. After Plymouth, there is room for investment in the other 
ports which serve the specialist needs of their hinterlands. Here Fowey 
' 
Par, and Teignmouth spring to mind. Some of the small ports will no doubt 
cease to exist in a few yea:rs time, e.g. Charlestown and Padstovr, but 
PLATE SEVENTEEN. 
SUT'IDN HARBOUR , PLYMOUTH . Sutton Harbour is the oldest part of the 
Port of Plymouth , and was the nucl eus of the original fishing port . 
Today it is the s mallest unit in the fragmentary or ganisation of 
t h e port . This view shows a typical 2, 500 ton coaster discharging 
coal at the coal wharf . Coal is one of the South- West ' s principal 
imports by sea;most of it comes from the Northumberland and 
Durham coal - field .It is likely that the coal wharves at Sutton 
arbour will be cl osed by I 970,for most of the coal discharged there 
is used at the nearby gas- works.A n ew gas plant,using oil as the 
raw material,started pr oduction in the Spring of I 967,and the 
""' old convential gas- wor l..: s will be phased out . 
A 
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this does not mean that the maritin~ tradition in the South-West will 
disappear. Small ports handling only 1,000 tons per annum are 
hopelessly uneconomic nowadays. With such small quantities of traffic 
they can hardly be regarded as contributing to the economy of their 
hinterlands. Coastal shipping has decli.rle.d ·in :recent years and is now 
most·importailt for the carriage of bulk products such as coal and oil, 
or where it fulfills a.specialist role. Over the region as a whole, 
therefore, the future of the ports depends on two factors; the 
prosperity of industry and an expansion in the field of trade with other 
countries. 
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CHAPl'J!;R NINE. 
CONCLUSION 
The main difficulty in compiling a thesis on contemporary transport 
problems is that it soon becomes an historical document. Transport in 
Britain today is in the throes of a revolution to meet the demands of an 
affluent, tecfu<ologically- advanced society. 1~y of the ·products of 
this revolution are of a spectacular nature ••••• the 1C.oncorde', the 
Hovercraft, monorails, the gas-turbine train ••••• and are of great 
national importance for the future. It is difficult ·to say at this 
stage how such projects will affect the transport situation in the South-
West. That is not the function of this thesis.· A technological 
revolution which produces such outstanding achievements is the result of 
a process of gradual evolution which has been taking place for many years 
and is still continuing. It is that process of change which is the 
subject of this thesis. In the previous eight chapters we have described 
the changing transport situation in the South West, and have attempted to 
examine the geographical, social and economic factors behind it. 
'l'he transport change in the South West has its roots in the 
development of the railwar system in the nineteenth century, but the 
problems discussed in this thesis date from the end of the first World 
War, when the internal combustion engine made its. presence felt. From 
that time great changes in the socio-economic situation in the region 
forced the adjustment in the transport structure. 
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Between the wars, road tra!lsport began to make inroads into 
the traditional railw-ay traffics. Since the Second World War the 
increase in private motoring has caused wide-spread decline in 
the use of public transport i road and rail. 
The history of these changes has,_; been examined in some detail 
in Chapters 3 and 6 and need not be discussed here. The future of 
public transport in the South West will depend on the considerations 
of national ~Government policy. The current Labour Government has an 
extremely strong transport policy, and in the 1967/68 Parliamentary 
Session there will be issued a new Tr~~sport Act to supersede the 
Transport Act of 1962. 
The policy which will be expressed in this new Act was laid 
-down in a \Vhite Paper on transport published in July 1966. The 
Author spent the two years study period in Durr~m, but returned to 
Plymouth in the summer of 1966· in orcter to complete this thesis. 
During this particular period several other works have been issued 
which will have a bearing on the future transport situation in the 
South West. In this conclusion we shall attempt to discuss the 
recommendations of these publications. 
Vl.llii'l'E PAPER - TRANSPURT POLICY - JULY 1966 
The White Paper of 1966, 'lvhich is a ·prelude to the forthcoming 
Transport Act made three basic recommendations:-
(1) the modernisation of the transport infra-structure 
and services; 
(2) that transport M~st take account of social as well 
as economic needs; 
PL:ATE EIGHTER'J . 
L.li..IRA LOCOHOTIVE DEPOT , PLYMOUTH . The modern diesel locomotive 
at Laira,Plymouth is the principal lo comotive depot in t he 
South-West .I t was opened in 1962 on a si te adjacent to the old 
steam l oconotive depot which has now been demolished.In t h e fore -
ground are diesel multiple- unit trains , which are also serviced at 
Laira . 
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(3). a key role for public transport)with integration 
of publicly owned road and rail services. 
In terms of the transport situation in the South West this 
White Paper is most important because it suggests for the first 
time that the Government is prepared to subsidise uneconomic 
services which are of gTeat social value to the community. It also 
states that by modernisation and advanced buJness· techniques, the 
. A 
transport authorities will be encouraged to make transport services 
as economic as possible. 
On the railways there will be a definition of the basic 
railway network. The Government will assume responsibility for 
losses on any services retained on social grounds a..11d a.lso the cost 
of the lines. There will be a joint study on a national scale of 
the B.R.B. finances, and the Government will mal~ available capital 
for the modernisation and development of the railways on an 
economic basis, particularly the uses for which the railways are 
best suited.. In the South West this would mean the development of 
bulk freight carrying ser-11ices and the continuing improvement of 
inter-city passenger services. To ensure the smooth passage of 
such measures, discussions will be held with the Trade Unions on 
pay and productivity. 
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In terms of road transport more capital is promised for road 
building, but there is a concentration on the problems of urban 
transport. It is recommended that land use and transportation 
planning should proceed together; there should be a traffic plan 
formulated for every ·town and city, and there will be firm 
Government backing for complete local transport plans. 
Over the South West region as a whole, machinery will be set up for 
the co-ordination of regional transport. Povvers are to be sought to 
enable local authorities and the Government to continue to subsidise 
the cost of bus services in the rural areas. On the freight side a 
National Freight Plan is envisaged with a National Freight 
Organisation, to be responsible for the general merchandise ru1d 
stmdries traffic of· both the B.R.B. and the Transport Holding 
Company. The integration of road a.'1d rail services wUl give door to 
door delivery. Shortly, the first step~a be made to co-ordinate the 
parcel services of British Road Services ~~d t~e Freight Concentration Schemes 
of B.R.B. In addition a survey will be made to review the commercial 
vehicle licencing system, with a view to ironing out its discrepancies. 
The "White Paper does not make any concrete reco!!II!lendations on port 
facilities except tP~t port investment will be expanded over the next 
five years and that there will be an overhaul of the charges structures 
in ports and a review of port administration. 
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'l'HE SOUTH WEST ECCJNOllUC PLANNING COlil'.JC IL - 11.A REG ION WI'.rH A FUTT.TP..E: 
A DRAFT STRATEGY FOR 'l'HE SOUTH WEST" 
This report was published by the South West Economic Planning 
Council in July ,1967, and is a strategy upon which the economic plan 
for 'the South West region will be based. In its recommendations on 
transport it does not make any outstanding points, but endorses the 
proposals which have been made in the White Paper and earlier 
documents. 
Its main deviation from the White Paper is that it recommends 
a substantial increase i~ port investment at Bristol, and favours 
the fu-:l:fi1:::meht of the Portburi scheme, which the Ministry of 
Transport refuses to support. This would possibly mean that the 
smaller ports in the far South West would decline. This proposal, 
however, is unlikely to be entertained by the Government, and it is 
hoped that port expansion in the South West penL'I"lsule: · will be 
concentrated on Plymouth (see Chapter B). The recommendations on 
land transport are headed by a concept of a spine· road from the M.5 
near Bristol via Exeter and Plymouth to Penzance. The report 
recommends that this road should be completed by 1975· It is 
difficult to imagine that funds would be forthcoming for such a 
major scheme, but the idea of a toll motorway could be raised in 
Parliament. 
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In 1~rch,l9671 the lunistry of Transport and the B.R.B. 
' published a map showing British Raililw~s basic network for 
development. In the South West this follows very closely the 
proposals of the BeechL~g ~ap in 1963 (see map 4). The South 
West Report accepts the proposals of this map, but cautiously 
recommends the retention of certain passenger lines until road 
recommendation 
improvements are forthcoming. Its final transportjis for a 
to be 
sub-regional airport for Devon and CornwallAconstructed in the 
near future) either by the expansion of the present airport at 
Exeter)or by the establishment of a completely new air terminal 
between Exeter and Plymouth near the A.38 main road. 
GE..l\'fERAL CONCLUSIONS 
These documents demonstrate_ the .fac·t that the special problems 
of transport in the South West are'· at last. recognised at both 
national and regional level. In addition to its peculiar geographical 
constitution the South West has problems of an:.agang population, 
stagnation of industry and the inbalance of the economy 1which is 
caused by a dependence on the tourist industry. 
Economic policy for the South West seems to recognise now the 
importance of a good road system, especially the concept of the spine 
road. In addition it realises the priority of a modern railway 
system which is thoroughly integrated with the road network. The 
future patteJrJ. of public transport in the region will consist of a 
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rationalised network of services designed to meet the basic needs of 
the comm1mity at the lowest possible cost. If the economy of the 
South West is to be revived, good communications will be essential. 
IvJajor items of investment in the future, therefore, are likely 
to be concentrated on existing main routes, such as the A.38 trunk 
road, the main railway line to Plymouth and the Exeter Airport or its 
replacement in South Devon. Such investment, hov-Tever, will not 
solve the very real problems of the remote rural areas, especially in 
the North of the peninsula:~::· We have constantly made the point that 
the South coast is more prosperous·than the North by vmue of its 
social and geographical conditions and that it has always expanded at 
the expense' of the North. There is a very real danger that this will 
continue to be so. 
This thesis is, in some ways, more than an exercise in economic 
geography, it is also substantially a social commentary on how 
changing economic and technological conditions in an industrial nation 
can alter the pattern of life in its predominantly rural areas. The 
railway age orientated the South West on London; the motor .age has not 
only increased this dependence on London and the other industrial 
regions, but also it has brought increasing personal mobility within 
the region. The subsequent decline in public transport has had far-
reaching effects on the social geography of the more. remote parts of 
the South West. 
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In remote rural areas, rail and bus services are regarded as the 
life blood. Not only are they forms of public passen~r transport, 
but they also perform important social functions in the conveyance of 
maiis, parcels traffic, and newspapers. When these services are 
withdrawn on economic grounds, such deliveries are not necessarily 
discontinued, of course, but frequently, the alternat.iV:e arrangements 
are less reliable and talre longer and are a widespread cause of social 
unrest in the countryside. 
A certain proportion of every rural community is committed to 
pu.blic transport, especially the very young, the elderly, and females. 
The family vehicle is usually required by the head of the house for 
his work. Loss of public transport, therefore, may have a much. more 
s·erious effect, in that it can,and does, cause family m1rest. In the 
North in particular, the lack of public transport may be regarded as 
a major···factor in the continuing decline of population by the 
migration of young people to more attractive areas. This affect·s the 
economy of the region as a whole. In time, no doubt, asvehicle 
ownership increases, a more stable situation will be attained. In 
the meantime, however, a pattern of change is. affecting the rural 
areas of the South West from which the area may never recover. 
Much apprehension has been expressed at the possible effects of 
local rail and bus closures on the tourist industry, but it is unlikely 
to suffer any appreciable harm. As has already been shown, most 
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visitors arrive by car and the most important priority in terms of 
tourism is a spine road. 
The crux of the problem is undoubtedly to be found in the rural 
areas, where the effects are most d.eeply felt. .4. basic network of 
public transport facilities is essential for the life-blood of these 
parts of the peninsula:~·.· Already, a rationalised railway plan has 
been formulated a.."YJ.d has been· widely accepted a.s a blueprint for 
future railway aqtivity. Now that the principle of subsidy has been 
accepted, a similar a..YJ.alysis of the omnibus network is needed, 
possibly in conjunction with the local authorities, as suggested in 
Chapter Six. Subsidy, however, is not the answer as ·it can be 
applied only to certain routes. V.~t is needed is a revision of the 
public service licencing system to terminate the monopoly of the 
territorial companies and to allow the smaller operator&Jwith their 
lower operating costs, to take over the services for which they at.e 
best sui ted. After all, public money should be spent only wht:;re it is 
necessary. If a small company can operate a service profitably, then 
there is no reason why it should not do so. With more freedom of 
competition, the transport system will be more flexible. 
With these hopes for the future, this thesis is ended. Only time 
will show the results of the very significant changes which are taking 
place at the present time. Above all, one hopes that the outcome will 
be that the motor car becomes a true.friend and not the potential 
monster it seems. 
PLATE NTNEI'EEii . 
GUrffi iSLAKE STATION. For merly t h e principal int er n ediate station on 
t he Ber e Alston-Call ington branch line,Gunnislake is t o be retained 
as the terrui nus of a diesel servi c e from Plymouth to the Tamar 
Valley . The physical geography of this ar ea has been th e princi pal 
factor in the decision to retain the servi c e . Bet vreen t he ar.1ar 
Valley area and Plymout h , the railway is the only direct transport 
link . Travel by road i nvolves a long de t our to cross the Rivers 
Tanar and Tavy . The Gunnislal'- e-Callington secti on of t h e line,however , 
carri ed v ery little tra f fi c and was closed on 7 t h . November,I966. 
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~.A IN P,.E:FERE~S USED IN CHAPl'EH NINE. 
1. British Railways.Bo~rd. Ministry .of Transport -
"British B.ailways Net>vork for Development". H.M.S .0. Ma.rch 1967 
2. Ministry of Transport - "Transport Policy"_. H.ll•i.S.O. (Ccimmd 3057) 
Ju+y 1966. 
3. South West Economic Planning Council'; "A Region with a Future -
A Draft Strategy for the South-West". E.M.S.O. July 1967. 
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APPENDIX ONE: TOURIST SURVEY AT IDRQUAY. 
A random sample of holidaymakers in the Torqua.y area wa.s conducted 
on Friday, 9th Septembe.r, 1966; a hot sunny day when visitors thronged · 
the seafront and its adjacent open spaces. All the people interviewed 
were visitors to Devon ~~d Cornwall; day trippers were discounted. The 
results of survey are set out in the tables below and they ~1be 
compared with the general information about tourism in the whole region 
in Chapter 1. 
IviE.II.NS OF ARRIVAL IN THE ~·ORQUAY A..REA : 'l'ABLBS 1 and 2. 
Tables 1 and 2 show how visitors reached·the Torquay area. It is 
noticeable that 28~ arrived by train, a higher fi~1re tran for the 
region as a whole. Several reasons may be advanced for this •. Firstly, 
Torquay 1s busy railway station has extremely good conneqtions to London, 
the Midlands and the North throughout the year. Secondly, Torquay has 
more hotels and guest houses than any other South-West resort and most 
rail travellers seek this type of accommodation.· In addition, Torquay 
.is extre~~ly pepular with elderly persons who are unable to ow.n the~P 
own transport. One third of the rail travellers·interviewed came L~to 
this category. For these reasons, the railway appears to have a 
greater share of holiday traffic than the coach firms. By far the 
greater proportion of visitors, however, trave.lled to the area by car. 
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TABLE 1 - Means of Arrival in the Torguay Area 
ll!iEN Bus Train Car Coach Other 
Under 21 3 6 3 
21-34 1 19 22 1 
35-54 2 18 48 14 
55 & over 3 15 25 12 
-· 
6 55 101 30 
WQ]iJEliJ" 
·under 21 2 3 1 
21-34 1 8 9 2 1 
35-54 1 11 29 13 
55 & over 1 14 9 15 
5 33 50 31 1 
TOT.AIS Bus Train Car Coach Other 
Under 21 2 3 9 4 
21-34 ,. 2 27 31 3 1 
35-54 . 3 29 77 27 
55 & over 4 29 34 27 
TO'l'AL 11 88 151 61 1 
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TABLE 2 - Means of Arrival in Percentages 
Arrive~L~ Eer cent 
Car 151 4&! 
Train 88 2~~ 
Bus 11 :1. 32 
Coach 61 19 
Other 1 :1. 2 
3s2 100 
P~lCE OF ORIGIN- Table 3· 
Visitors were asked what area they came from. Not 
surprisingly, most came from the densely populated areas of London, the 
South-East, the Midlands and the North, all of which have reasonably 
direct communications with the holiday resort. From the three main 
areas shown in the Table, about one-fifth travelled by rail in each ca.se. 
From the So11th and South-East, however, the railways did not convey so 
much traffic because of the difficulty of rail travel from these areas. 
Only one through train per day runs from the South Coast to the South-
West, the ll.ee a.m. Brighton-Plymouth. To reach Torquay and the other 
South Devon resorts, passengers must change at Exeter. The most 
disturbing feature of this Table, however, is that on~ 0.9% of the sample 
were foreign visitors. 
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TABLE 3 - Place of Origin 
Nui:nber Per cent 
London Area 54 
South-East 24 
South 52 
Midlands 60 
North .90 
East Anglia 10 
Wales 11 
Scotland 8 
Abroad 3 
TOTAL 312 
Torquay Station is to be retained in the future rail network 
but as Torquay receives a considerable number of its summer visitors by 
rail, an assessment of the affect of closing the railway station was 
undet.taken. All raH travellers were asked whether they had been to the 
South-West before, also if they would have come to Torquay if the railway 
station ha.d been closed. The South-West appears to be an extremely 
popular holiday area ••••• 229 out of 312 persons interviewed had been 
before, many on several occasions, including an elderly couple who had 
been coming since 19191 Yet nearly 50% of the rail travellers stated 
that they would not have come to Torquay if the station had been closed. 
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One wonders whether these resorts whicn have lost their rail links will 
be adversely affected in future. 
TABLE 4 PROBABIE EFFECT OF CWSING 'I'ORQUAY STATION 
Rail Travellers Interviewed 
If T'orquay Station had been closed: 
Have Been Before 
Have_Not Been Before 
Would Rave CollE 
34 
12 
46 
Would Not 
30 
14 
44 
1Vr8ANS USED BY VISTTORS DURING 'rflE HOLIDAY TABLE 5. 
Questions were also asked to discover how the visitors moved 
around the South~West during their holiday. The buses proved to be the 
most popular means of transport; two-thirds of the people interviewed 
used them. In the local area, the Devon General Omnibus Company 
provides an excellent service in the town and to the adjacent holiday 
settlements. The most popular route is the Number 12, which runs 
between Babbacombe and Brixr~m; in the season open~top Atlantean b1~ses 
are a big ·attraction. Another noticea.ble feature was, that only four 
people used the railway for local travel, despite the good services to 
Teignmouth, Dawlish and Exeter. 
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'l'ABLE 5 :· Th'lli.:Ji]ITS Oli' TRAVEL Ub"ED BY VISITORS DURING HULIDAYS 
Means of TransPort 
Train 
No. of above with 
Runabout 
Bus 
Coach 
Boat 
Car 
Motor Cycle 
Walk (as pastime) 
Total of Answers 
Car Arrivals 
1 
8 
6 
93 
10 
181 
Non-Arrivals 
1 
133 
45 
15 
6 
1 
15 
219 
N.B. Of 312 persons interviev;ed, 132 were car arrivals. Discrepancy 
in th•:s table is due to the fact that many people moved about by more 
than one means. 
BUS USERS 1 SURVEY : FREQ.UENCY OF WCAL TRAVEL DTJRnTG HOLIDAYS : TABLE 6 
About 7fY'/c of the sample claimed to use the buses during their stay. 
Detailed questions were put on this ·asp~ct~to asce~tain the_usage .and 
importance of the local omnibus network. It will be immediately apparent 
that just over ~~lf of the bus-users.travelled by this means on five or 
more days per week. 1\ffa.ny used the bus to reach the sea. front from their 
accommodation inland. Younger people displayed a tendency to walk, but 
the bus service was declared to be essential by most people over the age 
of 35. 
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Tli:BLE 6 - BUS USERS' SURvl:Y : FREQ.UENCY OF LOCAL TH.AVEL Dli"RTI'fG. HOLIDAYS 
~!1Q]R 
MEN -21 21-34 35 ... 54 55 & over TO'l'AL 
5 +-days 
per week 4 11 26 19" 60 
1-4 days 
per w~ek 8 16 14 38 
Less often 2 8 7 17 
Not at all 6 24 32 15 77 
12 43 82 55 192 
WOMEN 
5 +"days 1 1 19 18 39 
per week 
1-4 days per 
week 3 8 12 10 33 
Less often ~ 8 3 14 
Not at all 2 8 15 9 34 
TOTALS 6 20 ~ .4Q. 120 
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APPENDIX TWO: ROP~ HAULAGE - 1965: 
i. HATIONALISED FLEETS. 
British Rail 
British Road Services 
South Western Electricity Board 
South Western Gas Beard. 
1,060 (to Bristol area) 
2. IIAULIERS Uf DEVON. 
~ 
Aggetts Ltd. 
Blatchfords 
Place 
Ok.e :b..a.mpton 
Exeter 
C.Bowden Okehampton 
Bradford 's Sand and Haulage L ~;d • Plympton 
Budleigh Transport Ltd Exeter 
A.Burgoyne and Sons(Transport) 
Ltd. Kings bridge 
Carder ~~d Company 
P. Cobbledick ~1d Co. 
W .J. Estmond Ltd 
G. Eggbeer and Sons Ltd 
R.A. Gibbs of Chudleigh Ltd 
A.J. Gregory and Son 
H.J .1'. Transport Ltd 
W.E. Harvey and Sons Ltd 
!i'. J. Heale Ltd 
W.G. Hine (Plymptnn) Ltd 
Haman's Haulage Ltd 
H. Hopkin and Sons Ltd 
Ki ve 11 and Sons 
Vi .J. Lamey and Son 
L.H. Lockyer 
lil".annings Ltd 
Barn.staple 
Torrington 
Exeter 
Newton Abbot 
Cb1dleigh 
North Tawton 
Kingsteignton 
Plymouth 
Exeter 
Plympton 
Exeter 
Bide ford 
Exeter 
Appledore 
Sidmouth 
Da.wlish 
+From Road Transport Year Book 
Road Haulage Association - 1966 
No. of Vehicles 
16 
10 
20 
25 
33 
10 
11 
11 
10 
26 
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W.Matthews and Son Ivy bridge 
W .F. Miners and Sons Widecombe-in-the Moor 
Mitchells Ltd Bide ford 
S.J. Norman Plymouth 
A .Nott and Sons Tiverton 
Pioneer Haulage Ltd Beer 
Drake Carriers Ltd 
(Formerly P.T.C.) 
Plymouth 
F.J. Reeves and Co, Ltd. Totnes 
W.J. Rich and Sons Crediton 
J. W. Scott and Sons Bampton 
Sellicks Transport Services Ltd Torquay 
W.G. Stoneman Ltd Plymouth 
W.J. Tancock Ltd 
F -Tucker 
G.S. Tully 
W. L. Vallance Ltd 
J.watts and Sons 
C. Weston Ltd 
White and Goodman Ltd 
Whittons Transport Ltd 
Willmotts (Contractors) Ltd 
3. riAULTh'RS lli CORNWALL 
Allen and Lock 
Cornish r.![eat Transport Ltd 
A.J .Deeble Ltd 
G.B. Edwards Ltd 
Falmouth Transport Co, Ltd 
Glover and Uglow Ltd 
Greenaway and Greenaway Ltd 
W. G. Griff:L"'l:· · ·: 
A.R. Haddy and Sons Ltd 
Heavy Transport Co, Ltd 
E. Hooper and Sons (Fraddon) 
H.Rawling and Son 
Richards and Osborne Ltd 
Exeter 
Exeter 
Bridford 
Newton Abbot 
Bra.unton 
Exeter 
Tavistock 
Cullompton 
Devon port 
Liskeard 
Truro 
Lis!k:eard 
Helston 
Falmouth 
Callington 
Bude 
Lisk.eard 
Tideford, near Saltash 
St. Austell . 
St. Columb 
Mawgan, near Newquay 
Fraddon, near St. Co1umb 
9 
17 
120 
9 
14 
75 
11 
35 
14 
E.C.C. 
E .C .C. 
Thomas Rowe ·(carriers) Ltd 
(B .R .S • Fed. ) 
Taylor and Low Bros. Ltd 
E.H. Tipson 
Western Express Haulage 
4. 'l'RADERS nr DEVON. 
Devon Trading Co, Ltd 
Exeter Co-operative and 
Industrial Soc.Ltd 
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Penzance 
st. Austell 
Wade bridge 
St. Austell 
Exeter 
Exeter 
Exmouth Ind. and Co-op. Soc. Ltd. Exmouth 
Farleys Infant Food Ltd Plymouth 
Heavitree Brewery Ltd 
Newton Abbot Co-operative 
Society Ltd 
North Devon_Farmers Ltd 
Baignton Co-operative Society 
Exeter 
I•Te••ton Abbot 
Bide ford 
Ltd P.aignton 
Plymouth Breweries Ltd Plymouth 
Plymouth Co-operative Soc. Ltd Plymouth 
Robinson-Willey Ltd 
Rowe Bros. & Co, Ltd 
Tavistock and District 
Co-operative Socl. Ltd. 
Exeter 
Exeter 
Tavistock 
Tecalemit Limited Plymouth 
Torquay Co-operative Soc. Ltd Torquay 
~~rumps Ltd Barnst~ple 
Whiteways Cider Co, Ltd. 
5 .TF.ADERS IN CORNWALL 
Co-op Retail Services Ltd 
Cornish Mines Supplies Ltd 
English China Clays Ltd 
Penzance & District Ind. 
Whimple 
Saltash 
st. Austell 
St. Austell 
Co-op. Soc. Ltd Penzance 
Primrose.Dairy (Cornwall) Ltd St. Erth 
Suttons (Cornwall) Ltd Penzance 
West Cornwall Co-op. Soc. Ltd Cam borne 
+ + Subsidiary companies Heavy Transport Co. Ltd. 
5 
47 E.C.C. 
75 
56 
14 
122 (inc. sub) 
14 
60 
700 
41 
Western Express Haulage Co. Ltd. 
Glover and Uglow Ltd. 
- I (V -· 
BUS AND COACH OPERATORS IN DEVON AND CORNWALL, 19f.i4 
>pendix Three 
+ 
NAME 
'TP.AN~:i!! HOLDING COli!IPANY 
)uthern Natio~al 
~stern National 
, ~ll.UNICIPAL UNDERTAKINGS 
ceter 
Lymouth 
, B.E .T. 
tvon General 
:-eens lades 
, PRIVATE OPERATuRS IN CORNWALL 
.1\ol. Balaton 
, Bennette 
.ewetts Ltd 
E. o; E .T. Carter 
J. & B. Chapman 
A.R.Olarke 
f'. Cocks 
G. Cornish 
•rnish Riviera Coach Tours Ltd 
J. Deeble & Son 
J. Ede 
Fry 
H. George(Belene Motors) 
G.Gilbert 
'.!.'. Gist 
E.B. Gregory 
hn L. Gregory 
enville Motors Ltd 
J.Eambley 
~! .J .Hammett 
Harding. 
rper & Kellow Ltd 
~.Hawkey & Sons Ltd 
wkeys Tours Ltd 
B:ayne 
fiT .&H .Il.fh tchens 
Hooper 
.Rubber 
Jago & Sons 
1kins (Duchy Tours ) I,td 
T .0. Jennings Ltd 
T .H •. Jones 
}. Kinsman & Son Ltd 
I • Kins I!IP...n 
FLEET NOS. LICENCE 
387 (12ldd ,l48sd )ll8co.S .Exp.E&T •· 
60l(282dd,l80sd)l39co.S.Exp.E&T. 
67(6ldd,6sd) 
264 
291(174dd,69sd)48co. 
8lco. 
2 mini 
2 co. 
8 co. 
4 co. 
4 co. 
2sd.3co. 
7 co. 
1 co. 
3 co. 
5 co. 
4 co. 
6 co. 
2sd.4co. 
lsd.2 co. 
1 co. 
6 co. 
3 mini 
2dd.6sd.6co. 
2 co.l mini 
3 co. 
1 co. 
1 bus .4 co. 
4sd.lOco. 
10 co. 
.2 co. 
1 bus 
1 co. 
4 co. 
2 co. 
4 co. 
7 C0o 
3 co. 
6 co. 
i co. 
S.Exp. 
s. 
S.Exp.E&T 
E&T 
S .Exp.E&T 
Exp. ·E&T 
S.E&!r 
s 
Exp.E&T 
E&T 
s 
E&T.Exp 
Exp. E&'f 
S.Exp.E&T 
s 
S.E&T 
s 
s 
S.Exp.E&T 
s 
E&:T 
Exp.E&T 
S. E&T 
S .Exp.E&T 
Exp. _E&T&: 
Exp. E&T 
s 
Exp. E&T 
Exp.E&T 
Exp. E&T 
s. Exp. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
E&I., 
s 
~rom "Passenger Transport Yearbook", Ian Alla.Tl, 1965. 
PLACE 
Exeter 
Exeter 
Exeter 
Plymouth 
Torquay 
Torquay 
Bude 
St. Columb 
St. Ives 
Mt.Hawke,Truro 
St. Wezm,Bodmin 
st. Austell 
St. Austell 
Peranporth 
Penza.nce 
Liskeard 
Par· 
Tintagel 
Penryn 
Grampound Rd:~­
Bude 
La.m1ceston 
st. Austell 
Cam borne 
r.ooe 
St. Columb 
St. Agnes 
St. Agnes 
Wade bridge 
Newquay 
Camelford 
Newlyn 
Launceston. 
Nevrquay 
Liskeard 
Penza.."l~e 
Bude 
Cra.ntock,N/Quay 
Bodmin 
Ponsanooth 
: - sd - single -decked s. stage licence dd - double-decked 
Exp- Express licence co.coach E&T 
. - -Excursion & Touring Licence. 
----------
----
Lewis Motors Ltd 
L.F .J. Ley 
Lidgey•s Coaches Ltd 
~ .w. Lock 
~.H.Matthews & W.J.(Osborne 
(Penvor Motors) 
FJ .J. Metcalfe 
3.R. Mitchell & Sons 
} .A. Morse (Roseland Motors) 
P .w. Mtaidy & Son 
~.G. Mu.rgatroyd(E. Cornwall S.M.) 
rhe Newquay Motors Co. Ltd 
(Red and White Coaches) 
~ .w .J •· Nicholls 
11. Olde 
~ .J .B. Oxenham 
?earce' s Motors Ltd 
~.L. Pine 
r .J. Pollard. 
: .J. Pratt 
f .E. Prout 
r .J. Richardson (Flora Motors) 
: .N .··Rickard (Penryn & Falmouth) 
[otor Company 
tiviera Services Ltd 
~.G. Rowe 
! .'I'. Saule 
I .H. Stephens 
;tevens Tours(Blue Coaches ltd) 
'. Stoneman & son 
'.A. Swan 
~aylor 's Garage 
.• T. Tilley 
: .J. Tregunna 
r .A. Tremain 
.• T. Watson & ]?.':£. Ford 
"ebber Bros. 
'.C. Wellington 
r.T. Weston 
"ills Garage Ltd 
,.G. Wills (Primrose Coaches) 
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FLEET NOS. 
3b.5co. 
·3· co~ 
6 co. 
3 co. 
3 co. 
1 co. 
5 co. 
5 co. 
4 sd. 3 co. 
1 minicoach 
9 co. 
1 co 
1 co. 
1 co. 
6 sd. r; co. 
-' 
2 co. 
1 b. 5 co. 
3 co. 
1 co. 
3 co. 
2 sd. 6co. 
2 co. 
7 co. 
1 co. 
1 dd. 6 co. 
:a·: co. 
ldd. lsd. 4 
1 co. 
4 co • 
1 co. 
5 co. 
9 co. 
2 co. 
l co. 
3 co. 
10 co. 
3 co. 
co. 
LICENCE 
S.Exp.E&T 
S.E&T 
s 
E&T 
PL..oiCE 
Falmouth 
St. Burya.n 
Tre gony, Truro 
Nrenheniot 
Pendeen.~ r·:_,:.: :-: 
Penzance. 
Cornish Holida;) 
Camp, Treve1las (see Cornish) 
S.Exp.E&T Pe~ranporth 
S.Exp. E&T Veryan, Truro 
S Camborne 
E&T 
Exp. E&T 
S.Exp.E&T 
Exp. E&T 
s 
s 
s 
Exp 
S. Exp. E&T 
S • Exp. E&.--T 
S. Exp.E&T 
S. Exp. E&T 
E&T ··:--..'.: 
Exp. E&T 
S. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
s. 
s. E&T 
S. Exp. E&T 
S .Exp. E&T 
s. 
E:xp. E&T 
S.Exp. E&T 
E&T 
Looe 
Newquay 
Garbis Bay 
Boscastle 
Penza.nce 
Polperro 
Falmouth 
Fraddon, Rayle 
Rezare, I.atm.ctn 
Launceston 
Helston 
Penryn 
ll!ty1or Br. Fal: 
Dobwalls, 
Liskeard. 
Portscatbo 
Redruth 
St. Ives 
Nanpean 
Boscastle 
Falmouth 
Crackington 
Haven. 
PorthoJ.laild, 
Truro 
Ze1ah, Truro 
St. Anne's 
Chapel 
B1island, 
Bodmin;~· 
St. Austell 
Looe 
Bodmin 
Leedstown, Nr. 
F..ayle 
PRIVATE OPERATORS n~ DEVON 
Ange 1 Hote 1 & Garage 
runglo-Continental Tours Ltd 
L.A. Arscott & Son 
lishcroft Motors Ltd 
r .J. Ball 
J..M. & IY,-. Beard 
!:.A. Bearden 
~.w. & E. Bloomfield 
Slue Coaches Ltd. 
V .c. Born 
- I (t:. -
Fu~T NOS. 
6 co. 
1 co. 
9 co. 
3 co. 
2 co. 
3 co. 
2 co. 
3 co. 
17 co. 
12 co. 
'f .H. Braun ton 3 co. 
3rowne Eros • 1 co • 
~. Clatworthy 4 co. 
:ouch & Stoneman Ltd 1 co. 
:curt Garages (Torquay) Ltd 6 co. 
:ream Cars Ltd (included with Wallace Arnold Tours 
f.T.s. Crook 2 co. 
~. Davis l co. 
lawlish Coaches Ltd 5 co. 
',.P. Down 4 co. 
".J. Down 7 co. 
LICENCE 
E&T 
E&T 
S. Exp.E&T 
Exp. E&T& 
s. Exp. 
S. Exp. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
S. Exp. E&:T 
s. Exp. 
Exp. E&T 
S. Exp. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
E&T 
(Devon) Ltd). 
S. Exp. E&T 
E&T 
E&T 
s. Exp. 
E&T 
:mbankmen t Motor Company 30 co. E&T 
xcelsior Coaches Ltd. (included with Wallace Arnold, Torquay) 
· .s .J. Farley 2 co. 
.F. Flatters 1 co. 
.G.F. & P. Galpin 5 co. 
.M. Geddes & Son ldd.3sd.6co. 
.w. Good 5 co. 
oodmans Tours Ltd 
.P. Gourd 
reen & Cream Coaches Ltd 
.H. Hale· 
• & L.R. Hard 
.c. Hatton (Blue Venture) 
~ard 1 s Garages Ltd 
.L. Heard 
• K. Hill 
. Hoare & Sons (The Ivy) 
. H. Hobbs 
.J. Hookway 
. L. Jones (Teign Valley Coaches) 
3 co. 
2 co. 
1 co. 
1 co. 
1 co • 
8 co. 
7 co. 
8 co. 1 mini 
11 co. 
4 co • 
2 co. 
1 sd. 4 co. 
3 co. 
S.Exp.E&T 
Exp. E&T 
s.· Exp. E&T 
S. Exp. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
E&:T 
S. Exp .• E&T 
Exp. E&T 
Exp • 
Exp. E&T 
PL.4.CE 
Honiton 
Torquay 
Chagford 
Chudleigh 
Merton, 
Okehampton. 
Widecombe-in-
the-Moor 
Burlescombe 
S .Mil ton, Nr. 
Kings bridge 
Ilfracombe 
N'orthley, 
Okeha.mpton 
Torrington 
Holbeton 
Tiverton 
Dartmouth 
Torquay 
Torquay 
Goodleigh, 
Barnstaple 
Rockbeare, 
Exeter 
Dawlish 
Mary Tavey 
Ottery St. Mary 
Plymouth 
Chulmleigh 
Chris tow 
Newton Ferre!t's 
Brix..~m 
Beer 
Tavistock 
Bishopsteignton 
Cullompton 
Fille igh, Nr. 
Barnstaple 
S. Brent 
Culmstock 
Torrington 
Hartland 
Std!bbs Cross, 
Langtree 
Ivy bridge 
Uffculme 
:Meeth 
Hennock, 
Newton Abbott 
Cingdom 1 s Tours Ltd 
:.Overings· (Combe MartinO Ltd 
:he Millbrook Steamboat & Trading 
:ompany Ltd 
l.J. & K. Millman 
'.A.Newton 
~ .E • Nightingale 
t .A. Nook (Gayton 1 s Coaches) 
) 1 Donnell & Sons 
)keridge Motor Services Ltd 
l•J • Orchard 
; • Osborne 
; .G. Parnell 
'. Parsons & Sons 
) • & M. Perris 
r .T .Phillips 
. • J. Pincombe 
:.L.W. Potter 
·• Potter & Sons Ltd 
>ridham Bros. 
~.Pugsley (Imperial Coaches) 
[. Pursley (Superway Service) 
:ead' s Garage Ltd 
'.J. & B.J. Redwood 
:imps on 1 s Garage Ltd 
:. Saunders 
'.J. Skinner & Sons 
• H. Sleep 
tevens Garage 
unbeam Garages Ltd ( with Wallace 
ally Hal Coaches Ltd 
erraneau.""<: Garage 
. c. Trathen & Sons 
• Turner & Co. 
.G.Venner 
• Vernon 
allace Arnold Tours (Devon) Ltd 
all r s Garage Ltd 
• P.B. Watson 
- I (J -
FL!!;· :'l' NOS. 
14 co. 
8 co. 
8 sd. 3 co. 
3 co. 
6 co. 
5 co. 
6 co. 
2 co. 
5 co. 
1 co. 
1 co. 
2 co. 
10 co. 
4 co. 
2 co • 
1 co. 
1 co. 
2sd. 4 co. 
7 co. 
1 co. 
1 co. 
1 co. 
5 co. 
5 co. 
5 co. 
3 co • 
4 co. 
10 co. 
Arnold Ltd., Torquay) 
11 co. 
10 co • 1 Mini 
7 co. 
4 co. 
6 co. 
1 co. 
22 co. 
4 co • 
1 co. 
ave;rley iHotor Coach Tours Ltd 
ay & son 
(with Wa.llace Arnold Ltd 
7 co. 
• Wellington & Son (Kingsbridge) 
• T. Wills 
.D. Wooley 
• E. Wright (Bow Belle) 
3 co • 
7 co.l mini 
2 co. 
9 co. 
LICENCE 
S. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
S. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
s. 
s. E&T 
E&T 
Exp. E&T 
S. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
Et-c:T 
S. Exp.E&T 
S. ~&T 
s. 
S. Exp. E&T 
Hemyock 
S. E&T 
·s 
Exp. E&T 
s. Exp. E&T 
E&T 
E&T 
S. E&T 
s. 7"·. '·· ••. 
S. Exp. E&T 
Exp. E&T 
S. Exp. E&T 
E&T 
Exp. E&T 
Torquay) 
E&.-T 
. E&T 
S. Exp.E&T 
s • 
S. E&T 
PLACE 
Tiverton 
Combe Martin 
Millbrook 
Buckfastleigh 
Chu1mle igh · 
Budleigh 
Sa1terton 
Ash burton 
Hartland 
Okeharnpton 
Bra.tton Flemine 
W .wor1ington, 
Crediton 
Paignton 
Holsworthy 
Ha1will 
N·. Tawton 
Tiverton· 
Callacombe, 
Barnstaple 
Haytor 
Lamerton, 
Tavistock 
Yeo Vale, 
Barnstap1e 
Paignton 
Honiton 
Woo1acombe e'G 
Mortehoe. 
Vlink1eigh 
Millbrook 
Bere Alston 
Mod bury 
E. Allington, 
nr ~ K:in·gs bridge 
S. Molton 
Dousland·-
Chulmleigh 
Withe ridge, 
Tiverton 
North.1eigh, 
Colyton 
Paignton 
Dartmouth 
Torquay 
Crediton 
Kings bridge 
A theri1i.gton 
Haccombe • .N.A. 
Bow. 
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CARGO TONNAGE HANDLED BY SOUTH WEST PORTS. 
a).Foreign Traffic,l965. Thousand Tons. 
Imports Exports Total 
Dry Dry Dry 
cargo Petroleum Cargo Pet. Cargo Pet. 
Exmouth I8 II 29 
Exeter 9 I IO 
Teignmouth 7 267 274 
Dartmouth 2I 2I 
Plymouth 226 I7 228 454 I7 
Fowey 605 605 
Par II I 670 68I I 
Charlestown I I 2 
Truro I2 3 I6 
Falmouth 64 I 65 
Penzance 3 2 5 
Newlyn ~ I 
Rayle 6 6 
Padstow 
Bideford 5 II I6 
Source: Returns to the National 
Ports Council. 
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b).Coastwise Traffic,I965. 
Thousand Tons. 
Inwards Outwards Total 
Dry Pet. Dry Pet. Dry Pet. 
cargo cargo cargo 
Exmouth I9 I 20 
Exeter 22 22 
Teigmmouth 60 60 
Dartmouth 5 2 5 2 
Plymouth 3I9 706 I26 445 706 
Fowey I 25 26 
Par !9 39 I86 205 39 
Charlestown I8 32 50 
Truro !2 22 !2 22 
Falmouth 3 I76 48 3 224 
Penzance 49 49 
Newlyn 380 3~0 
Hayle !28 22 2 I3I 22 
Padstow I p I 
Bideford 
cl.Totals (thousands of tons). 
Exmouth 49 Fovrey 63I Penzance 54 
Exeter 32 Par 926 Newlyn 382 
Teignmouth 334 Charlestown 52 Hayle !59 
Dartmouth 28 Truro 50 Pa.dstow I 
Plymouth I,622 Falmouth 292 Bideford I6 
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The above listed constitute the main ref'erences consulted during the 
preparation of this thesis. A large proportion of the material is derived 
from a formidable personal hoard of press cuttings, photographs, magazines, 
timetables, leaflets and reminiscences which have been amassed in recent 
years. It is not proposed to 1ist all these sources as they are, for the 
most part, an extension of' the author's personal experiences. Mention should 
be made, however, of the informative value of the monthly magazines "Modern 
Railways", ":Modern Transport" and the "Railway Magazine". The principal 
newspaper sources were the daily "Western Morning News" and the "Sunday 
Independent" which circulate throughout the region. 
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PLATE TWENTY. 
DRIVER'S EYE VIEW,I9 67.This picture has been added as f ootnote. 
A line of f r ustra ted Sunday drivers attempt tp pass a cattle 
truck at Elburton Cross on the A.379 Plymouth-Dartmouth road. 
The place is unimportant;the situa tion is all too familiar. 
Transport problems in t he Sout h- West cannot be solved without 
n ew roads.A serious crisis canno t be averted in t he mid-seventies 
unles s exp enditure on r oads is i ncr eased dr a stically . 
11 • 
' 12. 
Devonian slates. 
Open moorland (china 
clay). Plateau in 
north, rolling topo-
graphy in south. Fine 
cliffs in north rias 
. . " ' ~n south. ·:: · . 
Well-wooded in south 
valleys. 
I: 
Mixed farming. Dense 
settlement. I 
Local building material-
granite and. slate. 
Cammenellis I 
Granite and ."country" I 
rock. I 
Metalliferous intrusions. 
Open pla~eau_and moor- I 
lands, r~as ~n south. 
Well wooded in south 
valleys. 
Mixed farming. 
Industrial waste. 
Dense settlements 
' centred on Cambourne/ 
Redruth. 
Local building materialsJ 
slate and granites. 1 
Lizard 
! 
Cambrian metamorphic I 
rocks. I 
Open plateau, fine cliffs. 
Little woodland. 
Mixed farming. 
Nucleated settlement. 
Local building materials-
slates and granites. 
1 3 • Lands End 
Granite. 
Open moorland and a few 
s·hel tered valleys. Fine 
cliffs. 
Few woods. 
Sheep farming and some 
market gardening. 
Settlements coastal. 
· Local building rna terial 
granite. 
.. 
/ 
1. East Devon 
Greensand capped hills. 
Keuper Marls. 
Flat-topped hills, 
steep-sided valleys and 
fine cliffs. 
~oodlands not confined 
to valleys, hill 
summits - scrub. 
Some coniferous 
afforestation. 
Fertile valleys 
dairying. 
Valley settlements 
mainly in-villages. 
1 Local building material-; 
some flint, cob and ' 
thatch. 
1A. Woodbu~ and Assoc. 
Commons I 
Budleigh pebble beds. I 
Open downs. 
Some coniferous affore- j 
station, otherwise scrub.· 
Infertile. Little 
settlement. 
2. Exe Basin 
Permian sandstones. 
Rolling topography. 
Little woodland. 
Very fertile - arable 
and dairy farming, 
settlement less scattered 
than elsewhere. 
Local buiiding material 
cob and thatch. 
3. Torbay 
Permian sandstones. 
Rolling topography. 
Key to Geographical Areas Map 
.. --: ''Woodlands limited except 
Dart Valley- deciduous. 
Very fertile (except B~vey 
Local building materials 
granite. 
Basin). · 
Mixed farming. 
SA. Tama~ Valley 
Large coastal settlements. 
Nucleated villages. 
Local building material -
cob and thatch. 
3A. Haldan 
4. 
Gravels. Open hills •. 
Coniferous afforestation 
and scrub. 
Infertile. Little settle-
ment. 
South Hams 
Devonian sandstone, slates 
and limestone. 
6. 
Devonian slates, Igneous 
Culm Measures. 
Steep sided valleys of 
Tamar, Tavy, etc. 
Well-wooded valleys, mixed 
deciduous and coniferous. 
Mainly small village 
settlements. 
Local building materials -
slate. · 
Mid-Devon 
Culm shales and shales. 
Undulating countriside. 
Well-wooded river valleys, I 
extensive coniferous wood-
lands. Moderately fertileJ 
Interspersed with wet moo~: 
land. Mixed farming. 1 
Scattered settlements. 
Local building materials 
cob and thatch. 
Rolling, open topography. 
Fine cliffs in South. 
Limited woodland in· 
valleys - deciduous 
Fertile land - dairying. 
Nucleated settlements. 
Local building material 
slate. 6A. North West Coast 
5. Dartmoor 
Granite and metamorphic 
aureole. 
Open moorland. 
Woodland confined to valle~ 
except recent coniferous 
afforestation. 
Infertile moorland., 
moderately fertile 
periphery, mixed farming. I 7. 
Little settlement, usually 
confined to valleys, tends 
to be scattered. 
Culm· shales and clays. 
Open plateau and fine 
cliffs near Hartland. 
Little woodland. 
Settlement in hamlets 
except Hartland, Clovelly 
and Bude. 
Local building material 
cob and thatch. 
North Devon Coast and 
Exmoor 
Partly National Park. 
,, ..... ~ 
Devonian slates and 
sandstones. . 
Open moorlands and.hills. 
Rounded topography, fine 
cliffs. 
Valley woodlands, beech 
hedges. 
Stock rearing. 
Small settlements confined; 
to. valleys. I 
Local building materials -· 
slate. 
8. North Cornwall - Bodmin 
Moor. 
Partly National Park. 
Granite boss and culm 
measures. 
Open moorlands 
plateaux. 
BOO' and 1000 1 
surfaces. 
Huge cliffs. 
and high 
erosion 
Woodlands only where 
sheltered. 
Stock rearing. 
Scattered settlement. 
Local building materials -
granite and slate. 
East Cornwall 
Devonian and slates, 
shales, grits. 
Rolling topography. 
Valley woodlands. 
Mixed farming. Nucleated 
settlement. 
Local building material -
slate. 
1 0. Mid-Cornwall 
Hensbarrow granite and 
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Notes : The above maJ? was drawn as a comnarison t o l1a.o I ? . In the 
densely- populated industrial County Durham , private bus 
companies operate in direc t com) eti tion with the Northern 
and United groups of territorial compan:Les . There is enough 
traffi c potential for both entities to exist . In addition , 
private comuanies did fall prey to t ake-over bids by the 
territorials in the thirties . Contrast this map to Hap I? , 
\'iliich sho\'ls that most of the private companies in Devon and 
Ebrnwall are s uall c.onc.er.n.o: in remote rural areas . 
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